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“The truth is, most of us discover where we are headed when we arrive” 
 
– Bill Watterson 

FOREWORD 
  
 
There will always be one more article to read, one more word to add, one more 
sentence to change, one more image to consider, and for that reason, a writer’s 
work, my work, is never quite finished.  
 
 
My fascination with studying power began during my master studies. It is 
driven by a keen desire to understand why individuals, inside and outside 
organizations, are so fascinated by the prospect of attaining power and what can 
be done to prevent the misuse of power. At the end of my master studies, I also 
became interested in studying ethical and unethical behavior. This interest is 
driven by a constant curiosity to understand what motivates individuals to 
behave both ethically and unethically and what the consequences of such 
behaviors are. 
The research included in this dissertation allowed me to address both 
power and unethical behavior. Such work, however, would not have been 
possible without the love, help, support, and understanding of some wonderful 
people who, in one way or another, have crossed my path in life1. Starting with 
my supervisors, I would like to first thank Marius van Dijke for his continuous 
commitment and dedication to our research projects. It has been a pleasure to 
have you as my daily supervisor – thank you! I would also like to thank Xue 
(Michelle) Zheng for her helpful guidance and advice provided particularly at 
the beginning of my Ph.D. I gained not only a colleague and co-author, but also 
a friend. Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to David De Cremer for his 
guidance and useful comments offered from a distance as well as for the amazing 
visit to Shanghai in 2013.  
I also wish to warmly thank two of my mentors who over the years have 
become my friends. Jennifer Jordan, I want to thank you for introducing me to 
the fascinating world of research and for inspiring me to pursue a Ph.D. You are 
a unique source of inspiration for me, a role model at work and in life and there 
are no words to express how grateful I am for our friendship and for all your 
support and care. I further wish to thank Ben Kuipers for making Erasmus 
University a warmer place to work at, from the internship offered during my 
master studies, to the paper we wrote together, and the wonderful conversations 
we had across the years. 

1 This list is by no means exhaustive. I therefore wish to thank many others who have crossed my 
path before and during my Ph.D. for being part of my journey and leaving their mark in one way 
or another.           
 
Moving on to my colleagues from within and outside the Business-Society 
Management department: Jasmien, Inga, Hannes, Nick, Salla, Samer, Niek, 
Mirjam, Krijn, Helen, Eva, Gijs, Mark, Mo, Ron, Roxana, Alex, Mihriban, and 
many others, thank you for the coffees, lunches, and cakes that we shared 
together, the lovely chats we had, and the sound advice you gave me when 
needed. I further wish to extend a warm thank you to Janneke and Yolanda for 
always being there to lend a helpful hand. A special thank you goes to Lucas for 
the wonderful department outings, in particular the wadlopen, and for the 
delicious Christmas dinners. I will surely miss being part of the Business-
Society Management group. I am also grateful to ERIM and to the office of Pedel 
for their kind support and help offered along the way – thank you Bea, Natalija, 
Miho, Mariska, Kim, Jules, Tineke, Laura, and many others. In addition, I want 
to extend a kind thank you to Christiaan and Marcel for ensuring that my 
experiments would run smoothly and for making the long hours spent collecting 
data in the lab more enjoyable. I end by thanking all my research participants 
who were brave enough to join my experiments and surveys across the years.  
Naturally, maintaining my sanity during the Ph.D. would not have been 
possible without the support of my fantastic friends from all over the world. 
Having lived abroad for many years now means that I have two homes and all 
the more friends to thank for being there, for understanding and tolerating my 
absence (and presence) at times, and for supporting me along the way. In no 
other order than that of time, I want to thank Ramona (for being my artistic 
anchor and constant source of inspiration), Teo and Liana (for being two of my 
closest and dearest friends no matter the distance), Adriana (for inspiring me to 
be a strong and fearless person), Ioana (for reminding me what it means to 
pursue your dreams with impressive dedication and determination), Willem, 
Jaap, and Keri (for being there for me during my time in Groningen), Aline and 
Kathi (for the many breakfasts that we shared together – they represented the 
beginning of a lovely friendship), Diana (for inspiring me to enjoy the little 
things in life, yet never be afraid to dream big), Dylan (for your kindness, 
generosity, and unconditional help), Lumi (for your continuously radiating and 
contagious positive mood), Anca (for your sweet and caring character, for your 
wise advice when needed, and for always knowing how to put things in 
perspective), Oana (for your beautiful and unmatched friendship, for your 
unconditional care and attention offered across the years, and for always 
reminding me to read more), Amanda (for inspiring me to grow more plants, for 
exploring various parts of the world with me, and for always being there to listen 
– you are the most European American I know and a wonderfully warm person 
to call a friend), Robert (for your kindness, patience, and unparalleled curiosity), 
Tridib (for sharing your vast knowledge about everything that happens in 
Rotterdam), Leo (for offering your unconditional help when I needed it the 
most), Alexandra (for being my yoga partner and Rotterdam enthusiast), 
Lisanne (for the many cat photos and videos that we shared and will share, for 
being an awesome officemate, and for being a brave enough friend to start 
climbing with me), Smriti (for your openness and kindness), and Stephanie (for 
sharing my thirst for craziness – New Year’s dive 2017! – and my passion for art 
and museums). I’m extremely lucky to have you all in my life. The list would not 
be complete without thanking my best friend and my better half – Gertjan – you 
might get the last rows in this paragraph but in my life you get the first and 
most important one. I’m grateful for so many things, but most of all I’m grateful 
that we met. Thank you for making my life richer and for being my number one 
supporter of whatever (crazy) thing I set my mind to do! I also wish to thank 
your family for welcoming me into their lives with open arms – Gerrie, Willem, 
Diederik, Siepke, and Jos, hartelijk bedankt voor alles! Met jullie is het altijd 
gezellig. 
From friends to family, doresc să le mulțumesc din toată inima părinților 
mei, Floare și Gheorghe, frățiorului meu Adrian, mătușii Maria și unchiului 
Radu, și bineînțeles dragilor mei bunici – Rozalia, Ioan, Maria, și Petre – pentru 
toate sacrificiile pe care le-au făcut pentru mine și pentru toată iubirea, 
înțelegerea, și suportul necondiționat oferit de-a lungul anilor. Au fost elemente 
esențiale în a ajunge unde am ajuns azi. Vă sunt etern recunoscătoare pentru 
că mi-ați oferit libertatea de a-mi urma drumul meu în viață, chiar dacă asta a 
însemnat a fi departe de voi. Să știți că vă simt mereu aproape și asta îmi dă 
puterea de a merge înainte. Mulțumesc! 
 
Laura M. Giurge 
January, 2017 
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A general introduction to the dissertation 
 
2                                                                                                  Chapter 1 
 
 
“The only thing that is constant is change” 
– Heraclitus 
 
 
Perhaps there is nowhere else in the world where the weather presents so much 
variability in the course of a day than it does in The Netherlands. One might 
experience rain in the morning, sun in the afternoon, and snow in the evening. 
While this example might come across as rather extreme and unlikely, it 
nevertheless sets the perfect stage for how we should be thinking about 
behavior. Similar to the Dutch weather, behavior is inherently dynamic: it 
varies within individuals and across time: dynamic because one’s behavior 
represents a constant adjustment to the immediate environment in the service 
of attaining desired goals; varies within individuals and across time because a 
particular type of behavior, for instance unethical behavior, is not characteristic 
of a particular group of individuals (i.e., bad apples vs. good soldiers) but rather 
of each individual. Thus, saying that someone is unethical is merely saying that 
someone has the tendency to engage in unethical behavior at some point in time 
and in a specific situation.  
Yet, apart from a few notable exceptions, the norm in organizational 
research has been to study individuals’ aggregate levels of behavior and either 
ignored within-individual variation in behavior or treated it as measurement 
error (Dalal, Bhave, & Fiset, 2014; Matta, Erol-Korkmaz, Johnson, & Bicaksiz, 
2014). Notwithstanding the countless ways in which this between-individual 
conceptualization of behavior has genuinely produced and will continue to 
produce advances in our knowledge, it is an oversimplification of a much more 
complex phenomenon. Interestingly, this realization is as true now as it was a 
few decades ago. In particular, the idea that behavior, within an organizational 
context, is dynamic and varies within individuals can be traced back to the early 
years of organizational research (Ghiselli & Haire, 1960; Hersey, 1932). For 
instance, in 1932, Hersey noticed that there was a relationship between 
fluctuations in mood and fluctuations in daily job performance. This observation 
was derived from data collected four times a day across an entire year from the 
working lives of twelve men. Fast-forward to the present day, there is increasing 
empirical evidence suggesting that within-individual variability in behavior is 
anything but trivial (Dalal et al., 2014; Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006; Matta et al., 
2014). Between-individual research does not permit, nor is it designed to explore 
what factors (e.g., situational factors) account for such within-individual 
variability or how this variability unfolds in time. 
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Part of the research presented in this dissertation aims to tackle the 
phenomenon of variability in relation to specific behaviors such as individual 
decision-making and unethical behavior. The other part aims to address 
potential short-term changes in the underlying cognitive process that is said to 
drive unethical behavior.  
 
Dissertation overview 
The research presented in this dissertation consists of three empirical 
chapters that resulted from extensive and intensive data collection, both in the 
laboratory and in the field. In terms of research methodology, I capitalize upon 
the benefits of both experimental and experience-sampling methodology (ESM). 
Whereas experimental research is preferred for establishing causality, ESM is 
the ideal research methodology for studying within-individual variability. 
Furthermore, because this methodology allows capturing fluctuations in 
individuals’ experiences and behaviors as they occur in the natural (work) 
environment (Alliger & Williams, 1993), it permits capturing data in real time 
and in highly localized contexts. Whereas each chapter deals in various ways 
with the notion of variability, they were developed independently as stand-alone 
research papers in collaboration with the members of my dissertation team. To 
reflect their contribution, I will use “we” rather than “I” when presenting the 
research undertaken in these chapters.  
In Chapter 2, we begin the journey of understanding this variability 
phenomenon by zooming-in on individual decision-making in organizations. In 
particular, we explore how a fundamental aspect of the organizational structure 
(i.e., structural power) facilitates daily decision-making that is flexibly attuned 
to the velocity of the situation. We define this concept as time-appropriate 
decision-making and build our theoretical argument by combining work from 
organization theory, namely the Carnegie School, with work from social 
psychology, namely the situated focus theory of power. In line with such work, 
we suggest that structural power facilitates time-appropriate decision-making 
such that organizational members with high structural power act fast in 
situations where fast action would be effective (i.e., high velocity situations) and 
slow in situations where slow action would be effective (i.e., low velocity 
situations). We also suggest that subjectively experienced power (i.e., 
experienced capacity to influence and control others; Anderson, John, & Keltner, 
2012) mediates this effect. In order to test our predictions, we first conducted 
two ESM studies among organizational members who described decisions they 
made each day across 10 consecutive working days. We also conducted a 
laboratory experiment in which undergraduate business students were 
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presented with predefined and pre-tested decisions embedded in either high or 
low velocity situations. 
In Chapter 3, we continue our journey to understand within-individual 
variability present in another type of behavior, namely unethical behavior in 
organizations. In line with many before us, we label this as counterproductive 
work behavior (CWB; Dunlop & Lee, 2004; Spector & Fox, 2005). Encapsulating 
a variety of discretionary selfish behaviors, such as being rude to colleagues at 
work or stealing from the organization (Salgado, 2002; Taylor, Hastings, Sturm, 
& Weigelt, 2013), CWB presents great variability within individuals. 
Furthermore, organizational members’ tendency to engage in such behaviors 
costs organizations as much as 200 billion dollars in the US alone (Bennett & 
Robinson, 2000) and further affects the well-being of their members. Scholars 
have begun to unveil what factors might account for intra-individual 
fluctuations in CWB (cf. Judge et al., 2006; Matta et al., 2014), but not what 
factors might facilitate such behaviors to unfold across time. In light of this, in 
this chapter we take within-individual variability a step forward and suggest 
that the display of CWB resembles addictive behaviors. In particular, we 
propose that enactment of CWB one day promotes enactment of CWB the 
following day. In building our theoretical framework, we return to the basics of 
what behavioral self-regulation is as outlined in control theory (Carver & 
Scheier, 1982; Powers, 1973), namely a continuous and controlled process 
through which individuals move towards their desired goals. Combining 
insights from this meta-theory of self-regulation with insights from the resource 
model of self-control (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), we 
suggest that CWB is addictive particularly among employees whose daily sleep 
quality is impaired. We further argue that this CWB X Sleep Quality interaction 
effect is restricted to employees who are low (rather than high) in moral identity. 
To test our predictions, we conducted an ESM study among organizational 
members across 10 consecutive working days.  
In Chapter 4, related to Chapter 3, we take a temporal perspective to 
understand whether a core cognitive process underlying unethical behavior – 
moral reasoning – is liable to short-term variability. In particular, we examine 
whether a short-term influence, such as the subjective experience of power, 
impacts moral reasoning, a long-term developmental cognitive process 
underlying the decision of what would be a morally right or wrong action to 
pursue (Kohlberg, 1969). Interestingly, prior to the 1950s, the role of the mind 
in understanding organizational behavior was rather minimal. Among others, 
the cognitive revolution movement that began around the 1950s brought to the 
fore the realization that individuals’ behavior is liable to cognitive constrains. 
To that end, of particular interest in this chapter was the notion of motivated 
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cognition i.e., the tendency to process information in line with what we know 
and wish to be true (Kunda, 1990). Combining insights from motivated cognition 
with those from the social psychological power literature, we suggest that the 
experience of high power (as opposed to low power or a control condition) lowers 
one’s level of cognitive moral development. We further suggest that this 
negative effect of the experience of high power is particularly present when 
individuals frame it as a notion of opportunity (as opposed to a notion of 
responsibility or a neutral control condition). To test our predictions, we 
conducted four laboratory studies among undergraduate business students and 
used different experimental methods to capture the experience of power. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I wrap up this journey with an overview of the main 
findings that emerged from the three empirical chapters. I further highlight the 
main theoretical and practical implications of this research. I end with a few 
lines about potentially fruitful areas for future research. 
 
Declaration of contributions 
There are four authors who contributed to the three empirical chapters 
presented in this dissertation. Laura M. Giurge was the main coordinator of all 
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understanding the results, and reviewing the writing. Xue (Michelle) Zheng was 
also closely involved in designing the studies, in particular the experimental 
ones, understanding the results, and reviewing the writing. David De Cremer 
was distantly involved in reviewing the writing. Noteworthy, for Chapter 2 and 
3, Laura M. Giurge was solely responsible for analyzing the data, with 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Many classic and contemporary approaches to management view decision-
making as a core aspect of the managerial role (Drucker, 1967; Gavetti, 
Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007; March & Simon, 1993; Mintzberg, 1973; Sharfman 
& Dean Jr, 1997; Simon, 1957, 1997; Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2002). An important 
characteristic of decision-making is whether it is conducted in a time-
appropriate manner, or in other words, whether it is flexibly attuned to the 
velocity of the specific situation that a manager is in (Bluedorn & Denhardt, 
1988; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005; Jacobs, 2005; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; 
Snowden & Boone, 2007). Clearly, in some situations fast decision-making 
would be effective whereas in others a more deliberate type of decision-making 
would be effective. For instance, during a typical workday, a manager might 
need to deal with an angry customer, requiring immediate action (i.e., a high 
velocity situation); subsequently he or she might need to decide whether to 
accept a new project or a change in role at work, in which a more deliberate 
action is effective (i.e., a low velocity situation). Scholars have suggested that 
failing to make decisions in a time-appropriate manner can decrease the 
effectiveness of managers as well as the performance of the organization that 
they work for (Garvin & Roberto, 2001; Gilliland, 1993; Kahneman et al., 1982; 
Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995). 
Unfortunately, we currently lack even a basic understanding of time-
appropriate decision-making and of the organizational factors that may 
facilitate it (Forbes, 2007; Gavetti et al., 2007; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). There 
are two reasons for this. First, relevant organization theory (e.g., the Carnegie 
School) posits that the organizational context, especially the organizational 
structure, influences the way in which individual managers make decisions 
(Louis & Sutton, 1991; March & Olsen, 1976; Ocasio, 1994, 1997; Simon, 1957, 
1997). Yet, studies inspired by the ideas put forth by the Carnegie School have 
focused on how the organizational context influences meso-level outcomes such 
as organizational learning and change rather than individual decision-making. 
As a result, we know very little about whether and how the organizational 
structure influences individual decision-making (Bazerman & Moore, 2008; 
Gavetti et al., 2007). Second, although the concept of time-appropriate decision-
making has been mentioned in the literature, it has not been theoretically 
defined or empirically examined yet (Burke & Miller, 1999; Hannah, 
Balthazard, Waldman, Jennings, & Thatcher, 2013; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow, 
2008).  
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To address these issues, we study how a manager’s structural power 
influences time-appropriate decision-making. We focus on structural power 
because this is usually considered a defining (if not the defining) element of 
organizational structure in organization theory, or in other words, the critical 
dimension that separates an organization from an unstructured collection of 
individuals (Cartwright, 1959; Davis, Greg Bell, Tyge Payne, & Kreiser, 2010; 
Kipnis, 1972; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Simon, 1957). Drawing on recent 
insights from social psychology research we take into account that individuals 
also form a subjective sense of their power, their experienced capacity to 
influence and control others (Anderson et al., 2012; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & 
Magee, 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). The subjective experience 
of power takes into account structural position but also other, more informal 
(and more fluctuating) sources of power such as one’s position in a social 
network (Emerson, 1962), subunit membership (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974), and 
person-organization fit (Anderson, Spataro, & Flynn, 2008). Unlike structural 
power, this subjective experience of power is therefore specific to the situation 
(Anderson et al., 2012; Moskowitz, 1994, 1988). In the current paper, we draw 
on the situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2007a) to argue that high 
structural power enables managers to flexibly adapt the pace of their decision-
making to situational velocity because high structural power leads to an 
elevated subjective experience of power (Johnson & Lammers, 2012; Lammers, 
Stoker, & Stapel, 2010; Sherman et al., 2012). We test our hypotheses in two 
experience-sampling (ESM) studies, which capture fluctuations in individuals’ 
experiences and behaviors as they occur in the natural work environment 
(Alliger & Williams, 1993), and in a controlled laboratory experiment.  
Our research makes three contributions to the literature. First, research 
has, thus far, not been very successful in identifying whether and how specific 
structural aspects of the organization influence individual decision-making 
(Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Gavetti et al., 2007). We contribute to organization 
theory and organizational behavior scholarship by identifying structural power 
(i.e., a meso-level factor) as an antecedent of time appropriateness (i.e., a micro-
level outcome) via the mediating mechanism of subjectively experienced power. 
Second, we add to the literature on decision-making by examining the concept 
of time appropriateness; a concept that has been mentioned to be of great value 
to organizational managers (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005; Kahneman et al., 1982; 
Snowden & Boone, 2007), but that has not been theoretically clarified or 
empirically studied yet (Burke & Miller, 1999; Hannah et al., 2013; Sadler-
Smith & Sparrow, 2008). Third, we heed the call for new methods of studying 
the effects of power within organizations (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015) by using 
ESM to test how structural power, via subjectively experienced power, may 
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facilitate flexible attunement to situational demands and affordances among 
organizational members and managers in their daily work environment. Prior 
research testing the effects of power, in general, and the situated focus theory 
of power, in particular, was conducted in laboratory contexts or, on rare 
occasions, in cross-sectional surveys; the latter cannot capture within-person 
processes underlying attunement to situational demands and affordances. To 
the best of our knowledge, the ESM studies therefore represent the first 
externally valid test of the situated focus theory of power.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Decision Time and Situational Velocity  
In line with prior work, we define decision time as the time individuals take 
to make a decision (Benson & Beach, 1996; van de Calseyde, Keren, & 
Zeelenberg, 2014). We distinguish decision time from decision speed - a concept 
used in the management literature to illustrate how quickly decisions are made 
and acted upon in organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989). We explicitly use the term 
decision time, rather than decision speed, since the latter term is often used in 
ways that suggest that fast action is superior to slow action (Baum & Wally, 
2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Forbes, 2005; Jones, 1993; Kepner-Tregoe, 2001). Time 
appropriateness, however, implies that situational velocity will dictate whether 
fast or slow decision-making is appropriate. 
We define situational velocity at the individual level as the extent to which 
the rate of change in the situation requires fast action (i.e., high situational 
velocity demands) or slow action (i.e., low situational velocity demands). 
Specifically, because of the high pace at which changes can emerge, a situation 
of high velocity is characterized by high urgency and time pressure, with 
inaccurate, incomplete, and often unavailable information present. In such 
situations, it is therefore effective to make an intuitive judgment and take fast 
action in order not to miss opportunities (Burke & Miller, 1999; Dane & Pratt, 
2007; Khatri & Ng, 2000). Conversely, because of the slower pace at which 
changes can emerge, a situation of low velocity is characterized by less urgency 
and time pressure, with reliable and often complete information present. In such 
situations it is therefore more effective to make deliberative judgments and take 
slow action rather than sacrifice potential benefits and comprehensiveness for 
the sake of speed (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hough & White, 2003; McMackin & 
Slovic, 2000). Time-appropriate decision-making thus refers to flexibly adjusting 
to situational demands, such that one takes little time to make decisions in 
situations of high velocity and more time in situations of low velocity.  
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The relationship between organizational managers’ decision-making and 
velocity has previously been studied in terms of environmental velocity only. 
However, environmental velocity has mostly been used in organization-level 
research to describe stable differences between organizational environments 
across multiple dimensions such as demand, competition, technology, and 
regulation (Eisenhardt, 1989). Previous empirical research indicates that 
optimal performance results when organizational managers’ chronic speed of 
responding matches the typical level of velocity present in the organization’s 
environment (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989; Khatri & Ng, 2000). However, this research 
does not address the issue of time appropriateness - flexibly adapting to 
situational changes in velocity, which takes a dynamic view of decision time and 
focuses on factors at the individual-level within the decision-making 
environment.  
 
Structural Power, Experienced Power, and Time appropriateness 
Perhaps the most influential school of thought in the organizational 
sciences that links meso-elements of the organizational structure (i.e., power 
differentiations) with individual manager decision-making is the Carnegie 
School. Portrayed as a constellation of ideas, this school of thought was initiated 
by Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon (1957, 1997) and further developed by March 
and Simon (1958), Cyert and March (1963), and more recently by Gavetti et al. 
(2007). Simon argues that a fundamental effect of organizational structure is 
that it facilitates and simplifies organizational decision-making (Gavetti et al., 
2007; Simon, 1957). In particular, the organizational structure creates a specific 
pattern of communications and relations by providing certain organizational 
members with access to information that is necessary to make decisions in line 
with the organization’s objectives. Yet, although the Carnegie School considers 
the organizational structure to “provide the general stimuli and attention-
directors that channelize the behaviors” (Simon, 1957, pp. 100-101) of 
organization members and their actions, it has not been successful in arguing 
how the organizational structure specifically shapes the decision-making of 
individual managers. Along the lines of this school of thought, we therefore 
suggest that structural power represents an important structural element of the 
organizational context that should be considered in relation to time 
appropriateness.  
Structural power is, however, a broad operationalization of power that 
encapsulates factors other than objective power differences alone such as status 
(Halevy, Chou, & Galinsky, 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008) and felt 
responsibility (Sherman et al., 2012). Furthermore, structural power, as an 
objective indicator of power, is not tied to specific situations and it therefore does 
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not reflect to a full extent the actual power that individuals have. As noted, the 
subjective experience of power, on the other hand, is a complex assessment of 
one’s actual power that captures not only the direct interpretation of one’s 
structural position of power but also various other and more fluctuating aspects 
of power such as one’s position in a social network (Emerson, 1962), subunit 
membership (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974), and person-organization fit (Anderson 
et al., 2008). Defined as one’s experienced capacity to influence and control 
others, subjectively experienced power (Anderson et al., 2012) is therefore 
situation specific and represents a more accurate caption of one’s actual power 
in any specific situation. Furthermore, to the extent that individuals further 
differ in how they assess their own power (Anderson, Spataro, & Thomas-Hunt, 
2005), subjectively experienced power is arguably essential for obtaining a 
better understanding of how structural power affects individuals’ actual power 
and subsequently their actions (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Anderson et al., 
2012; Guinote, 2007a; Keltner et al., 2003; Sherman et al, 2012; Tost, Gino, & 
Larrick, 2013; Lammers et al., 2010).   
The literature on power has shown that the subjective experience of power 
shapes individuals’ cognition, affect, and behaviors (Anderson & Brion, 2014; 
Brauer & Bourhis, 2006; Keltner et al., 2003). Keltner and colleagues (2003) 
were the first to provide an overarching theoretical framework – the approach-
inhibition theory of power – that explains how power shapes individuals’ 
cognition, affect, and behavior. This theory proposes that, by activating the 
behavioral approach system, the experience of high power increases positive 
affect and sensitivity to rewards and as a result facilitates approach-oriented 
behavior. In contrast, by activating the behavioral inhibition system, the 
experience of low power increases negative affect and sensitivity to threats and 
as a result enhances inhibition-oriented behavior (Brauer & Bourhis, 2006; 
Galinsky et. al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003). Ample empirical evidence supports 
such predictions (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003; Magee, 
Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007).  
Advancing the work of Keltner and colleagues, Guinote (2007a) developed 
the situated focus theory of power to address how power affects cognition in line 
with the surrounding situation. Integrating research on situated cognition, 
which argues that cognition is not simply a collection of static representations 
of external reality (i.e., schemas), but rather a dynamic and adaptive process 
that guides behavior in line with one’s immediate surrounding (Barsalou, 2003), 
Guinote’s (2007a) theory proposes that the experience of power affects the way 
individuals interact with their surrounding environment by facilitating 
increased processing flexibility and selectivity of available information. In 
particular, the experience of power enhances individuals’ ability to selectively 
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attend to goal-relevant information and disregard goal-irrelevant information. 
As a result, individuals who experience high power are more attuned to the 
primary factors that drive cognition and should therefore be more effective at 
achieving goals in line with any particular situational demands and affordances. 
Conversely, individuals who experience low power exhibit a stronger tendency 
to attend to multiple different types of information, irrespective of its potential 
or relevance, and as a result they have fewer cognitive resources to focus on the 
task at hand. Their ability to accurately judge the information present in any 
particular situation decreases, with consequences for how they act.  
Research has provided robust evidence for predictions derived from the 
situated focus theory of power. For instance, Guinote (2007b) showed that 
experiencing high power facilitates goal setting, initiation of goal-directed 
action, persistence and flexibility in goal pursuit, and responses to good 
opportunities for goal pursuit. Overbeck and Park (2006) demonstrated that 
power facilitates flexible adjustment to situational goals. Guinote (2008) showed 
that the experience of power facilitates acting upon situational affordances. The 
experience of power seems to have this effect because it facilitates attentional 
focus on goal relevant information, at the expense of goal irrelevant information 
(Guinote, 2007c; Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008). The situated 
focus theory of power and supportive research thus suggests that high 
structural power may also facilitate managerial decision-making that is flexibly 
attuned towards the velocity of the specific situation via the mediating 
mechanism of subjectively experienced power. This argument culminates in our 
two hypotheses: 
High (relative to low) structural power facilitates decision-making in a time-
appropriate manner (H1). 
High (relative to low) structural power facilitates time-appropriate decision-
making via the mediating role of subjectively experienced power (H2). 
The line of reasoning leading to our two hypotheses implies a moderated-
mediation model (Figure 1). Specifically, we argue that the effect of situational 
velocity on decision time (i.e., time appropriateness) is moderated by 
organization managers’ structural power, and that the moderating role of 
structural power is itself mediated by subjectively experienced power. We 
elaborate on the terminology used (i.e., Level 1 and Level 2) in the methods 
sections below. 
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
 
We tested our hypotheses in three studies using two different 
methodologies. Study 1 and 2 were ESM studies. Study 1 was conducted among 
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managers with varying levels of structural power; Study 2 was a replication of 
Study 1, and included organization members with a non-managerial role. 
Situational velocity, decision time, and subjectively experienced power are all 
likely to vary at the momentary level (Anderson et al., 2012; Moskowitz, 1994, 
1988). Structural power is a more stable characteristic of managers in the 
context of their organization (Davis et al., 2010; Ocasio, 1994). ESM, which 
allows capturing fluctuations in individuals’ experiences and behaviors as they 
occur within the context of more stable aspects of the work environment, is thus 
well suited to test our hypotheses. 
 
 
Figure 1. The conceptual model with time appropriateness representing the 
connection between decision time (i.e., the actual time taken for making a 
decision) and situational velocity (i.e., the extent to which fast action or slow 
action would be effective in that situation). 
 
 
To allow us to draw causal conclusions, Study 3 was a laboratory 
experiment conducted among undergraduate business students using a popular 
tool to assess managerial behavior: the in-basket exercise (Hoogervorst, De 
Cremer, & van Dijke, 2013; Whetzel, Rotenberry, & McDaniel, 2014). 
Participants were assigned the role of a manager with either high or low 
structural power in a fictitious organization and asked to indicate the extent to 
which they would take more or less time in dealing with organizational decisions 
in a context of high and low situational velocity. 
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STUDY 1 
 
Method 
Respondents and procedure. We invited 150 full-time working 
individuals with supervision responsibility to participate in our study via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) in exchange for $1.50. With the use of 
appropriate screening procedures (i.e., attention checks or specific 
qualifications; Oppenheimer, Mayvis, & Davidebko, 2009), AMT has become a 
popular platform for collecting data in organizational research (Cryder, 
Loewenstein, & Scheines, 2013; Uhlmann, Heaphy, Ashford, Zhei, & Sanchez-
Burks, 2013; van Houwelingen, van Dijke, & De Cremer, 2014).  
Study 1 comprised two parts. The first part was a one-time survey to 
measure respondents’ level of structural power and demographic 
characteristics. At the end of this survey, we asked who would be interested to 
participate in the second part, a short daily survey that would be assessed 10 
times, on 10 consecutive workdays3. Out of 150, 144 agreed to participate. Since 
there are no clear indications regarding sample size (e.g., a minimum of 50 cases 
at the higher level – the respondent-level in our case - is often the norm for 
interactions across levels; Hox, 2010; Maas & Hox, 2004) and in order to keep 
the second part manageable, we randomly selected 100 respondents to 
participate.  
The daily survey asked respondents to describe a work-related decision 
made during their workday, encouraging them to provide as much detail as 
possible. To prevent respondents from describing the same mundane decision 
across all days, we gave them specific examples of decisions that normally occur 
in an organization setting (e.g., deciding when a meeting should be organized, 
whether to launch a new product, or whether to expand into a new market). 
Next, respondents filled out several measures related to the decision. Each 
respondent was sent a reminder of each daily survey about six hours before their 
next workday and were given from the end of their workday until midnight that 
day, to fill it out. Respondents received $1 for each day and a bonus of $5 upon 
successfully completing all 10 surveys. 
In total, 60 respondents (43.3% female) with an average age of 38.83 (SD = 
12.33) completed all 10 daily surveys (60% response rate). On average, 
                                                        
3 We conducted additional analyses to rule out the possibility that our dependent variable varied as 
a function of time. Specifically, we coded the 10 working days (from 0 = Day 1 to 9 = Day 10; Heck, 
Thomas, & Tabata, 2013) and entered this variable as a factor in all our models. We also entered 
the variable time as a quadratic term in all our models to examine whether changes in decision time 
exhibit any particular growth trend (i.e., accelerated or decelerated) across the 10 days. Results of 
these analyses revealed no main effect of time on decision time. Moreover, adding these two time 
variables did not significantly alter our hypothesized relationships. 
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respondents had 18.43 (SD = 11.54) years of work experience and 7.87 (SD = 
6.01) years of work experience in their current company. The majority (51.7%) 
had a bachelor or associate-level degree, 26.7% had a high-school degree, 15% 
had a master degree, and 6.7% had an MBA. Of respondents, 85.1% were 
Caucasian American, 5% were of Hispanic ethnicity, 3.4% were Latino, 3.3% 
were African American, and 1.7% American Indian. Industry/sector and 
company size were categorized in line with Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and 
the Dutch Chamber of Commerce4.  
Out of a total of 600 daily observations, 100 represented decisions that were 
not made that particular day at work. We treated these observations as missing 
data5.  
 
Daily Measures 
Situational velocity. Two independent coders read the decisions 
described by the respondents on the first day of the daily survey and evaluated 
the extent to which the situation surrounding the decision was of high velocity 
and thus fast action would be effective (i.e., changes emerge at a high pace, there 
is high urgency and time pressure, with inaccurate, incomplete, and often 
unavailable information rendering intuitive judgments effective in order not to 
miss opportunities) or of low velocity and thus slow action would be effective 
(i.e., changes emerge at a slower pace, there is less urgency and time pressure, 
with accurate and often complete information available, rendering deliberative 
judgments effective in order not to sacrifice potential benefits and 
comprehensiveness for the sake of speed). The coders evaluated this on a scale 
from 1 (the decision demands very quick action) to 7 (the decision demands very 
slow action). To ease interpretation of our results and graphs, situational 
velocity was coded such that low values imply fast action whereas high values 
imply slow action. Given the high agreement between the two coders (r = .92, p 
< .001) on the first day (N = 57, three respondents did not make any decision 
that day), only one coder rated the decisions described across the nine remaining 
days (see also Moore & Tenbrunsel, 2014).  
                                                        
4 Detailed description of the sample composition regarding industry/sector and company size is 
available upon request from the first author. 
5 We examined whether missing data present at Level 1 would affect our hypothesized relationships 
(Hedeker & Gibbons, 1997). In particular, we created a dummy variable at Level 2 (0 = missing; 1 = 
not missing) that was entered across all our models to examine whether missing data would affect 
our hypothesized relationships (see Sun, Song, & Lim, 2013, for a similar procedure). Results 
revealed that missing data patterns did not significantly alter our hypothesized relationships. 
Moreover, there were no significant main effects or moderating effects of missing data patterns with 
situational velocity on decision time across our models. 
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Subjectively experienced power. We measured subjectively 
experienced power with two items adapted from previous power research 
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003). Specifically, respondents 
were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
the extent to which they felt they had (1) control and (2) influence over others 
that day at work (α = .91).  
Decision time. We measured decision time with one item asking 
respondents to indicate how much time they spent making the decision 
described on a scale that included number of days, hours, and minutes as well 
as the option of not having made the decision that day. Asking respondents to 
report the time taken for specific activities is a well-known, valid technique in 
research areas such as work and organizational psychology (Sonnentag, 2001) 
and health psychology (King, Haskell, Young, Oka, & Stefanick, 1995). The 
range for days was between 0 and 270 (M = 10.90; SD = 29.76; N = 135), the 
range for hours was between 0 and 19 (M = 2.66; SD = 2.57; N = 257), and the 
range for minutes was between 0 and 60 (M = 18.09; SD = 14.90; N = 394). There 
was overlap among the values for days, hours, and minutes because some 
respondents indicated only days, or only hours, or only minutes, whereas others 
indicated hours and minutes or days and hours. To facilitate comparisons across 
observations, we transformed these variables so that that all respondents’ 
decision time would be measured in terms of the number of hours taken to make 
the decision. The values ranged from .02 to 6480 hours (M = 65.29; SD = 15.70). 
Response time measures, such as our decision time measure, are often not 
normally distributed (Whelan, 2008). As a result, residuals are positively 
skewed. To correct for this, we applied a square root transformation (often 
employed to normalize variance in time-related measures, Kirby, Lévesque, 
Wabano, & Robertson-Wilson, 2007; Larson, Dworkin, & Gillman, 2001) and 
present all subsequent results using the transformed variable6. The values on 
the transformed variable ranged from .13 to 80.50 (M = 3.23; SD = 7.56). 
 
One-time Measures 
Structural power7. In line with previous work in management (Sherman 
et al., 2012) and social psychology (Johnson & Lammers, 2012; Lammers et al., 
                                                        
6 We conducted all analyses with the untransformed decision time variable and obtained similar 
results to the ones presented in the main text. 
7 In the main text, we report results using an existing scale. We note that we also measured direct 
and indirect number of subordinates for which we found similar yet weaker results; when these two 
measures were combined, results were similar to the ones presented in the main text. We also 
measured hierarchical position in both Study 1 and 2 with an item taken from Begley, Lee, and Hui 
(2006; i.e., “What best describes your position in the organization?” 1 = non-executive, 2 = line 
management, 3 = middle management, 4 = senior/top management). Results with this measure were 
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2010; van Dijke & Poppe, 2003, 2004), we measured respondents’ structural 
power in terms of the number of subordinates on a 6-point scale: no subordinates 
(0%), 1-5 subordinates (36.7%), 6-10 subordinates (33.3%), 11-15 subordinates 
(16.7%), 16-20 subordinates (10%), and more than 20 subordinates (3.3%).  
Control variables. In the baseline survey, we used open-ended questions 
to record respondents’ gender, age, overall work experience, tenure in the 
current organization, ethnicity, size of the company they work in (e.g., number 
of full-time employees; Kimberly, 1976), and the industry/sector of their 
company.  
 
Analyses 
For each respondent, we had data at two levels: at the respondent-level 
(Level 2) and at the observation-level (Level 1). Structural power and the control 
variables constituted Level 2 data. Decision time, situational velocity, and 
subjectively experienced power constituted Level 1 data. Given the structure of 
our data with observations (N = 500) nested within respondents (N = 60), we 
analyzed the data via multilevel modeling using the linear mixed-effects models 
(MIXED) procedure in SPSS, version 22 (Heck et al., 2013). In line with 
recommendations (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998), we grand-mean centered all 
variables, except the dependent variable. We did not group-center Level 1 
variables because we were interested in variance in decision time both within 
and between respondents (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
We conducted cross-level moderated-mediation analyses following 
procedures suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) and Muller, Judd, and 
Yzerbyt (2005). Particularly, four conditions need to be met. First, the 
                                                        
similar to the ones presented in the main text yet the effects seemed to be driven mostly by medium 
vs. low, rather than high vs. low hierarchical position, possibly because of the relatively low number 
of organizational members in those conditions. While prior work has often operationalized 
structural power as the formal hierarchical position one has in the organization, we opted to use an 
existing scale of the number of subordinates one has for three reasons. First, hierarchical position 
has a strong symbolic value attached to it, in that it strongly communicates prestige and recognition, 
sometimes more so than actual power (Aquino & Douglas, 2003; Useem, 1979). Number of 
subordinates is less strongly associated with such symbolic connotations and it is thus a more direct 
measure of the amount of actual power that one has in the organization (Bendahan, Zehnder, 
Pralong, & Antonakis, 2015). Second, individuals often do not have a clear idea of what their 
hierarchical position actually is. To illustrate this, in a sample of working individuals (N = 309, 34% 
female; M work experience = 12.05 years, SD = 10.82; not included in this manuscript), we measured 
respondents' hierarchical position two times, with the two measurements separated by one month 
in time. We found a correlation of .67 between the two measurements of hierarchical position. This 
correlation is sizable but it also implies that over half of the variance in the same item is not shared 
across two measurement points. Third, hierarchical positions vary across organizations and it is 
therefore more suitable in research that focuses exclusively on one organization (cf. Aquino, Tripp, 
& Bies, 2001); this was not the scope of our research as we aimed to look across organizations and 
across industries. 
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independent variable (Level 2 structural power) and the moderator (Level 1 
situational velocity) should significantly interact to predict the dependent 
variable (Level 1 decision time). Second, the independent variable should 
significantly predict the mediator (Level 1 subjectively experienced power), while 
controlling for its main effect and its interaction with the moderator. Third, the 
moderator should significantly interact with the mediator to predict the 
dependent variable; the shape of this interaction should be similar to that of the 
interaction between the independent variable and the moderator. Fourth, the 
interaction between the independent variable and the moderator should be 
reduced in significance when the interaction between the mediator and the 
moderator is entered into the model. Because our moderator was measured at 
Level 1, we fitted random intercepts models only (Heck et al., 2013).   
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses. Table 1 provides 
means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among our interval 
measured variables. For calculating the correlations between observation-level 
data and respondent-level data (values below the diagonal), we aggregated 
(group-mean centered across the 10 days) the observation-level data at the 
respondent-level. As is evident from Table 1, none of the control variables were 
significantly related to our dependent variable or to our predictor variable8.  
Prior to testing our hypotheses, we fitted a null model (i.e., a model with no 
predictors) to examine the proportion of variance in decision time that can be 
attributed to differences across respondents by means of the intra-class 
correlation (ICC). Results from Table 2 (Model 1) show that 30.17% of the 
variance in decision time comes from differences between respondents. This 
value is clearly above the cutoff point of 5%, rendering multilevel analyses 
appropriate for our data (Heck et al., 2013; Hox, 2010). 
Hypotheses test. H1 predicted that situational velocity interacts with 
structural power to predict decision time. We regressed decision time on 
situational velocity at Level 1, decision time on structural power at Level 2, and 
the interaction term between situational velocity and structural power across 
levels (Table 2, Model 2). This also represents the first step of the cross-level 
moderated-mediation analyses. Results showed that situational velocity was 
significantly and negatively related to decision time (γ10 = -1.47, SE = .16, p < 
                                                        
8 We conducted additional analyses with the control variables entered as covariates (i.e., continuous 
variables such as age, work experience, and organizational tenure) or as factors (i.e., gender, 
industry sector, education, ethnicity, and organizational size) to examine whether they had any 
influence on our hypothesized relationships. Results of these analyses did not significantly alter the 
results presented in the main text. 
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.001). Structural power did not significantly influence decision time (γ01 = .74, 
SE = .47, p = .12) but it significantly interacted with situational velocity in 
predicting decision time (γ11 = -.60, SE = .13, p < .001). Figure 2 graphically 
illustrates the interaction between structural power and situational velocity.  
Figure 2. Cross-level interaction between respondent’s structural power (Level 
2) and situational velocity (Level 1) on decision time (Level 1), Study 1. 
 
 
Next, we conducted simple slopes analyses following the ‘indirect method’ 
developed by Dawson (2014). Specifically, we re-centered situational velocity at 
one standard deviation above and below the mean to represent high and low 
levels of situational velocity. We then fitted the same model (Model 2) separately 
for the re-centered high and for the re-centered low values of situational 
velocity. The main effect and significance level of the independent variable 
(structural power) represents the simple slopes test (Dawson, 2014). Results 
showed that for low situational velocity, the difference in decision time between 
respondents with high and those with low structural power was significant (γ01 
= 1.80, SE = .51, p < .001). For high situational velocity, the effect of structural 
power was not significant (γ01 = -.32, SE = .54, p = .55).  
In step two, we examined whether structural power predicted subjectively 
experienced power while controlling for its main effect and its interaction with 
situational velocity. Results (Table 2, Model 3) indicated that respondent’s 
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structural power had a significant and positive effect on their subjective 
experience of power (γ01 = .17, SE = .07, p = .01).  
In step three, we examined whether situational velocity interacted with 
subjectively experienced power to predict decision time. Results (Table 2, Model 
4) revealed that situational velocity had a significant main effect on decision 
time (γ10 = -1.56, SE = .16, p < .001). Subjectively experienced power was not 
significantly related to decision time (γ20 = .20, SE = .26, p = .43). Of most 
importance for H2, subjectively experienced power interacted significantly with 
situational velocity to predict decision time (γ30 = -.26, SE = .12, p = .03). Figure 
3 illustrates the shape of the interaction.  
 
Figure 3. Lower level interaction between subjectively experienced power and 
situational velocity on decision time, Study 1.  
 
 
Simple slopes tests (as in step one and using the indirect method, Dawson, 
2014) showed that for low situational velocity, respondents with high 
subjectively experienced power acted more slowly compared to those with low 
subjectively experienced power (γ20 = .66, SE = .33, p = .04). For high situational 
velocity, there was no significant difference in how respondents with high versus 
low subjectively experienced power acted (γ20 = -.25, SE = .33, p = .45). 
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In step four, we examined whether the interaction term between structural 
power and situational velocity was reduced in significance once the interaction 
term between subjectively experienced power and situational velocity was 
introduced in the model. Results (Table 2, Model 5) showed that the interaction 
between subjectively experienced power and situational velocity was not 
significant (γ30 = -.13, SE = .11, p = .24). Similarly, the interaction between 
structural power and situational velocity was not significant (γ11 = -.45, SE = 
.30, p = .13), albeit the size of the effect decreased compared to the effect 
presented in step one (Model 2). Thus, overall, H2 is not supported although the 
lower level interaction between subjectively experienced power and situational 
velocity indicated a similar pattern as the interaction between respondents’ 
structural power and situational velocity. 
Overall, results from this study provide initial evidence that organizational 
managers’ structural power partially facilitates time appropriateness. 
Specifically, we found that in low velocity situations, organizational managers 
with high structural power acted more slowly compared to those with low 
structural power. Yet, we found that in high velocity situations, managers acted 
equally fast, irrespective of their structural power. 
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ates for m
odels predicting decision tim
e, Study 1  
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eter 
N
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M
odel 1 
M
odel 2
 
M
odel 3
 a 
M
odel 4 
M
odel 5 
Fixed Effects 
Intercept 
γ
00  
3.19 (.60)*** 
3.16 
(.51)*** 
5.46 (.07)*** 
3.25 
(.53)*** 
2.77 (.37)*** 
/
HYHOREVHUYD
WLRQ
OHYHO
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situational velocity  
γ
10  
 
-1.47 
(.16)*** 
.01 (.06) 
-1.56 
(.16)*** 
-1.22 
(.33)*** 
Subjectively experienced 
pow
er  
γ
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.13 (.19) 
/
HYHOUHVSRQ
G
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Structural pow
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γ
01  
 
.74 (.47) 
.17 (.07)* 
 
.10 (.34) 
Structural pow
er X 
Situational velocity 
γ
11  
 
-.60 (.13)*** 
-.05 (.06) 
 
-.45 (.30) 
Subjectively experienced 
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er X Situational velocity 
γ
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-.26 (.12)* 
-.13 (.11) 
Random
 param
eters 
/
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G
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Intercept  
σ
b 2 
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(3.86)*** 
11.55 
(2.77)*** 
.19 (.04)*** 
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(2.21)*** 
5.13 (.88)*** 
/
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WLRQ

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Intercept 
σ
w
2 
38.93 
(2.61)*** 
32.20 
(2.16)*** 
.97 (.07)*** 
33.03 
(3.08)*** 
16.77 
(1.18)*** 
D
eviance 
-2*log 
likelihood 
3340.06 
3236.73 
1553.49 
3253.92 
3007.89 
N
otes. N
 = 500. * p < .005, *** p < .001.σ
b 2 = the betw
een-respondents variance (the variance of the values of u
oj ); 
σ
w
2 = the w
ithin-respondents variance (the variance of the values of εij ). M
odel 1 represents the null m
odel (no 
predictors). Standard errors are in brackets. a The D
V for this m
odel is subjectively experienced pow
er. 
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STUDY 2 
 
We conducted Study 2 for two reasons. First, we wanted to replicate the 
results from Study 1. Scholars are increasingly stressing the value of 
replications (see e.g. Lishner, 2015, for a recent account), especially for null 
findings such as our finding in Study 1 that structural and subjectively 
experienced power does not facilitate fast action when situational velocity is 
high. Moreover, while the quality of data obtained from AMT is as reliable as 
that obtained through traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 
2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) and past work has successfully used 
AMT to collect data from supervisors (e.g., Cryder et al., 2013; Uhlmann et al., 
2013; van Houwelingen et al., 2014), we wanted to increase the robustness of 
our results and replicate our findings with the use of a professional research 
agency. Second, Study 1 provides initial evidence among managers with varying 
levels of power. Yet because it is also employees (i.e., members with low 
structural power) who can experience both high and low subjective power 
(Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Sparato, & Charman, 2006; Rucker & Galinsky, 
2008), and in light of previous research that used a similar operationalization of 
structural power (Johnson & Lammers, 2012; Lammers et al., 2010; Sherman 
et al., 2012), in Study 2 we aimed to replicate the results among all 
organizational members.  
 
Method 
Respondents and procedure. We collected our data via a Dutch research 
agency – Flycatcher. The Flycatcher panel has the ISO-26362 certification for 
access panels (i.e., it meets the qualitative ISO requirements for social scientific 
research, market research, and opinion polls) and consists of about 16,000 Dutch 
citizens. In return for their voluntary involvement in completing questionnaires, 
panel members received a small reward in the form of points, which they could 
collect and eventually convert into a voucher of their choice. The target group 
for this project consisted of full-time working individuals. Similar to our 
approach on AMT, we asked Flycatcher to select panel members with varying 
levels of structural power so that our sample would reflect their sample 
distribution among the overall available sample.  
As a result of the pre-screening survey, 240 respondents were invited via 
email to complete an initial baseline survey and the daily surveys. The baseline 
survey included similar measures as in Study 1, with the exception of ethnicity. 
The daily survey was sent by email every workday at 4:00 pm for 10 consecutive 
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workdays9. Similar to Study 1, respondents were asked to describe in detail a 
work-related decision made at work and to answer some additional questions. 
Since missing three or more daily surveys might indicate a lack of commitment 
to our project, we decided to include only those who missed no more than two 
daily surveys10. As a result, 60 respondents with an average age of 45.18 (SD = 
10.86) who participated at least eight out of ten times (25% response rate) were 
included in subsequent data analyses.  
On average, respondents (28.3% female) had 22.13 (SD = 12.06) years of 
work experience and 12.06 (SD = 9.94) years of work experience in their current 
company. Most respondents (30%) had completed higher professional education, 
28.3% had completed academic education, 25% had completed senior secondary 
vocational education, 6.7% had completed senior general secondary education, 
5% had completed preparatory secondary vocational education, and 5% had 
completed an equivalent degree to preparatory secondary vocational education. 
Similar to Study 1, industry/sector and company size were measured as 
categorical variables in line with CBS and the Dutch Chamber of Commerce.11  
Because seven respondents missed two daily surveys and 25 missed one, 
we ended up with 561 daily observations, out of which 43 represented decisions 
that were not made that day at work. We treated these 82 daily observations as 
missing data12.   
 
Daily Measures 
Situational velocity. One native Dutch coder read the decisions described 
by respondents and evaluated the extent to which the situation surrounding the 
decision was of high velocity and thus fast action would be effective (i.e., changes 
emerge at a high pace, there is high urgency and time pressure, with inaccurate, 
incomplete, and often unavailable information rendering intuitive judgments 
effective in order not to miss opportunities) or it was of low velocity and thus 
slow action would be effective (i.e., changes emerge at a slower pace, there is 
less urgency and time pressure, with accurate and often complete information 
                                                        
9 Similar to Study 1, we examined whether our dependent variable varied as a function of time by 
entering time as a factor (coded from 0 = Day 1 to 9 = Day 10) and as a quadratic term in our models. 
These analyses revealed no main effect of time on decision time. Moreover, adding these two time 
variables did not significantly alter our hypothesized relationships. 
10 We conducted all analyses with only those who participated 10 times (N = 283) and obtained 
results similar to those presented in the main text. 
11 Detailed description of the sample composition regarding industry/sector and company size is 
available upon request from the first author. 
12 We followed the same procedure as in Study 1 to examine whether missing data present at Level 
1 would affect our hypothesized relationships. Results revealed that missing data patterns did not 
significantly alter our hypothesized relationships. Moreover, similar to Study 1, there were no 
significant main effects or moderating effects of missing data patterns with situational velocity on 
decision time across our models. 
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available, rendering deliberative judgments effective in order not to sacrifice 
potential benefits and comprehensiveness for the sake of speed). The coder 
evaluated this on a scale from 1 (the decision demands very quick action) to 7 
(the decision demands very slow action). The coder was unaware of the purposes 
of the study. Similar to Study 1, situational velocity was coded such that low 
values imply fast action whereas high values imply slow action.  
Subjectively experienced power. We measured subjectively 
experienced power with the 2-item scale that we used in Study 1 (α = .93).  
Decision time. As in Study 1, we asked respondents to indicate how much 
time they spent making the decision described on a scale that included number 
of days, hours, and minutes as well as the option of not having made the decision 
that day. The range for days was between 0 and 140 (M = 6.28; SD = 14.44; N = 
111), the range for hours was between 0 and 20 (M= 2.75; SD = 2.61, N = 189), 
and the range for minutes was between 0 and 45 (M = 13.04; SD = 11.56; N = 
319). Again, there was overlap among the values for days, hours, and minutes 
because some respondents indicating only days, while others indicating days 
and hours. To facilitate comparisons across observations, we transformed this 
variable so that all respondents’ decision time was measured in terms of hours 
taken to make the decision. The values ranged from .02 to 3360 hours with a 
mean of 32.84 (SD = 169.79). Similar to Study 1, we applied a square root 
transformation on this variable and present all subsequent results using the 
transformed variable13. The values on the transformed variable ranged from .13 
to 57.97 (M = 2.59; SD = 5.12). 
 
One-time Measures 
Structural power. In line with Study 1, we measured respondents’ 
structural power in terms of the number of subordinates on a 6-point scale: no 
subordinates (36.7%), 1-5 subordinates (21.7%), 6-10 subordinates (10%), 11-15 
subordinates (11.7%), 16-20 subordinates (3.3%), and more than 20 
subordinates (16.7%).  
Control variables. In the baseline survey, we recorded the same control 
variables as in Study 1 (except ethnicity). Categorical variables were used for 
all variables except overall work experience, tenure, and age which were 
measured with open questions.  
Analyses 
As in Study 1, we analyzed the data via multilevel modeling (Hox, 2010) 
using the linear mixed-effects models (MIXED) procedure in SPSS, version 22 
                                                        
13 As in Study 1, we ran all the analyses with the untransformed decision time variable and obtained 
results similar to the ones presented in the main text. 
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(Heck et al., 2013). Similarly, situational velocity, decision time, and 
subjectively experienced power constituted Level 1 data, and structural power 
and the control variables constituted Level 2 data. We again grand-mean 
centered all our variables, except the dependent variable. We followed the same 
four steps as in Study 1 when conducting cross-level moderated-mediation 
analyses. 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses. Table 3 provides 
means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among our interval 
measured variables. We followed the same procedure as in Study 1 when 
calculating the correlations between observation-level and respondent-level 
data (values below the diagonal). As evident from Table 3, education was 
positively related to decision time, indicating that respondents with higher 
levels of education tended to take more time to make decisions. Gender was 
positively related to structural power, indicating that male respondents had a 
higher level of structural power compared to female respondents. Yet, in line 
with recent recommendations (Carlson & Wu, 2012), we did not include the 
control variables in subsequent analyses. 14   
As in Study 1, we first fitted a null model to examine the proportion of 
variance in decision time that can be attributed to differences across 
respondents. Results from Table 4 (Model 1) indicate that 29.08% of the variance 
in decision time comes from differences between respondents. This value is 
again clearly above the cutoff point of 5%, rendering multilevel analyses 
appropriate for our data (Heck et al., 2013; Hox, 2010). 
Hypotheses test. In line with Study 1, to test H1 we regressed decision 
time on situational velocity at Level 1, decision time on structural power at 
Level 2, and the interaction term between situational velocity and structural 
power across levels (Table 4, Model 2). Again, this also represents the first step 
of the cross-level moderated-mediation analyses. As in Study 1, situational 
velocity was significantly and negatively related to decision time (γ10 = -.72, SE 
= .13, p < .001). In contrast to Study 1, structural power had a significant main 
effect on decision time (γ01 = .57, SE = .17, p < .001) and also significantly 
interacted with situational velocity in predicting decision time (γ11 = -.27, SE = 
.07, p < .001). 
Figure 4 illustrates the interaction between structural power and 
situational velocity. We used the indirect method to run simple slopes tests. 
Results showed that for low situational velocity, the difference in decision time 
                                                        
14 Entering these control variables did not affect the significance of the focal interactions.  
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between respondents with high and those with low structural power was 
significant (γ01 = 1.00, SE = .19, p < .001). For high situational velocity, the effect 
of structural power was not significant (γ01 = .15, SE = .21, p = .46).  
In step two, we examined whether structural power predicted subjectively 
experienced power while controlling for its main effect and its interaction with 
situational velocity. Results (Table 4, Model 3) revealed that respondent’s 
structural power had a significant and positive effect on their subjective 
experience of power (γ01 =. 20, SE = .04, p < .001). 
 
Figure 4. Cross-level moderation between respondent’s structural power (Level 
2) and situational velocity (Level 1) on decision time (Level 1), Study 2. 
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   Table 3 
D
escriptive Statistics, W
ithin- and B
etw
een-Person C
orrelations, IC
C
s and Pearson Correlations, Study 2 
Variables 
M
 
SD
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1. D
ecision tim
e
a 
2.59 
5.12 
- 
-.31** 
.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Situational velocity
 a 
4.64 
1.53 
-.54** 
- 
-.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Subjectively experienced pow
er a 
4.75 
1.44 
.04 
.00 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Structural pow
er  b 
2.73 
1.84 
.40** 
-.21 
.35** 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Age
 b 
45.18 
10.86 
-.14 
.13 
.02 
-.00 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
6. G
ender  b 
1.72 
.45 
.03 
-.01 
.40** 33** 
.12 
- 
 
 
 
 
7. Education
 b 
5.53 
1.39 
.25* 
-.16 
.09 
.19 
-.28* 
.05 
- 
 
 
 
8. W
ork experience
 b 
22.13 
12.06 
-.17 
.00 
.06 
.00 
.86** 
.11 
-.30* 
- 
 
 
9. O
rganizational tenure
 b 
12.06 
9.94 
-.15 
.06 
.05 
-.16 
.56** 
.10 
-.29* 
.70** 
- 
 
10. O
rganizational size
 b 
5.95 
1.39 
.05 
-.16 
-.19 
-.03 
.14 
.08 
-.01 
.12 
.09 
- 
N
otes. Correlations presented below
 the diagonal are respondent-level correlations w
ith observation-level variables 
aggregated at the respondent-level (N
 = 60); Correlations above the diagonal are observation-level correlations (N
 = 518). 
M
eans and standard deviations for the observation-level variables are com
puted based on the raw
, un-centered scores.  
a Level 1 (daily observations-level) variable. b Level 2 (respondent-level) variable.  
G
ender w
as coded such that 1 = fem
ale and 2 = m
ale. 
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 In step three, we examined whether situational velocity interacted with 
subjectively experienced power to predict decision time. Results (Table 4, Model 
4) revealed that situational velocity had a significant main effect on decision 
time (γ10 = -.69, SE = .13, p < .001). Subjectively experienced power was not 
significantly related to decision time (γ20 = .19, SE = .16, p = .23). Yet, 
subjectively experienced power interacted significantly with situational velocity 
to predict decision time (γ30 = -.23, SE = .08, p < .01). Figure 5 illustrates the 
interaction. 
 
Figure 5. Lower level interaction between subjectively experienced power and 
situational velocity on decision time, Study 2. 
 
As in Study 1 and using the indirect method, simple slopes tests showed 
that for low situational velocity, respondents with high subjectively experienced 
power acted more slowly compared to those with low subjectively experienced 
power (γ20 = .55, SE = .22, p = .01). For high situational velocity, there was no 
significant difference in how respondents with high versus low subjectively 
experienced power acted (γ20 = -.15, SE = .20, p = .44).  
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In step four, we examined whether the interaction term between structural 
power and situational velocity was reduced in significance once the interaction 
term between subjectively experienced power and situational velocity was 
introduced in the model. Results (Table 4, Model 5) showed that the interaction 
between subjectively experienced power and situational velocity was significant 
(γ30 = -.24, SE = .10, p = .01) whereas the interaction between structural power 
and situational velocity was reduced in size and significance (γ11 = -.21, SE = 
.11, p = .056). Thus, H2 is partially supported. Namely, we found that 
subjectively experienced power was the underlying mechanism that explained 
why organizational members with high (as opposed to low) structural power 
acted in a time-appropriate manner when situational velocity was low.  
Overall, results from this study provide further partial evidence that 
structural power facilitates time appropriateness. In line with Study 1, we found 
that in low velocity situations, organizational members with high structural 
power acted more slowly compared to those with low structural power. This was 
because organizational members with high structural power had a high, rather 
than low, subjective experience of power. However, we found that in high 
velocity situations, organizational members acted equally fast irrespective of 
their structural power. 
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STUDY 3 
 
Study 1 and 2 used ESM to gain a deeper understanding of how structural 
power facilitates decision-making on a daily basis in line with situational 
velocity. This methodology has many advantages; in particular it permits 
respondents to describe decisions that are meaningful in their day-to-day work 
context. Yet it does not allow drawing causal conclusions. To obtain evidence of 
causality, Study 3 was a controlled laboratory experiment. In order to create an 
engaging experience (i.e., use an in-basket managerial exercise) and to keep the 
structural power conditions comparable between the studies, we decided to use 
a direct manipulation of the number of subordinates by drawing on the work of 
Bruins and Wilke (1992; see also van Dijke & Poppe, 2003, 2004).  
 
Method 
Participants. Sixty undergraduate business students (55% female, Mage = 
20.87, SD = 1.37) at a medium sized European university participated in 
exchange for course credits. Fourteen participants failed our attention check 
question (described below) and were therefore excluded from further analyses15. 
Our final sample consisted of 46 participants (45.7% male) with an average age 
of 20.78 years (SD = 1.36) and an average overall work experience of 20.55 
months (SD = 23.09). Of these, 28.3% indicated currently having a job, working 
on average 4.01 hours (SD = 8.15) per week. Participants were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (Structural power: low vs. high) × 2 (Situational velocity: low vs. 
high) mixed-factors design. Structural power was a between-subjects factor 
while situational velocity was a within-subjects factor.  
Procedure. In this study, we used an in-basket managerial exercise, which 
is a popular tool for assessing managerial behavior (Whetzel et al., 2014) and 
often used to provide a realistic work setting to laboratory experiments 
(Hoogervorst et al., 2013; Stouten and Tripp, 2009). Upon arrival in the 
laboratory, participants were welcomed and escorted to separate cubicles, each 
equipped with a personal computer. Participants were told that they would take 
part in a decision-making exercise in a fictitious company called “Duron Paints” 
and that they would participate in the evaluation of one of the most often used 
assessment tools for workplace decision-making that was developed by a 
company in collaboration with the university. We informed participants that we 
used a version of the in-basket exercise that involves taking the role of either 
supervising 2 employees (i.e., low structural power) or 40 employees (i.e., high 
                                                        
15 Analyses including these participants revealed similar results to the ones presented in the main 
text. 
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structural power). This manipulation procedure was developed in line with the 
work of Bruins and Wilke (1992) and van Dijke and Poppe (2003, 2004). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of these two roles by the computer. 
After 25 seconds, participants were first presented with a short description of 
their role, i.e., a manager supervising 2 employees (40 employees) working 
within a company called “Duron Paints”. The company was introduced as an 
international manufacturer of paint products with headquarters in Paris and 
several other locations in Europe and the United States. After reading about the 
major work activities undertaken by the company, we told the participants that 
they would be presented with some situations that described a particular 
decision and that it would be their responsibility to indicate how they, in their 
role within the company, would approach and deal with these decisions. To 
ensure that all participants understood their role correctly and to increase 
commitment to the task, we asked participants to indicate (1) how many 
employees they supervised, (2) the name of the company they worked for, and 
(3) their role. Thereafter, we assessed participants’ subjectively experienced 
power in their role within ‘Duron Paints’ and recorded their answers on three 
role manipulation check questions.  
Next, participants were presented, in random order, with two situations, 
each containing a different decision, and were asked to indicate how they would 
approach these decisions (i.e., our dependent variable). These situations 16 
represented our manipulation of situational velocity.  
Specifically, the low situational velocity decision read as follows: 
“Your company is planning to purchase a new appraisal system for 
evaluating its employees on all levels from front line workers to senior managers. 
This appraisal system would be used for all employees in your company. This 
new system is fully digitalized, allowing everyone in the company to fill out their 
own goals as well as view their own evaluation at their own pace. Such a system 
would further reduce the time necessary for undertaking these procedures and 
give a better overview of all existing employees' performance. Implementing this 
new appraisal system would be great but it would also cost the company money 
(acquiring the license) and time (temporary disturbance of the HRM 
department's performance). In fact you have a colleague who said it was really 
tough going through such a change in the past because it required the interaction 
                                                        
16 We conducted a pilot study among 41 organizational members with a supervisory role (61% male; 
M work experience = 16.88 years, SD = 11.51) in which we randomly presented these two situations and 
measured situational velocity with one item (The situation above presents a decision that 
demands…) on a scale from 1 (very quick action) to 7 (very slow action). Results showed that 
respondents perceived the decision presented in the low velocity situation to require slow action (M 
= 5.07, SD = .19) while the one presented in the high velocity situation to require quick action (M = 
2.14, SD = .24), F(1, 40) = 79.47, p < .001.   
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of almost every employee. In other words, it would be an important but large 
investment to undertake, one that would require careful consideration.”  
The high situational velocity decision read as follows: 
“Your company discovered a new way to enhance the value of one of its 
products, which has the potential to significantly increase the company's market 
share. A large number of the company's prospective customers indicated an 
interest in this new version of the product. There is, however, a rumor that the 
Jones Company has uncovered a similar enhancement and your prospective 
customers are aware of this. Developing the new way of enhancing the product's 
value is a large investment but Duron Paints, your company, has sufficient 
research, prototype, and production resources to proceed with developing and 
introducing the new product.” 
Thereafter, we introduced the attention check question. Specifically, we 
first explained the detrimental effects on the quality of data of inattentive 
participants and then instructed them to choose option six (e.g., Wagner) out of 
seven when answering a question about their favorite classical music composer 
(cf. Oppenheimer et al., 2009). At the end of the session, we recorded 
participants’ gender, age, work experience, and whether they currently had a 
job or not. Finally, we debriefed and thanked participants for their effort. 
Manipulation checks for structural power. To test whether the 
manipulation of structural power was successful, we asked participants to 
indicate the extent to which they felt (1) powerful, (2) in control, and (3) in 
control over others’ outcomes in the upcoming decision-making exercise. The 
items were assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = disagree strongly; 7 = agree strongly; 
D = .87). 
Subjectively experienced power. We measured subjectively 
experienced power with an adapted version of the 8-item sense of power scale 
(Anderson et al., 2012). Participants were asked to indicate their agreement 
with these items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree 
strongly). An example item is: “In my role as supervising 2 employees [40 
employees], I feel I could get others to listen to what I have to say in this company” 
(α = .77). 
Dependent variable. We measured decision time with one item that was 
presented after each situation (see Schneider & De Meyer, 1991, for a similar 
measure). Specifically, participants were asked to indicate how they, in their 
role within the company, would approach the decision presented in the 
respective situation on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (I would make a quick 
decision) to 7 (I would take time to make the decision).  
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Results 
Manipulation checks. A one-way ANOVA on the structural power 
manipulation check scale revealed that participants in the high structural 
power condition felt more powerful and in control (M = 5.62, SD = .81) compared 
to those in the low structural power condition (M = 3.73, SD = 1.27), F (1, 45) = 
37.56, p < .001, η2 = 1.76. We did not include situational velocity as an 
independent variable since we manipulated it after the power manipulation 
checks were assessed.  
Hypotheses test. A 2 (Structural power: low vs. high) x 2 (Situational 
velocity: low vs. high) ANOVA on decision time revealed a main effect of 
situational velocity (F[1, 44] = 8.34 p < . 01, η2 = .15) and no main effect of 
structural power (F[1, 44] = .00, p = .95, η2 = .00). In line with H1, we found a 
significant interaction effect between structural power and situational velocity 
(F[1, 44] = 4.94, p = .03, η2 = .10). Figure 6 graphically illustrates this 
interaction.  
 
 
Figure 6. Interaction between structural power and situational velocity on 
decision time, Study 3. 
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Simple effects analyses revealed that participants in the high structural 
power condition indicated they would take more time to make the decision (M = 
5.65, SE = .27) compared to those in the low structural power condition (M = 
4.80, SE = .31) when situational velocity was low, F(1, 44) = 4.07, p = .05, η2 = 
.08. Participants in the high structural power condition indicated that they 
would act faster (M = 3.73, SE = .35) compared to those in the low structural 
power condition (M = 4.55, SE = .40) when situational velocity was high. Yet, 
the effect was not significant, F(1, 44) = 2.35, p = .13, η2 = .05. 
H2 predicted that subjectively experienced power would be the mechanism 
explaining why high (as opposed to low) structural power facilitates decision 
time in line with situational velocity. First, a one-way ANOVA on subjectively 
experienced power revealed that participants in the high structural power 
condition indicated higher subjectively experienced power (M = 5.73, SE = .62) 
compared to those in the low structural power condition (M = 3.38, SE = .98), 
F(1, 44) = 97.50, p < .001, η2 = .68. Second, a Situational velocity (low vs. high) 
x Subjectively experienced power ANCOVA on decision time with the former 
factor as a within-subjects variable and the latter as a covariate showed that 
situational velocity interacted significantly with subjectively experienced power 
to predict decision time (F[1, 44] = 8.14, p < .01, η2 =.15). There was a positive 
and significant effect of subjectively experienced power on decision time when 
situational velocity was low (β = .42, SE = .14, t = 2.98, p < .001, η2 = .16), and a 
negative and non-significant effect of subjectively experienced power on decision 
time when situational velocity was high (β = -.30, SE = .18, t = -1.64, p = .10, η2 
= .05). We plotted these results to see the shape of the interaction (see Figure 
7). Lastly, adding subjectively experienced power resulted in a non-significant 
interaction between structural power and situational velocity (F[1, 43] = .01, p 
= .89, η2 = .00) and a marginally significant interaction between subjectively 
experienced power and situational velocity (F[1, 43] = 2.83, p = .10, η2 =.06).  
We used Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro to test the significance of the 
indirect effect. This macro uses the bootstrapping procedure to calculate bias-
corrected confidence intervals (CI) for the indirect effect of structural power 
(high vs. low) on time appropriateness via subjectively experienced power. We 
used model 4 with 5,000 bootstrap samples and ran two independent analyses, 
one with the decision time scores for the high velocity situation and one with 
those for the low velocity situation as the dependent variable (see Table 5). In 
line with our findings from Study 2, results revealed an indirect effect of 
structural power on decision time, via subjectively experienced power when 
situational velocity was low (IE = 1.32, Boot SE = .64, CI: [.09; 2.65]) but not 
when situational velocity was high (IE = -.52, Boot SE = .87, CI: [-2.12; 1.33]. 
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Figure 7. Interaction between subjectively experienced power and situational 
velocity on decision time, Study 3. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The present research explored, theoretically and empirically, the concept of 
time appropriateness that is, flexibly adapted decision-making to the velocity of 
the situation. We hypothesized that structural power facilitates time 
appropriateness such that managers with high (vs. low) structural power are 
more likely to flexibly adapt their decision-making pace and act fast in high 
velocity situations (i.e., when fast action would be effective) but act slowly in low 
velocity situations (i.e., when slow action would be effective). We also 
hypothesized that subjectively experienced power represents the underlying 
process that explains why time appropriateness is particularly pronounced 
among managers with high (rather than low) structural power. The results of 
two ESM studies and a laboratory study provide consistent but partial support 
for our hypotheses. Specifically, we found that high, as opposed to low, 
structural power, via the mediating mechanism of subjectively experienced 
power, slows down the pace of decision-making in low velocity situations, but it 
does not speed up the pace of decision-making in high velocity situations. Below 
we discuss the implications and limitations of this research. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
More than five decades ago, Simon (1957) argued that the organizational 
context and, in particular, the organizational structure plays a crucial role in 
shaping organizational decision-making. This argument represents one of the 
main pillars of the Carnegie School and together with the work of Cyert and 
March (1963) and March and Simon (1958) represented the start of a new era 
in the study of organizations. Yet, despite the vast amount of theory and 
research that advanced from this School, it remains unclear how exactly the 
organizational structure influences organizational managers’ decision-making 
(Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Gavetti et al., 2007). Integrating unique insights 
from the Carnegie School with research from social psychology, our work 
extends scholars’ understanding of how a defining element of the organizational 
structure, namely structural power (Cartwright, 1959, Davis et al., 2010; Magee 
& Galinsky, 2008), influences an important aspect of decision-making behavior 
– time-appropriate decision-making. Specifically, we found that structural 
power, via the mediating mechanism of subjectively experienced power, only 
facilitates slowing down the pace of decision-making when situational velocity 
is low. Thus, our work extends organization theory, at large, and the Carnegie 
School, in particular, not only by bringing back scholars’ attention to the 
influence of structural factors on individual decision-making but also by 
explicitly testing how this influence materializes. 
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Furthermore, our research also has implications for the situated focus 
theory of power and, more generally, for our understanding of the effects of 
subjectively experienced power on cognitive processes. Prior work in this area 
relied almost exclusively on controlled laboratory experiments (Gervais, 
Guinote, Allen, & Slabu, 2012; Guinote, 2008) and occasionally on cross-
sectional surveys (Weick & Guinote, 2008). Yet, in line with a recent review that 
called for new methods for studying the effects of power within organizations 
(Sturm & Antonakis, 2015), we used ESM to capture data in real time and in 
highly localized contexts, thereby zooming-in on our respondents’ daily 
experiences that more truthfully and systematically reflect their organizational 
actions. Thus, our two ESM studies have greater external validity compared to 
laboratory research and compared to cross-sectional surveys because such 
surveys cannot capture flexible adjustment in decision-making, which is a 
within-subjects process. Moreover, they ask respondents to provide information 
about past occurrences, which often results in strongly biased reporting (Orne, 
2009). In sum, by using ESM as a highly relevant methodology for studying 
power in organizations, our research represents the first externally valid test of 
the situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2007a). In partial support of this 
theory, our research consistently showed that structural power and subjectively 
experienced power facilitated slow action in low velocity situations. Yet, 
structural power and subjectively experienced power did not facilitate fast 
action in high velocity situations. Thus, the present research calls into question 
the broad claims that derive from the situated focus theory of power, in 
particular the extent to which this theory accurately portrays the empirical 
reality present within organizational settings. 
Our research is even less supportive of the approach-inhibition theory of 
power (Keltner et al., 2003). This theory proposes that subjectively experiencing 
high power promotes approach-oriented behavior, while low power promotes 
inhibition-oriented behavior. In the present research, however, we find opposite 
results: power had no effect on fast decision-making behavior but it did facilitate 
slow decision-making behavior in situations where slow action would be 
effective, that is in low velocity situations. Our results thus add to the mixed 
findings in the literature that has tested the approach-inhibition theory. While 
there is empirical evidence that supports some of the predictions from this 
theory, such as research showing that power promotes an action orientation 
(Galinsky et al., 2003), other studies present a more complex picture. For 
instance, Inesi (2010) showed that power decreases the negative anticipated 
value of losses but does not increase the anticipated value of gains (Inesi, 2010). 
Relatedly, there is even research that presents conflicting results, such as 
studies showing that power can lead to increased risk-seeking behavior 
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(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) versus studies showing that power can also lead 
to decreased risk-seeking behavior (Maner, Gailliot, Butz, & Peruche, 2007). In 
line with others, our results further undermine the general, non-contextualized 
theoretical argument that high power leads to approach-oriented behavior 
whereas low power leads to inhibition-oriented behavior (see also Magee & 
Smith, 2013; Moskowitz, 2004).  
 
Practical Implications  
Scholars and practitioners have argued that making decisions in a time-
appropriate manner promotes both the effectiveness of individual 
organizational managers and organizational performance (Bluedorn & 
Denhardt, 1988; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005; Jacobs, 2005; Kahneman et al., 1982; 
Snowden & Boone, 2007). Yet, past work on time issues mainly focused on acting 
fast as the optimal time-appropriate course of action and strived to identify its 
antecedents at the individual-level (e.g., use of intuition, Baum & Wally, 2003; 
age and work experience, Forbes, 2005) or at the industry-level (i.e., a high 
velocity environment such as the microcomputer industry in the 1980s, 
Eisenhardt, 1989). In light of this, it is not surprising that fast decision-making 
is often described by scholars as a source of competitive advantage (Jones, 1993) 
and increasingly sought after by practitioners (Kepner-Tregoe, 2001). Yet, as a 
relatively recent article indicates (Nayar, 2010), slow might be the new fast, 
meaning that managers should be aware of being trapped into thinking that 
quick action is the only source of competitive advantage. Our results suggest 
that managers, particularly those with high structural power, have the ability 
to “slow down” because of their enhanced subjective experience of power. Thus, 
to help organizational members actually “slow down” when the velocity of the 
situation is low (i.e., when slow action would be effective), it is important to 
empower them - that is enhance their day-to-day subjective experience of power.  
Furthermore, our results highlight that aside from the broader and rather 
stable characteristics of the industry in which the organization operates, 
managers and employees should also consider the characteristics of the 
situation, in particular, velocity (i.e., the pace at which changes emerge) before 
taking action. Specifically, our results indicate that low velocity triggers 
different decision-making behaviors among managers and employees, 
depending on their level of structural power. Thus, we suggest that 
organizational interventions could be tailored towards training managers and 
employees to pay more attention to situational velocity, in general, and low 
situational velocity cues, in particular, so that every organizational member can 
assess more accurately when to suppress their initial impulse to act quickly.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
We wish to note several limitations of our research and provide suggestions 
for future research. Methodologically, single-source measures can potentially 
lead to common method bias issues. Nevertheless, there are three reasons why 
we believe this is not an issue. First, common method bias cannot explain 
interaction effects (Evans, 1985), which were of primary interest in the present 
paper. Second, we grand-mean centered our variables such that certain 
between-individual variance in the focal variable was eliminated (Heck et al., 
2013). Third, the repeated measures design across 10 consecutive workdays 
allowed a temporal separation between our predictor (i.e., structural power) and 
our dependent and moderator variable (i.e., situational velocity and decision 
time). Thus, the cross-level moderating effect of structural power found across 
two studies cannot be explained by common method bias, and it is also highly 
unlikely that the moderating role of subjectively experienced power results from 
such bias. 
In this research, we consistently found support for only half of our 
predictions. Specifically, structural power and subjectively experienced power 
did facilitate slow action in low velocity situations, but it did not facilitate fast 
action in high velocity situations. It is possible that the situational cues in the 
fast decision-making situations were more salient (i.e., dealing with an angry 
customer) and thus triggered a narrower range of possible actions than those 
present in the slow decision-making situations (Guinote, 2008). As a result, we 
observed similarly fast responses from high- and low-power individuals. 
Furthermore, while the pace of decision-making was similar for low-power and 
high-power individuals in high velocity situations, there might be different 
underlying motivations for acting in that manner (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, 
& Calvo, 2007; Guinote, 2008). For instance, powerful individuals’ fast action 
might have been a result of increased sensitivity to rewards whereas powerless 
individuals’ fast action could have been a result of increased sensitivity to 
threats. These findings are still at odds with major theories in the field on the 
psychological effects of having power. Nevertheless, it seems imperative that 
the effects of power on the behavior of individuals and their underlying 
motivation are integrated in future research on power if we are to gain a better 
understanding of how the experience of power affects individuals’ cognition and 
subsequent behavior. One way to achieve this would be to examine 
simultaneously individuals’ decision-making behavior as well as their 
underlying motivational drivers.  
Moreover, we focused only on one aspect of power differentiations within 
organizations: the number of subordinates supervised. In future research, power 
differentiations could be conceptualized and measured in various ways such as 
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participation in organizational tasks and activities (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). 
Future research could also examine the influence of informal structures such as 
status (i.e., asymmetries in respect and admiration from others; Anderson et al., 
2008). Furthermore, in light of recent socio-psychological research on power 
(Anderson et al., 2012; Guinote, 2007a; Keltner et al., 2003; Sherman et al, 2012; 
Tost et al., 2013; Lammers et al., 2010), it seems imperative to understand how 
these and other forms of power differentiations affect individuals’ subjectively 
experienced power and subsequently time appropriateness. For instance, it 
might be that informal, as opposed to formal, power results in more fluctuations 
in organizational members’ subjectively experienced power (Magee & Galinsky, 
2008).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Connecting notions from organization theory (i.e., the Carnegie School) 
with research from social psychology (i.e., the situated focus theory of power), 
we examined a relevant yet underdeveloped micro-level outcome, time 
appropriateness, and identified structural power, a defining meso-level factor of 
organizational structure, as a theoretically and empirically relevant antecedent 
(via the mediating mechanism of subjectively experienced power). Across two 
ESM studies and a laboratory study, we found consistent support that 
structural power facilitated slow action in low velocity situations but not fast 
action in high velocity situations. We hope that our findings spark further 
efforts to better understand the phenomenon of time appropriateness, its 
antecedents, and its consequences.  
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SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
 
In Study 1, we also evaluated the discriminant validity of the concept of 
time appropriateness by measuring several constructs that are related to time 
perception and action such as time perspective (i.e., the extent to which 
individuals have a cognitive bias towards being past-, present-, or future-
oriented; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), polychronicity (i.e., the extent to which 
individuals have a preference to engage in more than one task simultaneously; 
Judge & Miller, 1991), pacing style (i.e., individuals’ behavioral tendencies when 
working towards deadlines; Gervers, Mohammed, & Baytalskaya, 2013), time 
urgency (i.e., the extent to which individuals feel chronically hurried; Landy, 
Rastegary, Thayer, & Colvin, 1991), and thinking style (i.e., intuitive-
experiential vs. analytical-rational; Khatri & Ng, 2000). We also evaluated the 
discriminant validity of situational velocity by measuring several indices that 
capture stable differences in velocity between organizational environments such 
as organizational structure (mechanistic vs. organic; Khandwalla, 1977), 
centralization (Hage & Aiken, 1969), and market competition (i.e., market 
turbulence, competition intensity, & technological intensity; Jaworski & Kohli, 
1993).  
The discriminant validity of both time appropriateness and situational 
velocity were evaluated in Study 2 as well but, for pragmatic reasons (i.e., 
limited space for the study items), we included only a subset of the time-related 
constructs and the environmental velocity indices.  
 
STUDY 1 
 
Measures 
Time-related constructs. We measured time perspective with two scales. 
First, we measured respondents’ perceived time availability with one item 
(adapted from Moon & Chen, 2014; “Thinking about how much time you feel like 
you have for the future, please indicate how much time you feel like you have”; 1 
= very little to 101 = a lot). Second, we measured respondents’ tendency to make 
connections between present activities and future outcomes/goals with a 12-item 
connectedness subscale of the future time perspective scale developed by 
Husman and Shell (2008; E.g. item, “I don’t think much about the future”; 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly disagree; α = .91). We measured time urgency 
with a 6-item scale from Landy, et al. (1991; E.g. item, “I tend to be quick and 
energetic at work”; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; α = .65). 
Polychronicity was measured with a 10-item scale adapted from Bluedorn, 
Kalliath, Strube, and Martin (1999; E.g. item, “In this organization, we like to 
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juggle several activities at the same time”; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
disagree; α = .93). We measured three types of pacing style (steady, deadline, 
and U-shaped) with a 9-item scale adapted from Gervers et al. (2013; E.g. 
deadline pacing style item, “I do not get much done on projects until the due date 
is close”’; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly disagree). Internal reliability for 
the three pacing styles was: steady, α = .61; deadline, α = .72; U-shaped, α = .88. 
Lastly, we measured respondents’ intuitive-experiential or analytical-rational 
thinking style (REI) with a 10-item scale developed by Epstein, Pacini, Denes-
Raj, and Heier (1996; E.g., item, “I believe in trusting my hunches”; 1 = not at all 
to 7 = extremely). Internal reliability was good (α = .71).  
Environmental velocity indices. We measured organizational structure 
with a 5-item scale from Khandwalla (1977) that captures the degree to which 
the organization is mechanistic versus organic (E.g. item “The operation 
management philosophy of the top management of my company is”; from 1 = tight 
formal control of most operations by means of sophisticated control and 
information systems to 7 = loose, informal, heavy dependence on informal 
relations and norm of co-operation for getting work done; α = .82). We measured 
degree of centralization with a 5-item hierarchy of authority subscale from Hage 
and Aiken (1969; E.g. item, “I have to ask my boss before I can do almost 
anything”; α = .93). We used the market competition scale from Jaworski and 
Kohli (1993) to measure market turbulence (5 items; E.g., “Our customers tend 
to look for new product all the time”, α = .72), competition intensity (5 items; 
E.g., “Our competitors are relatively weak”, α = .75), and technological intensity 
(5 items; E.g., “The technology in our industry is changing rapidly”, α = .87).  
 
Results 
Discriminant validity analyses. In order to evaluate the discriminant 
validity of the concept of time appropriateness, we regressed decision time on 
situational velocity at Level 1, decision time on the time-related constructs at 
Level 2, and the interaction term between situational velocity and the time-
related constructs across levels (Table 6). Results indicated that only 
polychronicity influenced time appropriateness (i.e., only polychronicity 
interacted with situational velocity to predict daily decision time). To further 
explore this interaction effect, we regressed decision time on situational velocity 
at Level 1, decision time only on polychronicity at Level 2, and the interaction 
term between situational velocity and polychronicity across levels. Results 
indicated that the interaction was no longer significant (γ17 = -.43, SE= .27, p = 
.11). However, in line with previous work on time management (Koch & 
Kleinmann, 2002), deadline-pacing style had a marginally significant positive 
main effect on daily decision time (γ05 = .78, SE = .44, p = .07).  
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Furthermore, to examine the discriminant validity of situational velocity 
and thus rule out the possibility that time appropriateness might result from 
flexible adjustment to changes in the velocity of the organizational environment 
rather than situational changes in velocity, we regressed decision time on the 
environmental velocity indices at Level 2. Table 7 shows that respondents’ 
decision time was no influenced by the environmental velocity indices.  
Overall, these analyses illustrate that the concept of time appropriateness 
is different from time-related constructs (i.e., time perspective, polychronicity, 
pacing style, time urgency, and rational vs. intuitive thinking style). Similarly, 
the analyses show that the concept of situational velocity is distinct from 
environmental velocity indices such as organizational structure, centralization, 
market turbulence, competition intensity, and technological intensity. Time 
appropriateness thus refers to flexible adjustment to situational changes in 
velocity and not simply adjusting to stable differences between organizational 
environments.   
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Table 7 
M
ultilevel estim
ates for m
odels predicting decision tim
e w
ith environm
ental velocity indices, Study 1  
Param
eter 
N
otations 
 
Fixed effects 
Intercept 
γ
00  
3.15*** (.58) 
/
HYHOUHVSRQ
G
HQ
WOHYHO 
 
 
O
rganizational structure  
γ
10  
-.10 (.53) 
D
egree of centralization
  
γ
20  
.19 (.47) 
M
arket turbulence  
γ
30  
.59 (.57) 
Com
petition intensity  
γ
40  
-.80 (.60) 
Technological intensity  
γ
50  
.29 (.46) 
Random
 param
eters 
/
HYHOUHVSRQ
G
HQ
WOHYHO 
σ
b 2 
15.78*** (3.65) 
Intercept 
 
 
/
HYHOREVHUYD
WLRQ
OHYHO 
 
 
Intercept
σ
w
2 
38.28*** (2.54) 
D
eviance 
-2*log likelihood 
3388.75 
N
ote. N
 observations  = 500, N
 respondents  = 60.   
σ
b 2 = the betw
een-respondents variance (the variance of the values of u
oj ); σ
w
2 = the w
ithin-
respondents variance (the variance of the values of εij ); Standard errors are in brackets.  
*** p < .001. 
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STUDY 2 
 
Measures 
Time-related constructs. We used the same items as in Study 1 to 
measure the following time-related constructs: polychronicity (α = .75), pacing 
style (steady, α = .56; deadline, α = .59; and U-shaped, α = .80), and the one-item 
scale of perceived time availability. 
Environmental velocity indices. We used the same items as in Study 1 
to measure the following environmental velocity indices: centralization (α = .91), 
market turbulence (α = .67), competition intensity (α = .81), and technological 
intensity (α = .82).  
Results 
Discriminant validity analyses. In line with Study 1, we evaluated the 
discriminant validity of the concept of time appropriateness by regressing 
decision time on situational velocity at Level 1, decision time on the time-related 
constructs at Level 2, and the interaction term between situational velocity and 
the time-related constructs across levels (Table 8). Results illustrates that none 
of the time-related constructs significantly interacted with situational velocity 
to predict decision time.  
Lastly, we followed the same procedures as in Study 1 to rule out the 
possibility that time appropriateness might result from flexible adjustment to 
changes in the velocity of the organizational environment rather than 
situational changes in velocity. Table 9 shows that decision time was not 
affected by any of the measured environmental velocity indices.  
As in Study 1, these analyses illustrate that the concept of time 
appropriateness is different from the measured time-related constructs (i.e., 
time perspective, polychronicity, and pacing style). Relatedly, the concept of 
situational velocity is distinct from the measured environmental velocity indices 
(i.e., centralization, market turbulence, competition intensity, and technological 
intensity).  
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Table 8 
M
ultilevel estim
ates for m
odels predicting decision tim
e w
ith tim
e-related constructs, Study 2  
Param
eter 
N
otations 
 
Fixed effects 
Intercept 
γ
00  
2.26** (.25) 
/
HYHOREVHUYD
WLRQ
OHYHO

 
Situational velocity  
γ
10  
-.77*** (.20) 
/
HYHOUHVSRQ
G
HQ
WOHYHO 
 
 
Perceived tim
e availability  
γ
01  
-.01 (.01) 
Steady pacing style  
γ
02  
.65* (.24) 
D
eadline pacing style
  
γ
03  
-.09 (.27) 
U
-shaped pacing style
  
γ
04  
.24 (.22) 
Polychronicity 
γ
05  
.02 (.34) 
Perceived tim
e availability X Situational velocity 
γ
11  
.00 (.01) 
Steady pacing style X Situational velocity 
γ
12  
-.18 (.19) 
D
eadline pacing style
 X Situational velocity 
γ
13  
-.26 (.21) 
U
-shaped pacing style
 X Situational velocity 
γ
14  
.07 (.18) 
Polychronicity X Situational velocity 
γ
15  
.23 (.28) 
             Random
 param
eters  
/
HYHOUHVSRQ
G
HQ
WOHYHO 
 
 
Intercept 
σ
b 2 
1.47*** (.33) 
/
HYHOREVHUYD
WLRQ
OHYHO 
 
 
Intercept 
σ
w
2 
16.42*** (1.11) 
D
eviance 
-2*log likelihood 
3008.86 
N
ote. N
 observations  = 518, N
 respondents  = 60.   * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
σ
b 2 = the betw
een-respondents variance (the variance of the values of u
oj );  
σ
w
2 = the w
ithin-respondents variance (the variance of the values of εij ); Standard errors are in brackets.  
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 S
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Pa
ra
m
et
er
 
N
ot
at
io
ns
 
 
Fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ 0
0 
2.
55
**
* 
(.4
0)
 
/
HY
HO


UH
VS
RQ
G
HQ
W
OH
YH
O
 
 
 
D
eg
re
e 
of
 ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n 
 
γ 1
0 
-.0
2 
(.3
4)
 
M
ar
ke
t t
ur
bu
le
nc
e 
γ 2
0 
.4
5 
(.6
1)
 
Co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
in
te
ns
ity
  
γ 3
0 
.2
6 
(.4
2)
 
Te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l i
nt
en
si
ty
  
γ 4
0 
-.3
5 
(.4
0)
 
Ra
nd
om
 p
ar
am
et
er
s 
/
HY
HO


UH
VS
RQ
G
HQ
W
OH
YH
O
 
σ b
2  
7.
53
**
* 
(1
.2
0)
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
 
 
/
HY
HO


RE
VH
UY
D
WL
RQ
O
HY
HO
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t
σ w
2  
18
.2
6*
**
 (1
.2
0)
 
D
ev
ia
nc
e 
-2
*l
og
 li
ke
lih
oo
d 
30
65
.4
0 
N
ot
e. 
N
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 =
 5
18
, N
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s =
 6
0.
 **
* 
p 
< 
.0
01
. 
σ b
2  =
 th
e 
be
tw
ee
n-
re
sp
on
de
nt
s v
ar
ia
nc
e 
(th
e 
va
ri
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 v
al
ue
s o
f u
oj
); 
 
σ w
2  =
 th
e 
w
ith
in
-r
es
po
nd
en
ts
 v
ar
ia
nc
e 
(th
e 
va
ri
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 v
al
ue
s o
f ε
ij);
 S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
re
 in
 
br
ac
ke
ts
.  
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STATISTICAL EQUATIONS 
 
Basic notations: 
j – the subscript used for respondents (Level 2 respondent-level data) 
i – the subscript used for observations (Level 1 observation-level data) 
 
The Null Model for observation i in individual j: 
Level 1 equation:  
Decision Timeij = β0j+εij 
Level 2 equation:  
β0j = γ00 + uoj 
 
Substituting the Level 2 equation in the Level 1 equation gives the Mixed 
Model equation: 
Decision Timeij = γ00 + uoj +εij 
Where:  
β0j = the mean of decision time for the jth respondent 
γ00 = the fixed component, representing the intercept or the average level 
of decision time across the 60 respondents  
uoj +εij = together compose the random component  
uoj = the between-individuals variation in intercepts (level 2 variance) 
εij = the error parameter in estimating decision times within respondents 
(level 1 variance) 
 
Step 1 - Model 2  
Level 1 equation:  
Decision Timeij = β0j + β1jSituational velocityij + εij 
Level 2 equation:  
β0j = γ00 + γ01Structural powerj + uoj 
β1j = γ10 + γ11Structural powerj 
 
Again substituting the L2 equation in the L1 equation gives the Mixed 
Model equation: 
Decision Timeij = γ00 + γ01Structural powerj + γ10Situational velocityij + 
γ11Structural powerj *Situational velocityij + uoj +εij 
Where: 
γ10 = the estimate for the effect of situational velocity on decision time 
(level 1 slope) 
γ01 = the estimate for the effect of individuals’ structural power on 
decision time  
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γ11 = the estimate for the effect of the interaction between structural 
power and situational velocity 
γ10 Situational velocityij = cross-level interaction but with variance fixed at 
0 at Level 2  
 
Step 2 - Model 3 
Level 1 equation:  
Subjectively experienced powerij = β0j + β1jSituational velocityij + εij 
Level 2 equation:  
β0j = γ00 + γ01Structural powerj + uoj 
β1j = γ10 + γ11Structural powerj  
 
Again substituting the L2 equation in the L1 equation gives the Mixed 
Model equation: 
Subjectively experienced powerij = γ00 + γ01Structural powerj + 
γ10Situational velocityij + γ11Structural powerj *Situational velocityij + 
u1jSituational velocityij +εij 
Where: 
γ00 = the intercept or the average level of respondents’ subjectively 
experienced power across the 60 respondents  
 
Step 3 - Model 4  
Level 1 equation:  
Decision Timeij = β0j + β1jSituational velocityij + β2jSubjectively experienced 
powerij + β3jSubjectively experienced powerij*Situational velocityij +εij 
Level 2 equation:  
β0j = γ00 + uoj 
β1j = γ10  
β2j = γ20  
β3j = γ30 
 
Again substituting the L2 equation in the L1 equation gives the Mixed 
Model equation: 
Decision Timeij = γ00 + γ10Situational velocityij + γ20 Subjectively 
experienced powerij + γ30 Subjectively experienced powerij* Situational 
velocityij + uoj +εij 
Where: 
γ20 = the estimate of the effect of subjectively experienced power on 
decision time 
56                      Chapter 2 
γ30 = the estimate of the interaction between subjectively experienced 
power and situational velocity on decision time 
 
Step 4 - Model 5  
Level 1 equation:  
Decision Timeij = β0j + β1jSituational velocityij + β2jSubjectively experienced 
powerij + β3jSubjectively experienced powerij*Situational velocityij + εij 
Level 2 equation:  
β0j = γ00 + γ01Structural powerj + uoj 
β1j = γ10 + γ11Structural powerj 
β2j = γ20  
β3j = γ30  
 
Again substituting the L2 equation in the L1 equation gives the Mixed 
Model equation: 
Decision Timeij = γ00 + γ01Structural powerj + γ10Situational velocityij + 
γ11Structural powerj *Situational velocityij + γ20 Subjectively experienced 
powerij + γ30Situational velocityij*Subjectively experienced powerij + uoj +εij 
 
CHAPTER 
 
   

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Addicted to bad behavior? A self-regulation understanding of the interplay among 
counterproductive work behavior, sleep quality, and moral identity17  
58                                                                                                              Chapter 3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
From being rude to colleagues, to leaving work early without permission or 
stealing from the organization (Marcus, Taylor, Hastings, Sturm, & Weigelt, 
2013; Spector & Fox, 2005), counterproductive work behaviors (CWB), or 
discretionary selfish behaviors that run counter to established company norms, 
bare tremendous costs for organizations and their members (Dalal, Lam, Weiss, 
Welch, & Hulin, 2009). Such behaviors have been estimated to annually cost 
organizations in the US alone around 200 billion dollars (Bennett & Robinson, 
2000). In light of such costs, a large number of studies have zoomed in on 
dispositions (e.g., conscientiousness) and contextual factors (e.g., justice) that 
predict whether some employees are more likely than others to enact CWB (see 
Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007; Dalal, 2005; O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, & 
McDaniel, 2012, for meta-analyses). Some research has also shown that the 
enactment of CWB varies not only between employees, as a function of 
differences in personality and stable characteristics of the work context, but also 
within employees. For instance, the same employee is more likely to display 
CWB on a day when (s)he experiences much work stress than on a day when 
(s)he experiences less stress (Yang & Diefendorff, 2009; see also Matta, Scott, 
Colquitt, Koopman, & Passantino, 2016; Skyvington, 2014).  
Unfortunately, none of this prior work tells us anything about how the 
enactment of CWB unfolds in time. In other words, we don’t know if displaying 
CWB at some point in time makes it more (or less) likely that CWB is displayed 
on a subsequent occasion. Yet, knowing “when things happen” (Mitchell & 
James, 2001, p. 530) and for how long is important in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the processes underling the emergence of CWB (George & 
Jones, 2000). Because time is embedded in any human experience, a full account 
of why employees engage in CWB is arguably not possible without considering 
the temporal context in which such behaviors emerge (Cole, Shipp, & Taylor, 
2015). To that end, in the present paper we study how the enactment of CWB 
unfolds in time. Specifically, we propose that the display of CWB resembles 
addictive behavior such that the enactment of CWB one day makes it more likely 
to enact CWB the following day. We build our theoretical argument on two 
influential theories of self-regulation, that is, control theory (Carver & Scheier, 
1982; Powers, 1973) and the resource model of self-control (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). We argue that indulging in the selfish or 
even retaliatory experience of CWB (at the disregard of long-term reputational 
and social concerns; cf. Iliescu, Ispas, Sulea, & Ilie, 2015; Lord, Diefendorff, 
Schmidt, & Hall, 2010; Rosen, Koopman, Gabriel, & Johnson, 2016) on one day 
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may makes it more likely that individuals enact CWB again on the next day, 
similar to how individuals who aim to watch only one episode of their favorite 
television series end up watching another one (i.e., addictive behavioral 
patterns; Herman & Mack, 1975). 
We also study the self-regulatory processes that explain why enacting CWB 
on a certain day predicts the enactment of CWB the next day. To that end, we 
consider the quality of sleep (i.e. the ease with which one falls and stays asleep; 
Buysse, Reynolds, Monk, Berman, & Kupfer, 1989) during the night connecting 
the two days. Previous research attests to the crucial role of sleep quality in 
determining employees’ workplace attitudes (Scott & Judge, 2006) and 
behaviors (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011). Even more 
relevant to our present purposes, research illustrates that impaired sleep 
quality reduces employees’ self-regulatory abilities the next day (Barnes, 
Lucianetti, Bhave, & Christian, 2015; Barnes et al., 2011). We will argue that 
CWB on a specific day leads to enactment of CWB the next day particularly 
when sleep quality has been impaired during the connecting night. 
Finally, we consider the role of dispositional variations in moral identity in 
this process. This allows addressing a relevant between-individual factor in 
understanding the unfolding in time of CWB as a function of employees’ daily 
sleep quality. Moral identity captures the extent to which morality is chronically 
part of one’s self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002). It directly addresses the long-
term reputational and social concerns of wanting to be a good and moral person 
that underlie resisting the temptation to engage in CWB. This is because 
individuals who assign a high value to morality require less cognitive resources 
necessary for resisting such a temptation (cf. Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 
2011; Hardy, Bean, & Olsen, 2015; Joosten, van Dijke, Van Hiel, & De Cremer, 
2014). We introduce moral identity as a motivational force that can overcome 
individuals’ undermined self-regulatory abilities (as a result of impaired sleep 
quality) and break their addiction to further display CWB. Figure 8 illustrates 
our model.  
Our research offers several contributions to the literature. First, by 
introducing a temporal angle to the study of CWB, we address an often-
neglected issue in management research at large, and in the CWB literature, in 
particular, of when and for how long things happen (Dalal, Bhave, & Fiset, 2014; 
Mitchell & James, 2001; Shipp & Cole, 2015; Roe, 2008). Second, we introduce 
sleep quality to explain the temporal sequencing of CWB; a factor that has both 
direct theoretical relevance due to its link with self-regulation impairment 
(Barnes, 2015) and practical relevance: while the possible negative effects of low 
sleep quality are yet to be taken seriously within organizations (Barnes, 2011), 
more and more employees are sleep deprived (Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention [CDC], 2015; National Sleep Foundation, 2011). Third, by testing 
the role of a theoretically relevant between-individual variable (i.e., moral 
identity) in the within-individual process that underlies the temporal unfolding 
of CWB, we integrate two levels of analyses in the CWB literature (cf. Sonnentag 
& Ilies, 2011). Fourth, this research has implications for the self-regulation 
analysis of CWB. In particular, by examining the interaction between two 
underlying components of self-regulation (daily ability and long-term 
motivation), our work helps in closing the gap between our current knowledge 
of how different components of self-regulation operate in isolation and the actual 
complex and dynamic nature of self-regulation that underlies CWB. 
 
 
Figure 8. Our proposed model. 
 
 
The Inter- and Intra-Individual Nature of CWB 
To date, much of the existing research on antecedents of CWB has taken a 
rather static approach to understanding the prevalence of CWB in 
organizations, often using cross-sectional designs (Berry et al., 2007; O’Boyle et 
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al., 2012). Such designs are useful to uncover between-individual (but not 
within-individual) differences, showing that individuals who are characterized 
by certain dispositions or who work in certain contexts are more likely than 
other individuals to display CWB. This research has uncovered a large variety 
of dispositional and contextual antecedents of CWB. At one end of the spectrum, 
studies focusing on dispositional antecedents conceptualize CWB as a mirror of 
employees’ personality. Most notably is the negative relationship between CWB 
and two personality characteristics, namely conscientiousness and 
agreeableness (Mount, Illie, & Johnson, 2006); other examined predictors of 
CWB are negative emotions and affective states (Penney & Spector, 2005). At 
the other end of the spectrum, studies focusing on contextual antecedents 
conceptualize CWB as a response or adaptation to the organizational context or 
to work stressors. For instance, research shows that interpersonal justice is a 
strong social predictor of CWB (cf. Berry et al., 2007; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, 
Porter, & Ng, 2001).  
Complementing this cross-sectional research, scholars have recently begun 
to adopt a longitudinal approach to study antecedents of CWB (Eschleman, 
Bowling, & LaHuis, 2014; Meier & Spector, 2013; Tucker, Sinclair, Mohr, Adler, 
Thomas, & Salvi, 2009). For instance, Meier and Spector (2013) found evidence 
for a reciprocal relationship between organizational constraints – a particular 
type of work stressor– and CWB. Relatedly, in a sample of soldiers, Tucker et 
al. (2009) found that work overload was positively associated with indiscipline 
– a specific type of CWB – particularly among soldiers who experienced low job 
control. Such studies signal a shift from static to more dynamic perspectives on 
the relation between antecedents and CWB (Eschleman et al., 2014). However, 
these longitudinal studies also employed a between-individual approach and 
focused on one particular group of antecedents – work stressors – arguably 
because these have been found to be the strongest contextual predictors of CWB 
(Berry et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2001). 
Addressing some of the limitations of the above-described research on 
CWB, research is beginning to emerge revealing clear evidence for within-
individual variability in CWB. In other words, the same individual may, on one 
occasion, display CWB and not do this on another occasion (Dalal et al., 2009; 
Debusscher, Hofmans, & De Fruyt, 2016; Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006; Ferris, 
Spence, Brown, & Heller, 2012; Matta, Erol-Korkmaz, Johnson, & Biçaksiz, 
2014; Matta et al., 2016; Meier & Gross, 2015; Skyvington, 2014; Yang & 
Diefendorff, 2009). Research has not only shown that such within-individual 
variation exists, but also identified antecedents of CWB at the within-individual 
level. For instance, Judge and colleagues (2006) assessed daily interpersonal 
justice and CWB across 3 weeks. The authors found that when the same 
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employee encountered more daily interpersonal justice than usual, he or she 
was also more likely to display above their usual average levels of CWB. Matta 
et al. (2014) found that when an employee experienced above usual negative 
work events, he or she was also more likely to display above their usual average 
levels of CWB.  
It is refreshing to see that within-individual research on CWB is beginning 
to emerge and that findings observed at the between-individual level hold true 
at the within-individual level. However, none of the within-individual research 
to date tells us anything about how the display of CWB unfolds in time. One 
promising way to address this limitation may be to look at the argument that a 
large proportion of the underlying within-individual variability in CWB might 
reflect the intra-individual processes responsible for successful self-regulation 
(Dalal & Hulin, 2008; Lord et al., 2010). For this reason, in the following section 
we set out to integrate insights from control theory with those from the resource 
model of self-control. In doing this, we advance a self-regulation argument for 
how the display of CWB leads to subsequently displayed CWB. We also address 
when such a pattern is likely to emerge.  
 
Self-Regulation and CWB 
Control theory explains the motivational processes that underlie goal-
directed behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Lord et al., 2010; Powers, 1973; see 
Harkin, Webb, Chang, Prestwich, Conner, Kellar, Benn, & Sheeran, 2016 for a 
meta-analysis). A goal refers to an internal representation of a desired state 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998). Control theory views the process of comparing the 
current state and the active goal as a continuous flow of feedback loops. When 
no or little discrepancy is found between the two states, no action is taken. 
However, when a discrepancy is found, action is often taken to reduce this 
discrepancy. Control theory therefore posits behavioral self-regulation as a 
process through which individuals move towards their goals. Many such self-
regulation processes are implicit (i.e., they represent automatic adjustments; 
Carver & Scheier, 1982) and vary, by nature, within-individuals and across time 
(Dalal & Hulin, 2008; Lord et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, even when individuals notice a discrepancy between the 
experienced and the desired goal state, action to initiate the necessary change 
may still not be taken (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister & 
Alghamdi, 2015; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). A main factor responsible for not 
taking action upon detecting such a discrepancy is whether individuals give in 
to their momentary impulses and engage in an initial act of indulgence that is 
not in line with their goals (Marlatt & Donovan, 2005). Ironically, while small 
slips do not necessarily affect the attainment of the desired goal, individuals 
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often believe that it does (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Heatherton & 
Wagner, 2011). For instance, watching a single episode of one’s favorite 
television series might not meaningfully violate the goal of focusing strongly on 
work. However, such a small slip might have a strong impact on individuals’ 
belief that they did violate their goal. Arguably, this happens because attending 
to behavior that is not in line with one’s desired goals creates distress 
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991) or because 
it provides such pleasure that individuals crave for more (cf. Suvorov, 2003). 
The end result is that individuals cease to compare their current experienced 
state with their active goal and a small slip turns into a binge that sabotages 
the achievement of their goal (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Heatherton & 
Baumeister, 1991; Bowen et al., 2009).  
Most empirical evidence in support of the above-described phenomenon 
comes from research on addictive and problematic behaviors (e.g., eating 
disorders; Herman & Mack, 1975; Herman & Polivy, 1983; abstinence, Marlatt 
& Donovan, 2005). This work shows how an initial act of indulgence in an 
addictive or forbidden product (due to giving in to one’s impulses), results in a 
spiraling down effect of further indulgence. Aside from research in this 
tradition, we know of only one paper in the organizational behavior literature 
(Welsh, Ordonez, Snyder, & Christian, 2014), which used experimental designs 
to show how individuals’ unethical behavior gradually develops over time from 
small ethical lapses to large ethical violations as a result of suboptimal self-
regulation processing (i.e., moral disengagement). All of these studies illustrate 
that a minor slip can, in time, undermine further behavioral self-regulation 
(Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Bowen et al., 
2009). 
Control theory is arguably highly relevant to the conflict that individuals 
experience between their desire to engage in behaviors that largely benefit 
themselves and their long-term reputational and social concerns of being a good 
and moral person (Bandura, 1986; Nisan, 1991; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). 
Obviously, these long-term concerns require that individuals are willing and 
able to forgo their short-term self-serving desires and impulses (Aquino et al., 
2009). However, despite the fact that a normally operating feedback loop should 
result in less enactment of CWB (as it harms one’s long-term reputational and 
social goals), the research mentioned above introduces the interesting 
possibility that previous engagement in CWB can make it more likely that 
individuals cease monitoring their behavior and thus maintain the display of 
CWB. Put differently, there may be situations in which individuals stop 
checking whether a discrepancy exists between the current state (i.e., enacting 
CWB) and the desired goal state (i.e., being a moral person), and instead display 
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the same initial (bad) behavioral pattern. The question to address is then: what 
triggers individuals to stop the much needed self-regulation process of 
monitoring? We argue that impaired sleep quality is a viable answer. Below, we 
develop an argument for how sleep quality can impair employees’ monitoring 
process, thus making it more likely that an initial act of CWB leads to further 
acts of CWB.  
 
The Role of Daily Fluctuations in Sleep Quality 
Baumeister and colleagues (1998) developed the resource model of self-
control to understand why individuals sometimes fail to take action in pursuit 
of their desired goals. In particular, this model explains this inaction as being 
contingent upon a limited pool of self-regulatory resources that individuals have 
at their disposal at any given moment in time (Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister 
et al., 1998). Because such resources are finite, failure to replenish them results 
in a state of depletion. This model suggests that individuals with low self-
regulatory resources will be particularly ineffective in inhibiting the urge to 
display CWB once they already did so because they have more difficulty in 
restraining their impulses (Kelley, Wagner, & Heatherton, 2015; Meier & Gross, 
2015). Empirical work supports this model, both in terms of trait self-control 
(Lian, Ferris, Morrison, & Brown, 2014) and state self-control (DeWall, 
Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Meier & Gross, 2015). Building upon 
this work, we argue that self-regulatory depletion impairs one’s self-regulatory 
ability (i.e., the self-regulation process responsible for taking action when a 
discrepancy is found) to refrain from responding to harmful behaviors with 
harmful behaviors as a result of their now salient selfish impulses. 
Although sleep quality is a rather unexplored variable in both the self-
regulation and the CWB literature, some limited theoretical (Barnes, 2012) and 
empirical work (Barnes et al., 2015) suggests that even one night of impaired 
sleep quality can have detrimental consequences for processes underlying 
successful self-regulation. Drawing from the assumptions of the resource model 
of self-control and, more broadly, control theory, in the present paper, we view 
sleep quality as a relevant daily intra-individual self-regulatory variable that 
affects individuals’ display of CWB. In particular, we expect that when 
individuals have already displayed CWB on a certain day, the state of impaired 
sleep quality during the following night will undermine their self-regulatory 
ability to refrain from displays of CWB the next day. This argument culminates 
in our first hypothesis: 
The positive relationship between CWB exhibited on one day and CWB 
exhibited on a subsequent day is stronger for individuals who experience low (vs. 
high) sleep quality during the night between these two days (H1). 
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The Cross-Level Moderating Role of Moral Identity 
Despite the prevalence of CWB, individuals value being a good and moral 
person and strive to behave in line with this value (Bandura, 1986; Nisan, 1991; 
Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Moral identity reflects the extent to which this 
value is important or characteristic to one’s sense of self (Blasi, 1984). It is a 
powerful self-regulatory variable that is more or less chronically accessible 
within an individual’s overall self-concept (Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Aquino & 
Reed, 2002). Characterized by high moral self-regulation (Bandura, 1991), 
individuals who place a high importance on being a good and moral person are 
more motivated and put more effort to behave consistently with their inner 
moral compass compared to those who place a low or moderate importance on 
this value (Aquino & Reed, 2002). As such, it should not be a surprise that 
differences in moral identity also determine differences in self-serving behaviors 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed II & Aquino, 2003). Furthermore, and relevant to 
our research question, moral identity is not only a predictor of self-serving 
behavior but also an important buffer of impaired self-regulatory abilities. Gino 
et al. (2011) theorized that individuals with a strong moral identity have to rely 
less on their self-regulatory resources to act in a pro-social manner. The authors 
found that a temporary deficit in self-regulatory resources did not facilitate self-
serving behavior (i.e., cheating) for individuals high in moral identity (see also 
Joosten et al., 2014). Recently, Hardy et al. (2015) found that moral identity 
curtailed the aversive effects of low trait self-control on aggression and rule 
breaking behaviors among adolescents.  
Building on our integrated self-regulation argument, we argue that moral 
identity mitigates the negative effect of individuals’ impaired self-regulatory 
abilities (as a result of impaired sleep quality) on the unfolding of CWB. Owing 
to their strongly internalized moral values (Aquino & Reed, 2002), individuals 
high in moral identity are less dependent on self-regulatory resources to curtail 
the influence of short-term temptations (Greene & Paxton, 2009; Gino et al., 
2011). This is because such internalized moral values chronically set 
individuals’ goals to act in a pro-social manner, thus helping them overcome 
their momentary short-term desires in the pursuit of their long-term goals. We 
therefore expect that high (vs. low) moral identity will buffer the extent to which 
individuals believe that a small momentary slip sabotages attaining their goals 
when their self-regulatory abilities are impaired. This culminates in: 
The relationship between CWB exhibited on one day and CWB exhibited on 
the next day, as moderated by sleep quality during the connecting night, is 
further moderated by moral identity such that the CWB × Sleep Quality 
interaction is pronounced particularly among employees low (vs. high) in moral 
identity (H2). 
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STUDY OVERVIEW 
 
We tested our predictions in an experience-sampling (ESM) study among 
members of various organizations. ESM is well-suited for capturing fluctuations 
and trends in momentary behaviors (CWB in this case) and experiences (sleep 
quality) within the natural work environment and across time. It also allows for 
studying the moderating role of stable factors (moral identity) on these trends 
within individuals (Alliger & Williams, 1993). Adopting this methodology in the 
present research is relevant from a theoretical and a practical perspective. 
Theoretically, it pushes research on antecedents of CWB to adopt a new 
perspective by zooming-in on the unfolding of CWB in time in addition to 
addressing factors that account for this unfolding. Practically, it provides 
organizations with new insights on how to manage the existing substantial 
within-individual variability in CWB.  
 
Method  
Respondents and Procedures. We collected our data via Flycatcher, a 
Dutch research panel that consists of about 16,000 Dutch citizens and has the 
ISO-26362 certification for access panels (i.e., it meets the qualitative ISO 
requirements for social scientific research, market research, and opinion polls). 
Panel members who voluntarily decide to become involved in completing 
questionnaires receive a small reward in the form of points, which they can 
collect and convert into a preferred voucher (e.g., tickets to the cinema). 
The study consisted of two parts. The first part was a one-time survey in 
which we measured respondents’ moral identity and demographic 
characteristics. The second part was a short daily survey sent via email across 
two weeks (10 working days) at random times between 11:00am and 6:00pm. 
Collecting data across time alleviates to some extent (but not entirely) concerns 
about the direction of causality implied in our hypotheses (Koopman, Lanaj, & 
Scott, 2016). The target group for this project consisted of full-time working 
individuals. Flycatcher sent an initial survey to a pool of panel members who 
met this criterion. Out of 233 employees who were initially contacted, 180 
agreed to participate (77% response rate). We considered respondents who 
missed more than two days as showing lack of commitment to our project (cf. 
Judge et al., 2006). We therefore ended up with a final sample of 106 employees 
who responded to at least 8 out of the 10 daily surveys.  
Of the included respondents (66% men), the mean age was 40.76 years (SD 
= 10.41), with 17.51 years (SD = 11.48) of overall work experience, and 11.03 
years (SD = 9.88) of work experience in their current company. Most 
respondents (28.3%) had a Master’s degree, 24.5% had a Bachelor’s degree, 
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23.6% had completed vocational training, 22.7% subsequent secondary 
education, and 0.9% had completed only secondary education. Regarding their 
position in the company, the majority (64.2%) were in a non-executive position, 
19.8% were in a middle management position, 8.5% were in a senior/top 
management position, 3.8% were in a low management position, and 3.8% 
indicated holding various other positions (i.e., project leader, program manager, 
and seller).   
We obtained 1001 out of a possible of 1060 experience-sampled ratings (a 
response rate of 94.43 % across time). Of 106 respondents, 13 missed two daily 
surveys (12.3%) and 33 missed one (30.2%).  
  
One-time Measures 
Moral identity. We measured moral identity with the 10-item instrument 
developed by Aquino and Reed (2002). The scale measures the extent to which 
moral identity, conceptualized as a schema organized around a set of moral 
traits (e.g., “kind”, “fair”), is important to the self. It consists of two subscales: 
internalization, which captures the extent to which a person’s moral identity is 
central to one’s self (e.g. item: “Being someone who has these characteristics is 
an important part of who I am”), and symbolization, which captures the external 
public expression of a person’ moral identity (e.g. item: “The kind of books and 
magazines that I read indicates that I have these characteristics”). Respondents 
answered each item on a 7- point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). Analyses with each of the subscales of moral identity revealed results 
similar to those conducted with the overall scale. We therefore present results 
with the full scale.  
Demographics. In the baseline survey, we also recorded respondents’ age, 
gender, education, hierarchical position, tenure, and overall work experience.  
 
Daily Measures 
CWB. We measured CWB with a composite scale of 11 items that were 
introduced with the stem “Up to the moment that I received the text message”. 
In particular, we supplemented the 7-item scale from Moore, Detert, Trevino, 
Baker, and Mayer (2012; e.g., “I damaged property belonging to the company I 
work for”) with an item from Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, and Fetter (1990; 
i.e., “I made an obscene gesture [the finger] to someone at work”), two items 
from Williams and Anderson (1991; i.e., “I took a longer break than I was 
allowed to take”; “I left work earlier than I was allowed to”), and one item from 
Fox, Spector, Goh, Bruursema, and Kessler (2012; i.e., “I started an argument 
with someone at work”). We created a composite scale because respondents are 
not likely to engage in such behaviors daily; thus having more items would 
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increase the pool of potential behaviors that respondents might have engaged 
in (see Ferris et al., 2012 for a similar approach in a within-individual study, 
and Marcus, Schuler, Quell, & Humpfner, 2002 in a between-individual study). 
Respondents indicated on a 5-point scale the extent to which they engaged in 
such behaviors from 1 (never) to 5 (very often).  
Sleep quality. We measured sleep quality with a 1-item measure adapted 
from the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index developed by Buysse and colleagues 
(1989; see also Sonnentag, Binnewies, & Mojza, 2008). We altered the response 
options so that respondents could rate the extent to which they slept well the 
previous night (i.e., “Overall, I feel I slept well last night”) on a 7-point scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).   
 
Statistical Analyses 
For each respondent, we had data at two levels: the respondent level (Level 
2) and the observation level (Level 1). Moral identity and demographics 
constituted Level 2 data whereas CWB and sleep quality constituted Level 1 
data. Given the structure of the data with daily observations (N = 1001) nested 
within respondents (N = 106), we analyzed the data with multilevel modeling 
using the linear mixed-effects models (MIXED) procedure in SPSS, version 22 
(Heck, Thomas, & Tabata, 2013). We centered our daily predictors (sleep quality 
and CWB) relative to each respondent’s average score (i.e., centering within 
context). This provides accurate estimates of the slope variances as well as 
precise Level 1 estimates because it removes between-individual (Level 2) 
variance from the Level 1 estimates (Enders & Tofighi, 2007; Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). We centered the between-individual predictor (moral identity) 
relative to the overall mean (i.e., grand-mean centering) to aid the 
interpretation of Level 2 coefficients. For variance explained, we present the 
pseudo-R2 statistic (similar to R2) - often used in within-individual research to 
provide an assessment of effect size (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
Because we wanted to model how behaviors shown on one day (i.e., time t) 
predict behavior the next day (i.e., time t+1), moderated by variables measured 
that next day (i.e., again t+1), we created time-lagged variables for our daily 
predictor and moderator variables. This allowed examining relationships 
between behaviors occurring during different time intervals. Specifically, we 
computed the time-lagged variables such that values on our focal variables from 
time t were shifted to time t+1. For example, values on Day 1 represent values 
on Day 2, values on Day 2 represent values on Day 3, and so forth until values 
on Day 9 represent values on Day 10. We treated the values from Day 10 (N = 
106) as missing (Nezlek, 2011; see Skyvington, 2014 for a similar procedure). As 
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a result of computing time-lagged variables, we ended up with a total of 902 
daily observations for the lagged variables.  
 
Results  
Table 10 presents means, standard deviations, average reliability 
coefficients (across the 10 working days), as well as correlations among all 
interval-measured variables at the between- and within-individual level of 
analysis. Results from a null model (i.e., model with no predictors) indicated 
that of the total variance, the within-individual variance for CWBt+1 was 
34.42%; multilevel analyses were therefore appropriate (Heck et al., 2013). 
H1 predicted that sleep qualityt+1 would moderate the relationship between 
CWB exhibited one day and CWB exhibited the next day such that this 
relationship would be stronger for low (vs. high) sleep quality during the night 
that connected these two days. In line with H1, sleep qualityt+1 significantly 
interacted with CWBt to predict CWBt+1 (γ30 = - .13, SE = .02, t = -5.02, p = .0001). 
Simple slopes analyses revealed that the association between CWBt and CWBt+1 
was significant for sleep qualityt+1 scores at 1 SD below the mean (γ30 = .27, t = 
6.37, p = .0001) but non-significant for sleep qualityt+1 scores at 1 SD above the 
mean (γ30 = -.02, t = - .67, p = .50). The within-individual variance explained (i.e., 
~ R2) in CWBt+1 by this interaction was about 3%18. This result is not surprising 
given that lagged effects are known to be weak (see Hulin, Henry, & Noon, 1990 
for a meta-analysis; see Dalal et al., 2009 and Ilies et al., 2006 for similar 
results). 
H2 predicted that moral identity would act as a cross-level moderator on 
the magnitude of the within-individual CWBt × Sleep Qualityt+1 interaction in 
predicting CWBt+1. In line with recommendations (Heck et al., 2013), we first 
checked whether the slope of CWBt predicting CWBt+1 varied significantly 
across respondents. Results indicated a positive main effect of CWBt (γ10 = .14, 
SE = .04, t = 3.33, p = .001). More importantly, they also showed that there is a 
significant variance in the slope (σb102= .05, SE = .01, Wald Z = 2.95, p = .003), 
which suggests that within-individual effects of CWBt on CWBt+1 varied 
significantly across respondents and the examination of Level 2 moderators was 
justified. We therefore proceeded to test H2 by adding moral identity as a Level 
2 moderator on the within-individual effect of sleep qualityt+1 on the relationship 
between CWBt and CWBt+1. Consistent with H2, we found a significant three-
way interaction among moral identity, sleep qualityt+1, and CWBt in predicting 
CWBt+1 (see Table 11).  
                                                        
18  We computed this as the proportional reduction in the within-individual Level 1 variance 
component of CWBt between a model with main effects of CWBt and sleep qualityt+1 and a model 
with the interaction term between these two predictors.  
70                                                                                                              Chapter 3 
Figure 9 and 10 visually present the interaction between CWBt and sleep 
qualityt+1 for high and low moral identity. We used R Studio to plot these 
interactions in line with recommendations (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) 
at 1 SD above and below the mean of moral identity. In support of H2, these 
graphs show that the interaction between CWBt and sleep quality in predicting 
CWBt+1 was significant only among employees with a low (rather than a high) 
moral identity.  
We proceeded by conducting simple slopes analyses at 1 SD above and 
below the mean of each moderator (i.e., moral identity and sleep quality; Aiken, 
West, & Reno, 1991). In support of H2, results revealed that the positive 
association between CWBt and CWBt+1 was significant only for the low sleep 
qualityt+1 and low moral identity combination (γ31 = .36, t = 5.74, p = .0001). This 
association was not significant for the high sleep qualityt+1 and low moral 
identity combination (γ31 = .00, t = .20, p = .91), for the high sleep qualityt+1 and 
high moral identity combination (γ31 = .01, t = .01, p = .98), or for the low sleep 
qualityt+1 and high moral identity combination (γ31 = .07, t = .90, p = .36).  
Finally, the slope of the low sleep qualityt+1 and low moral identity 
combination was significantly steeper than the slope of the low sleep qualityt+1 
and high moral identity combination, t = - 3.04, p = .002, the slope of the high 
sleep qualityt+1 and high moral identity combination, t = - 3.57, p = .0001, and 
the slope of the high sleep qualityt+1 and low moral identity combination t = - 
4.24, p = .0001. This cross-level interaction explained (~ R2) about 4.21%19 of the 
variability in the random slope between CWBt and CWBt+1. 
 
                                                        
19 We computed this as the proportional reduction in the variability of the random slope between 
CWBt and CWBt+1 between a model with the main effects of moral identity, CWBt, sleep qualityt+1, 
as well as all the 2-way interaction terms, and a model with the 3-way interaction term. 
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Figure 9. Interaction between CWBt, sleep qualityt+1 on CWBt+1 when moral 
identity is high (1 SD above the mean). 
 
Figure 10. Interaction between CWBt, sleep qualityt+1 on CWBt+1 when moral 
identity is low (1 SD below the mean). 
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In sum, our results indicate that CWB predicts subsequent CWB 
particularly among employees with impaired daily sleep quality who are 
chronically low on moral identity20.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
We studied how the enactment of CWB unfolds in time. In line with our 
self-regulation argument we found in an ESM study conducted across ten 
consecutive working days among members of various organizations that 
enacting CWB on one day predicts enacting CWB the next day. However, this 
was particularly the case among employees who experienced low, as opposed to 
high, sleep quality during the connecting night. Finally, in line with our self-
regulation argument, this CWB × Sleep Quality interaction was limited to 
respondents who were chronically low (vs. high) in moral identity.   
 
Theoretical Implications 
Prior research has shown that the enactment of CWB varies between 
employees, as a function of differences in personality and stable characteristics 
of the work context, but also within employees, for instance in response to 
momentarily experienced stress. However, this work has not made it clear how 
the enactment of CWB unfolds in time. As Dalal and colleagues (2014; see also 
Mitchell & James, 2001; Cole et al., 2015; Shipp & Cole, 2015) pointed out, 
understanding when things happen and for how long is important in terms of 
both temporal co-occurrence and temporal sequencing of behavioral patterns. 
By examining the temporal unfolding of CWB we address the often-overlooked 
element of time in organization research, at large, and in the CWB literature, 
in particular. This is important to address given that time is intimately 
connected to any human experience and a full understanding of the emergence 
of CWB is arguably not possible without placing such behaviors in a temporal 
context (Cole et al., 2015).  
We further add to the CWB literature by highlighting the self-regulatory 
processes that explain when (and thus also why) the enactment of CWB at a 
certain point in time predicts the enactment of CWB later on. We focused on 
sleep quality as a factor that sustains self-regulatory abilities. The bulk of 
research, mainly at the between-individual level, on impaired sleep has focused 
on sleep quantity, perhaps because sleep quantity is viewed as a more objective 
                                                        
20 As it is common in ESM studies (Debusscher et al, 2016; Matta et al., 2016; Skyvington, 2014), 
we conducted additional analyses to test the potential of reverse causality. In particular, we 
examined whether CWBt+1 interacts with sleep quality and moral identity in predicting CWBt. 
Results indicated no significant three-way interaction (γ31 = .08, SE = .05, t = 1.46, p = .14). 
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measure of impaired sleep. Given that management scholars have only recently 
considered how important sleep actually is for employees’ behavior (Barnes, 
2012), objective measures might have taken preference. Be that as it may, our 
finding that impaired sleep quality, at the daily level, facilitates the unfolding 
phenomenon of CWB from one day to the next is in line with recent within-
individual work by Barnes and colleagues (2015) who found that sleep quality 
rather than quantity impairs self-regulatory resources. Thus, by zooming-in on 
the effects of sleep quality on CWB, we respond to calls for future research on 
such effects (Barnes et al., 2015; Barnes, 2012; Barnes et al., 2011). Moreover, 
we also expand previous work. In particular, by treating impaired sleep quality 
not as the main driver of self-regulation failure but as a facilitator of its re-
occurrence in the form of engagement in CWB we broaden previous perspectives 
on self-regulation. This is in line with one of the main tenants of the resource 
model of self-control that states that a prerequisite for depletion to occur (in our 
case impaired sleep quality) is the initiation of a volitional act (in our case 
engagement in CWB) (Baumeister et al., 1998). 
Our research further contributes to the literature on moral identity. In 
particular, we found that the negative effect of sleep quality was less 
pronounced among employees whose moral values were strongly internalized 
(i.e., a high moral identity). With the exception of one study (Aquino et al., 2009, 
Study 4), research to date on moral identity has focused on unveiling its effects 
in static, one-time encounter situations. Our research suggests that one way to 
expand the literature on moral identity would be to study the extent to which 
the established effects of moral identity replicate in dynamic, rather than static, 
settings. Our finding pertaining to the buffering effect of moral identity echoes 
the between-individual research that found similar effects on other self-serving 
behaviors such as cheating (Gino et al., 2011). Understanding which effects hold 
across levels of analyses is important because similar to how meta-analyses 
inform us about the extent to which different measures capture similar 
conceptual meanings of the same construct across various studies (Hunter & 
Schmidt, 1990), examining constructs across levels of analyses informs us about 
the extent to which empirical results are similar in shape, size, and direction 
across levels of analysis (Chen, Bliese, & Mathieu, 2005; Dalal et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, by focusing on both intra- and inter-individual factors 
responsible for successful self-regulation, our research aligns with calls to 
investigate how stable individual-level factors interact with factors that are 
bound to vary on a daily basis to predict the intra-individual variability in CWB 
(Judge et al., 2006; Matta et al., 2014). Because between-individual factors 
reflect differences in developmental experiences, whereas within-individual 
factors reflect differences in momentary experiences (Chen et al., 2005), they 
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incorporate different types of variability (Roe, 2008). Arguably, the display of 
CWB has different meaning for different employees and examining between-
individual factors permits capturing such differences on top of those observed 
within employees. Addressing both between- and within-individual factors as 
well as their interaction within the same study would therefore provide a more 
holistic view of the processes through which within-individual relationships 
operate. One way to bridge research across levels is via the study of cross-level 
moderators because they allow scholars to identify what factors strengthen or 
weaken intra-individual relationships (Sonnentag & Ilies, 2011). Indeed, our 
findings indicate that the within-individual relationship between sleep quality 
and CWB is particularly present among employees with low moral identity. This 
illustrates that moral identity is perhaps a much stronger motivation for 
individuals to regulate their behavior in line with their long-term goals than we 
previously thought. In particular, it appears that moral identity is not only 
relevant in differentiating which employees are more likely than others to 
engage in CWB (between-individual studies), but also in understanding which 
employees are more likely to display CWB on some days but not on other days. 
The present research also has implications for the self-regulation literature 
on CWB. In particular, our model highlights the usefulness and importance of 
addressing within the same study factors that affect individuals’ daily self-
regulation abilities (in our case sleep quality) and those that affect individuals’ 
motivation to regulate their behavior (in our case moral identity) in providing a 
more complete picture of how employees regulate their behavior. In light of our 
results, employees seem to regulate their behavior as a function of both daily 
ability and long-term motivation. This finding is in line with recent theoretical 
work on self-regulation (Kotabe & Hofmann, 2015) that urges scholars to move 
away from examining only one component of self-regulation (i.e., self-regulation 
motivation, which we conceptualize as moral identity) to examining how the 
various components of self-regulation interact (cf. Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). 
This enriching of the self-regulation literature will help close the gap between 
areas of research that have been overlooked and the true complex and dynamic 
nature of self-regulation. It is further a necessary step to take if we wish to build 
strong theoretical frameworks that facilitate and encourage future integrated 
empirical work aimed at understanding truly dynamic phenomenon such as the 
intra-individual fluctuations.  
 
Practical Implications 
As noted, prior research identified various personality patterns (e.g., 
conscientiousness, Judge et al., 2006; Yang & Diefendorff, 2009) and contextual 
features (e.g., interpersonal justice, Berry et al., 2007) that make it more likely 
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that employees display CWB. Yet, while it might be appealing to say that some 
employees are simply predisposed to engage in CWB (i.e., “bad apples”) and 
some contexts provoke CWB (i.e., “bad barrels”), the reality is more nuanced. In 
light of our finding that CWB resembles addictive behaviors such that a small 
slip can turn into a binge, organizations may consider developing and 
implementing incentives to counter this phenomenon. For instance, 
organizations could make use of reassurance messages that help employees 
perceive small slips not as failure to work towards attaining their long-term 
goals but more as what they are: a small slip. Such messages could be delivered 
explicitly during evaluation meetings or implicitly via illustrations sent by 
email that present a specific form of CWB (i.e., leaving work early without 
permission one day) in a satirical yet comic manner. Alternatively, 
organizations could aim to become more lenient in when a particular behavior 
ought to be labeled as CWB. For instance, leaving work one hour earlier without 
permission should not be considered as CWB if the same employee comes one 
hour earlier the next day. One challenge with such an approach is the re-design 
of the monitoring processes to allow for such “trade-offs’ (cf. Bhave, 2014).  
Furthermore, our finding that poor sleep quality aids the unfolding of CWB 
from one day to the next aligns with other findings illustrating how sleep is 
critical for the well-being of organizational members and, indirectly, for 
organizational performance (Barnes et al., 2015; Barnes et al., 2011; Christian 
& Ellis, 2011; Welsh et al., 2014). Problems resulting from shortages of sleep 
have largely been ignored in organizations. This is not surprising given that 
employers care greatly about what employees do during the work time and less 
about what they do outside that time (Barnes, 2011). Yet, scholars have offered 
suggestions to address impaired sleep quality, including strategic napping and 
taking breaks from task work (Barnes, 2011; Welsh et al., 2014). Such methods 
are all the more relevant in the context of our present findings showing that low 
sleep quality increases the likelihood that enacting CWB on a certain day makes 
organization members do it again the next day.  
Nonetheless, our finding pertaining to the buffering effect of moral identity 
on the negative effects of impaired sleep quality indicates that organizations 
should not abandon their explicit or more informal selection practices that 
differentiate among employees. That is, organizations should still aim to recruit 
and select individuals that consider moral values are central to their self-
identity, among other reasons because such values are bound to protect 
employees from the detrimental effects of impaired sleep. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Our use of ESM among employees from a variety of organizations while 
including a theoretically relevant cross-level moderator present clear strengths 
of this research. However, as with any study, there are limitations that should 
be discussed. A first potential limitation stems from the fact that we measured 
all our variables using self-reports. This raises the question of whether these 
reports accurately reflect CWB enactment. As to accuracy, it has been argued 
that self-reports of CWB may be more accurate than other-reports of CWB (e.g., 
coworkers or supervisors reporting on the focal employee) because of the rather 
private nature of CWB (Dalal, 2005). In support of this claim, a meta-analysis 
(Berry, Carpenter, & Barratt, 2012) illustrates not only that self-reports of CWB 
present moderate to high correlations with other-reports of CWB but also that 
other-reports capture a narrower subset of CWBs, thus presenting, at best, an 
incremental contribution beyond self-reports of CWB.  
Another potential limitation resulting from measuring our variables using 
self-reports is that it may lead to common method bias. However, we do not 
believe that such bias drives our results. We used time-lagged variables, as well 
as temporal separation between our Level 2 moderator (i.e., moral identity) and 
our Level 1 predictors (i.e., CWB and sleep quality). This reduces common 
method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Moreover, 
common method bias cannot explain interaction effects (Evans, 1985), which 
were of interest in the present paper.  
Furthermore, the causal order presented in our model (CWB exhibited on 
one day facilitates exhibiting CWB the next day) is grounded in established 
theories (i.e., control theory and the resource model of self-control). However, 
although lagged data helps to tease out the presumed causal order of our 
variables (Brewer, 2000; Debusscher et al, 2016; Skyvignton, 2014), our data is, 
as any ESM data (Judge et al., 2006), correlational in nature. Given the 
difficulty of experimentally manipulating CWB, the procedures used in this 
paper follow the standards set by existing within-individual CWB research 
(Dalal et al., 2009; Debusscher et al., 2016; Judge et al., 2006; Ferris et al., 2012; 
Matta et al., 2014; Meier & Gross, 2015; Skyvington, 2014; Yang & Diefendorff, 
2009). Future research should, however, experimentally manipulate CWB and / 
or sleep quality to draw more internally valid conclusions.  
Future research should also more specifically address the motives 
underlying enactment of CWB. In line with the nature of CWB, we argued that 
employees engage in CWB in pursuit of self-serving goals. However, some prior 
research has identified more specific types of goals that fit under the broad 
umbrella of self-serving goals. Using a cross-sectional design, Krischer, Penny, 
and Hunter (2010) found that employees engaged in CWB for instrumental 
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reasons such as coping with work stressors. Recently, Yam, Klotz, and Reynolds 
(2014) found that employees engaged in CWB because they felt entitled to do so 
(as a result of having engaged in OCB). The specific type of reason for engaging 
in CWB might have an impact on the extent to which a momentary slip results 
in a binge. Future research would therefore benefit from taking a temporal 
perspective on the underlying motives that might make CWB more of less 
addictive over time.  
Finally, future research should also more carefully address the 
generalizability of the finding we obtained that enacting CWB on one day leads 
to enacting CWB on a subsequent day. This finding is in line with the moral 
consistency literature, which suggests that individuals strive to behave 
consistently in line with their moral self-regard. Thus, a salient self-concept as 
a moral person promotes pro-social behaviors whereas a less salient self-concept 
as a moral person promotes self-serving behaviors (Aquino et al., 2009; Blasi, 
1984). However, the literature on moral compensation and licensing provides a 
contrasting set of findings. Individuals who engaged in past self-serving 
behaviors feel they need to compensate by engaging in subsequent pro-social 
behaviors; individuals who engaged in past pro-social behaviors feel licensed to 
engage in subsequent self-serving behaviors (Monin & Miller, 2001; Miller & 
Effron, 2010; Nisan, 1991). As of yet, it is largely unclear when moral 
consistency or, conversely, moral licensing/compensation emerges (Mullen & 
Monin, 2016). Research does suggest that the specific mindset that one is in, 
such as outcome versus rule focused (Cornelissen, Bashshur, Rode, & Menestrel, 
2013) or an abstract versus concrete mindset (Conway & Peetz, 2012) 
determines whether one displays moral consistency versus moral 
licensing/compensation. Future research should address if such moderators 
could also be applied to our understanding of the unfolding in time of CWB. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The emergence of CWB is dynamic and fluctuates across time and within 
employees. Although our understanding of what triggers such fluctuations to 
emerge has been rapidly expanding over the past years, it is as of yet unknown 
how (and also why) CWB unfolds in time. Integrating insights from control 
theory with those from the resource model of self-control we aim to advance an 
understanding of the consequences of engaging in CWB for the subsequent 
display of CWB by suggesting that the display of CWB resembles addictive 
behaviors. In particular, we develop a self-regulation argument for how the 
interplay between a daily self-regulatory variable (sleep quality) and a stable 
self-regulatory variable (moral identity) explains the temporal sequencing of 
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within-individual variability in CWB. Results from an ESM study suggests that 
enacting CWB is indeed addictive, and this is particularly true for individuals 
who suffer from low sleep quality and who chronically do not consider morality 
as central to their self-definition. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
 
Positive and negative affect. In line with theoretical and empirical work 
showing that CWB varies systematically with affective states (Dalal et al. 2009; 
Hanisch & Huilin, 1991; Spector & Fox, 2002), we also measured respondents’ 
daily affect with a 4-item scale adapted from Miner, Glomb, and Hulin (2005). 
Two of these items referred to positive affect (e.g., “being in a good mood”, 
“cheerful”) and two referred to negative affect (e.g., “sad”, “unhappy”). We used 
a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) and introduced the items with 
the stem: “At the moment I feel”. We ran our models while controlling for both 
positive and negative affect.  Results with these additional control variables 
were similar to those presented above. 
Systematic biases. We examined whether certain employees were more 
likely than others to respond to our surveys by examining the strength of the 
association between respondents’ demographic characteristics and the number 
of surveys completed. We found no significant correlations between the number 
of surveys completed and respondents’ age (r = -.10, p = .29), gender (r = -.02, p 
= .78), overall work experience (r = -.07, p = .47), work experience in the current 
company (r = -.13, p = .16), and hierarchical position (r = .01, p = .86). There 
was, however, a negative correlation between the number of surveys completed 
and respondents’ education level (r = -.20, p = .03). We conducted additional 
analyses controlling for this variable and obtained results similar to those 
presented in the previous section. 
 Growth models. Whereas our aim was not to look at trends across time 
(i.e., growth models), our data was collected across time. To examine whether 
time had any effect on our hypothesized relationships, we conducted additional 
analyses including a linear and a quadratic term of time across all analyses. We 
obtained results similar to those presented in the section above.  
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STATISTICAL EQUATIONS 
 
Basic notations: 
j – the subscript used for respondents (Level 2 respondent-level data) 
i – the subscript used for observations (Level 1 observation-level data) 
t – the subscript used for time  
 
The Null Model for observation i in individual j: 
Level 1 equation:  
CWBijt+1 = β0j+εij 
Level 2 equation:  
β0j = γ00 + u0j 
 
Substituting the Level 2 equation in the Level 1 equation gives the Mixed 
Model equation: 
CWBijt+1 = γ00 + u0j +εij 
Where:  
β0j = the mean of CWBijt+1 for the jth respondent  
γ00 = the fixed component, representing the intercept or the average level 
of CWBijt+1 across the 160 respondents  
u0j +εij = together compose the random component  
u0j = the between-individuals variation in intercepts (Level 2 variance) 
εij = the error parameter in estimating CWBijt+1 within respondents (Level 
1 variance) 
 
Final model (3-way interaction) 
Level 1 equation:  
CWBijt+1 = β0j + β1j CWBijt + β2j sleep qualityijt+1 + β3j CWBijt * sleep qualityijt+1 
+ εij 
Level 2 equation:  
β0j = γ00 + γ01 moral identity + uoj 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 moral identity  
β2j = γ20 + γ21 moral identity 
β3j = γ30 + γ31 moral identity + u3j 
 
Substituting the L2 equation in the L1 equation gives the Mixed Model 
equation: 
CWBijt+1 = γ00 + γ01 moral identity + γ10 CWBijt + γ11 CWBijt * moral identity 
+ γ20 sleep qualityijt+1 + γ21 sleep qualityijt+1 * moral identity + γ30 CWBijt * 
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sleep qualityijt+1 + γ31 moral identity * CWBijt * sleep qualityijt+1 + uoj + u3j + 
εij 
Where: 
γ10 = the estimate for the effect of CWBijt on CWBijt+1   
γ20 = the estimate of the effect of sleep qualityt+1 on CWBt+1 
γ30 = the estimate of the interaction between CWBijt and sleep qualityt+1 on 
CWBijt+1   
γ11 = the estimate of the interaction between CWBijt and moral identity on 
CWBijt+1   
γ21 = of the interaction between sleep qualityt+1 and moral identity on 
CWBijt+1   
γ31 = the estimate for the effect of the interaction term of moral identity * 
CWBijt * sleep qualityijt+1 on CWBijt+1   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”   
– John Dalberg Acton 
 
“With power comes great responsibility”   
– Anonymous   
 
 
Power is an essential element of most formal leadership roles (DeWall, 
Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs, 2011; Goodwin, 2003; Magee, Gruenfeld, Keltner, & 
Galinsky, 2005; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Williams, 2014). The two quotes 
presented above paint two distinct images of power: one of power being a 
corrupting force and one of power requiring responsible action. Yet, the crude 
reality is that power often seems to corrupt the mind of those who possess it and 
the many ethical scandals that shocked the world over the past two decades, 
such as those at ENRON, Worldcom, and Volkswagen are often taken as an 
illustration of this. Although theses scandals present some variation in terms of 
the types of unethical behaviors involved, they share two striking similarities. 
First, the root cause was found in the leadership from the highest levels of power 
in the organization (Johnson, 2003; Elkind & McLean, 2004; Beresford, 
Katzenbach, & Rogers, 2003). Second, the unethical acts were not the result of 
leaders’ unintentional mistakes but appeared, in fact, to be the result of 
conscious and deliberate decisions (Elkind, 2013; Liker, 2015; Krauss, 2008; 
Zandstra, 2002). Because of the importance of leaders in power positions making 
sound moral decisions (Treviño, 1986; Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Brown 
& Treviño, 2006), in the current paper we argue that a focus is needed on how 
power impacts the process underlying such decisions, namely moral reasoning.  
Moral reasoning refers to the processes involved in judging what is a 
morally right or wrong action to pursue (Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1986; Treviño, 
1986). Moral reasoning is usually considered a conscious and deliberative 
process that, over relatively long periods of time (i.e., months or years), may 
progress to higher (i.e., more complex) levels (Kohlberg, 1969). Unfortunately, 
the few studies that so far looked at the relationship between power and moral 
reasoning revealed inconsistent findings, with some studies finding that higher 
power (operationalized as hierarchical position) is correlated with lower levels 
of moral reasoning (Ponemon, 1990, 1992; Shaub, 1989) and others finding no 
relationship (Forte, 2004; Sosik, Juzbasich, & Chun, 2011). This inconsistent 
evidence could result from the cross-sectional designs applied in these studies, 
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which cannot establish causal explanations for any obtained correlations 
between power and moral reasoning. It is possible that one’s level of power 
affects one’s moral reasoning level, but it is equally possible that certain moral 
reasoning levels facilitate gaining power in specific types of organizations 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Treviño & Weaver, 2003). 
In the present research we take an approach that is very different from 
prior work. Specifically, we connect insights on motivated cognition (Kunda, 
1990; Fiske, 1992) with the social psychological power literature (Anderson, 
John, & Keltner, 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013; Sturm & Antonakis, 2015) to 
argue that having high power can immediately (rather than over long periods of 
time) lower one’s level of moral reasoning. We also argue that this influence of 
power on moral reasoning will materialize particularly when power is construed 
as providing opportunities for goal attainment, which is how individuals often 
experience power in interpersonal power relationships (Zhong, Magee, Maddux, 
& Galinsky, 2006; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005, 2008). Finally, we argue that 
power does not lower moral reasoning when it is construed as having 
responsibility for one’s own actions, an element that is particularly central to 
organizational leadership (cf. Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Overbeck & Park, 
2001; Sassenberg, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2012; Sassenberg, Ellemers, 
Scheepers, & Scholl, 2014; Tost, 2015). We test these predictions using 
experimental procedures that permit establishing immediate and causal effects 
of power on moral reasoning. 
Our research makes three contributions to the literature. First, we 
illustrate the relevance of addressing power within the leadership literature by 
providing experimental evidence that the experience of high power lowers moral 
reasoning. Moreover, by showing that power lowers moral reasoning levels when 
it is framed as opportunity rather than as responsibility, we draw researchers’ 
attention to the need to consider the underlying framings of power if we wish to 
advance a deeper and more complete understanding of the effects of power that 
are inherent to leadership roles. Second, by integrating theorizing on the social 
psychological effects of power with motivated cognition research, we show that 
the influence of power on moral psychological processes is not limited to what is 
currently the focus of almost all research on how power relates to morality 
(Sassenberg et al., 2014) and in moral psychology, namely affect and intuition 
(Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Reynolds, 2006), but extends to 
conscious cognitive processes. Third, by arguing that power can immediately 
impact moral reasoning, we add to the large body of work on moral reasoning. 
As noted, moral reasoning is usually viewed as a process that over relatively 
long periods of time may progress to higher levels (Kolhberg, 1969; O’Fallen & 
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Butterfield, 2005; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). We show that power has 
an immediate effect on moral reasoning levels. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Moral Reasoning and Cognitive Moral Development Theory 
The most influential theory on moral reasoning and, in fact, the most 
influential theory in moral psychology during the second half of the twentieth 
century is Kohlberg’s (1969) theory of moral development. Kohlberg 
conceptualized moral reasoning as a developmental process that spans across 
six sequential and irreversible stages. At the lowest level of moral reasoning - 
the pre-conventional level – individuals’ judgment of what is right or wrong is 
influenced either by the concrete consequences of their actions such as 
punishments or rewards (Stage 1) or by their own self-interest (Stage 2). This 
pre-conventional level of moral reasoning resembles the typical reasoning that 
children use. Most adults, however, operate at the conventional level of moral 
reasoning (Colby, 1978). At this level, individuals’ judgments of what is right or 
wrong become sensitive to rules and laws set by their immediate social circle 
(Stage 3) and the broader society (Stage 4) that they are a part of. Finally, the 
post-conventional level represents the highest level of cognitive complexity and 
the most mature level of moral functioning; yet few adults reach it. At this level, 
individuals move away from being concerned with their own personal interests 
or with following rules and norms to having a more impartial judgment of what 
is right or wrong. Thus, individuals develop a more active perspective taking, 
focusing on the greater societal good (Stage 5) and can even form their own 
moral principles that might or might not overlap with existing rules and laws 
(Stage 6).  
Drawing on the work of Jean Piaget (1932/1965), Kohlberg (1969) argued 
that moral reasoning develops one stage at a time, in an upward progressive 
manner, without skipping a stage or regressing to a previously acquired stage. 
Decades of empirical research provide strong support for Kohlberg’s proposed 
sequential stage development (see Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, Lieberman, Fischer, 
& Saltzstein, 1983; Kohlberg & Kramer; 1969; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Rest, 
1975; White, Bushnell, & Regnemer, 1978; for longitudinal studies) and show 
that individuals prefer to use the highest acquired stage (Treviño, 1992). 
Notwithstanding the fact that for some individuals there are signs of stage 
regression (cf. Holstein, 1976), it appears that stage development exists and it 
is the norm rather than the exception (see Peterson & Seligman, 2004, and 
McCauley, Drath, Palus, O'Connor, & Baker, 2006, for reviews). While much 
empirical work focused on long-term influences such as stable individual 
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characteristics (see Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000; O’Fallen & Butterfield, 
2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Cowe, 2008; Treviño et al., 2006 for reviews), or 
stable organizational factors (i.e., hierarchical power; Ponemon, 1990, 1992; 
Shaub, 1989), there is some research to suggest that moral reasoning might 
actually vary as a function of the surrounding context (i.e., the context in which 
the moral dilemmas are situated in, Weber, 1990; see also Bredemeier, Shields, 
& Shields, 1986).  
Of particular interest to the present work are two studies suggesting that 
even short-term contextual factors may have an immediate influence on 
individuals’ moral reasoning. Reall, Bailey, and Stoll (1998) claimed that 
students’ moral reasoning levels were lower during a competitive game than 
they were before students started playing the game. Unfortunately, the use of 
different instruments to assess moral reasoning before and during the game 
makes comparing moral reasoning levels difficult. Zarinpoush, Cooper, and 
Moylan (2000) found in one study (but not in two replication attempts) that 
participants induced to be in a happy (compared to a sad or a neutral) mood 
displayed lower levels of moral reasoning. These findings suggest that 
individuals might not always reason at their highest acquired level of moral 
reasoning and that sometimes, contextual factors may lower moral reasoning 
levels. In the following sections we argue why power might be such a factor.  
 
Power and Moral Reasoning  
Power is commonly defined as the asymmetric control over valued resources 
(see Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Blader & Chen, 2014). People place high value on 
having power because, among others, it provides them access to material 
resources (Emerson, 1962; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Fiske & 
Berdahl, 2007), autonomy (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; van Dijke & Poppe, 
2006), and status (French & Raven, 1959; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In light of 
such benefits, it comes as no surprise that those in power are motivated to 
preserve the status quo and protect their position of power (Glick et al., 2004; 
Williams, 2014). One way in which those in power can achieve this is by 
emphasizing the value of existing rules and laws. This is because such rules and 
laws signal a stable power structure and further help preserve it (Lind, 2001; 
Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2004; Tyler, 2001, 2006). Building on the 
motivated cognition literature (Kunda, 1990; Fiske, 1992), we argue that this 
desire to protect one’s position of high power, highlighting the value of existing 
rules and norms, stimulates moral reasoning characteristic of Stage 3 and 4 of 
cognitive moral development. 
Motivated cognition refers to findings showing that individuals attempt to 
match the way they process information with what they know or wish to be true 
90                                                                                                              Chapter 4 
(i.e., goals or needs) in order to arrive at desired conclusions (Kunda, 1990; 
Fiske, 1992). This tendency is so strong that it pervades information processing 
across various levels from what individuals see, to how they think, and finally 
to what they decide to do (Dunning, 1999; Kruglanski, Belanger, Chen, Kopetz, 
Pierro, & Mannetti, 2012). Notable evidence that one’s motivations can shape 
cognitive processes comes from research on stereotyping or attributions. For 
example, motivations such as boosting self-worth shape individuals’ use of 
negative stereotypes (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Sinclair & Kunda, 1996). 
Furthermore, individuals’ motivation to enhance and protect their self-esteem 
shapes the attributions they make by, for instance, accepting credit for their 
own successes whilst placing blame on circumstances and bad luck for their 
failures (Dunning, 1999; Heider, 1958; Miller, 1976). It therefore stands to 
reason that the cognitive architecture that individuals bring to bear on their 
judgment of what is morally right or wrong is shaped by their current 
motivations – one important motivation for powerful individuals is the wish to 
protect their current power level.  
Based on the above, we argue that high power individuals’ motivation to 
legitimize their position of power may shift their moral reasoning towards a 
focus on the value of rules and norms set by one’s immediate social circle or the 
broader society (Stage 3 and 4) rather than on the greater societal good or on 
the formation of autonomous moral principles (Stage 5 and 6). Furthermore, 
knowing that adults rarely, if ever, reason at the lowest level of moral reasoning 
(i.e., the pre-conventional level, stage 1-2), temporary stage regression (from 
stage 5-6 to stage 3-4), rather than stage progression (from stage 1-2 to stage 3-
4) is likely to be more common. This line of reasoning culminates in our first 
hypothesis: 
Having high (vs. moderate or low) power leads to lower levels of moral 
reasoning (H1).  
 
Experiencing Power as Responsibility  
Our line of argumentation as presented earlier is based on the premise that 
high power involves opportunities to attain one’s goals (Zhong, et al., 2006; De 
Cremer & van Dijk, 2005, 2008). Nevertheless, the framing of power in terms of 
“opportunity” may be less likely to emerge in an organizational context in which 
the interdependence between power holders and subordinates is more salient 
(Hamilton & Biggart, 1985; Tost, 2015), and in which power holders’ behavior is 
highly scrutinized (Fleming & Spicer, 2014; Smith & Overbeck, 2014). Indeed, 
a central element of high power that organizations wish to stress and activate 
is a sense of responsibility (De Cremer & van Dijk, 2008; Hollander, 2009; Tost, 
2015). In fact, in a conceptual paper, Tost (2015) argued that the psychological 
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essence of organizational power relationships lies not only in the widely 
acknowledged sense of freedom but also in a sense of responsibility with 
downstream consequences on individuals’ cognitive processes. This author 
further argues that the experience of power as responsibility is particularly 
likely to emerge within an organizational context that stresses the salience of 
others’ dependency.  
Research in social psychology provides further insights regarding the 
connection between power and responsibility (Chen et al., 2001; Overbeck & 
Park, 2001; Sassenberg et al., 2012; Sassenberg et al., 2014). Baumeister, 
Chesner, Senders, and Tice (1988) found that placing individuals in a leadership 
position, as opposed to a subordinate position, triggered feelings of 
responsibility, which resulted in a higher tendency to help others in an 
emergency situation. Similarly, De Cremer and van Dijk (2008) found that the 
baseline feelings of entitlement that result from placing individuals in a 
leadership or a high-power role, were diminished when the underlying 
dimension of social responsibility was made salient to their role. Overall, it 
seems possible that individuals frame their experience of power not just in terms 
of opportunity but also in terms of responsibility; a shift that is likely to occur 
in an organizational context. 
Aligning the above evidence to the motivated cognition literature, we argue 
that our predicted effect that having high power lowers moral reasoning levels 
will emerge particularly when power is framed in terms of opportunity rather 
than responsibility. We expect this because individuals will be particularly 
motivated to maintain the status quo of the existing organizational power 
relationships when their high power position is construed in terms of 
opportunity rather than in terms of responsibility. In support of this argument, 
research shows that individuals find power more desirable when it is construed 
as providing opportunities for goal attainment rather than as providing a 
heightened responsibility for one’s actions (Sassenberg et al., 2012). As 
mentioned earlier, this motivation to maintain the status quo and thus 
legitimize one’s position of high power will focus individuals’ moral reasoning 
on the values of existing rules and laws, which resembles relatively lower level 
of moral reasoning (i.e., Stage 3 and 4). This brings us to our second hypothesis:  
Construing one’s power as opportunity for goal attainment leads to lower 
levels of moral reasoning compared to construing one’s power as responsibility 
for one’s actions (H2).  
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OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
 
Our aim is to zoom-in on the immediate effect of power on moral reasoning 
and to provide conclusive causal evidence for this effect. We therefore conducted 
four laboratory experiments to test our hypotheses. We used different 
manipulations to capture the influence of power on individuals’ moral 
reasoning. In particular, in Study 1, we used an established manipulation of 
power to place individuals in an actual hierarchical structure (manager vs. 
subordinate). In Study 2 we used a well-known and widely validated power 
recall procedure. We designed Study 3 to replicate our findings from Study 2 
and to add a neutral control condition. This permits drawing conclusions 
regarding whether high power lowers moral reasoning levels or whether low 
power heightens moral reasoning levels. Finally, in Study 4 we zoomed in on the 
experience of high power and used a priming procedure to study how construing 
this experience as opportunity versus responsibility (or a neutral condition) 
impacts individuals’ level of moral reasoning.  
 
STUDY 1 
 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and one undergraduate business 
students from a medium-sized European university participated in return for 
course credits. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions of a two-
level design (power: high vs. low). Based on criteria described below (see 
“dependent variable”), we included one hundred participants in subsequent data 
analyses. Fifty-one percent of participants were male; the average age was 19.39 
(SD = 1.74) years. Thirty-seven percent indicated currently having a job, 
working on average 10.16 (SD = 5.08) hours per week. Ninety-two percent of 
participants had a high-school diploma, 6% had a bachelor diploma, and 2% 
indicated having finished another type of education (i.e., passed the first year 
exam for the bachelor studies). 
Procedure. Participants were seated in separate cubicles, each equipped 
with a personal computer. All materials were presented on the computer screen. 
We informed them that they would be paired with another participant from 
another cubicle and take part in a decision-making exercise. We further 
informed them that this exercise required one person to be the manager and the 
other to be the subordinate. Such structural manipulations are often used to 
manipulate high versus low power (e.g., Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & 
Galinsky, 2009; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Guinote, Weick, & Cail, 
2012), and are also used in the leadership literature in studies that manipulate 
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leader versus follower roles (e.g., De Cremer & Van Vugt, 2002; De Cremer & 
van Dijk, 2005; Samuelson & Allison, 1994). We slightly adapted the procedure 
from Galinsky and colleagues (2003) by telling participants that their role would 
be randomly assigned by the computer. We opted for this procedure rather than 
the one in which their role is determined based on a score they receive on a 
“Leadership Questionnaire” in order to avoid suspicion and feelings of 
disappointment or unfairness. After waiting for a few seconds for the computer 
to assign them the role, participants received a brief description of the role they 
were assigned to. Specifically, participants assigned to the manager role (high 
power position) received the following instructions: 
“As a manager you are in charge of directing, supervising, and evaluating 
your subordinate in the upcoming exercise. You are the one in charge of deciding 
how to evaluate your subordinate. As a manager you are also in charge of 
evaluating the performance of your subordinate in how he/she handles the 
upcoming exercise. Importantly, the subordinate will not have a chance to 
evaluate you.” 
Participants assigned to the subordinate role (low power positions) received 
the following instructions:   
“As a subordinate, your manager will direct, supervise, and evaluate you in 
the upcoming exercise. Your manager will decide how to evaluate your 
performance in the upcoming exercise. You will not have the chance to evaluate 
your manager. Only the manager is in charge of directing and evaluating your 
performance in how you handle the upcoming exercise.”  
Following the role description, we asked participants to answer three 
manipulation check questions. Next, we measured their moral reasoning level 
with the Defining Issues Test (DIT). We introduced this as the decision-making 
part of the exercise. Specifically, we asked them to indicate their opinion about 
three different problem stories (i.e., moral dilemmas) that represent the short 
moral reasoning scale developed by Rest (1990; see also Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, 
& Bebeau, 1997). After each story, we asked participants (1) to indicate how 
they would approach the situation presented with one question, (2) to rate the 
importance of twelve more in-depth questions/statements about the situation, 
and lastly (3) to rank the first four most important questions/statements out of 
these twelve. At the end, we recorded their age, gender, education, and work 
experience.  
Manipulation checks. In line with previous work (Galinksy et al., 2003; 
Fast et al., 2009), we checked the effectiveness of our power manipulation with 
three items. Participants indicated on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
strongly agree) the extent to which they felt (1) in charge in the upcoming 
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exercise, (2) powerful, and (3) in control in the upcoming exercise. We combined 
these items into a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .92).  
Dependent variable. We measured participants’ moral reasoning with 
the short form of Rest’s (1990) DIT, the most widely used tool for assessing moral 
reasoning level (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999; Thoma, 2006). The 
short form is comprised of a sub-set of three out of six moral dilemmas. Since 
there is no particular preference given to which three dilemmas to use, we 
decided to use the following three: (1) the Student take-over (i.e., whether or not 
students should take over an administration building in sign of protest against 
war), (2) the Doctor’s dilemma (i.e., whether or not a doctor should administer 
an overdose of painkillers to a patient in pain), and (3) the Webster story (i.e., 
whether or not a minority member should be hired when the community is 
clearly biased against minorities). 
After each dilemma, we first asked participants to make a decision about 
the situation presented on a 3-point scale: 1 (take action), 2 (can’t decide), and 3 
(not take action). Thereafter, for each dilemma, we asked them to rate 12 
statements/questions on a 5-point scale from 1 (great importance) to 5 (no 
importance). Lastly, we asked them to consider all 12 statements/questions 
simultaneously and rank the four most important ones for making a decision 
about each dilemma from 1 (most important) to 4 (fourth most important). We 
used the ratings and rankings to compute each participant’s individual score. In 
line with previous literature (Abdolmohammadi & Sultan, 2002; Cummings, 
Dyas, Maddus, & Kochman, 2001; Jordan, Brown, Treviño, & Finkelstein, 2013) 
we derived the P-score as an overall measure of moral reasoning. The P-score 
represents the percentage of items comprising the principled reasoning stages 
from Kohlberg (Stage 5 and 6; 1981; 1984). In other words, it indicates the 
degree to which individuals place a great importance on post-conventional and 
principled considerations when making a decision. A higher P-score represents 
a higher level of moral reasoning.  
In line with recommendations from Rest (1990), we checked the reliability 
and consistency of participants’ answers on the DIT. First, none of the 
participants failed the reliability check (i.e., rating above 4 certain items that 
were written to simply sound exaggeratedly fancy but actually have no meaning 
such as in the Doctor’s dilemma item number 6: “What is the value of death prior 
to society’s perspective on personal values”). Second, one participant failed the 
consistency check (i.e., consistently choosing a ranking order that was not in 
line with the ratings given across two or all three stories). In line with 
recommendations from Rest (1990), we excluded this participant from further 
analyses. In addition to these criteria, we also scanned the data for outliers. 
There were no outliers in this study. 
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Results 
Table 12 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among 
the variables included in this study. This table shows that none of the variables 
included were significantly related to either the P-score or the condition 
variable. We therefore excluded these variables from subsequent analyses.  
 
Table 12 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among all variables, Study 1  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. P-score 34.20 11.75 -       
2. Condition a     .50     .50 -.36** -      
3. Age 19.39   1.74  .02 .00 -     
4. Gender b   1.49     .50 -.09 -.06 -.19* -    
5. Education c   1.10    .36  .05 -.11 .46**  .00** -   
6. Work d     .37    .48 -.03 .06 .25** -.08 .13 -  
7. Work hours 10.16 5.08  .18 -.23 .10  .15 .13 - - 
Note. N = 100. a Coded as 0 = Low structural power position, 1 = High structural power position;   
b Coded as 1 = Male, 2 = Female; c Coded as 1 = High-school degree, 2 = Bachelor degree, 3 = Other.  
d Coded as 1 = Working, 0 = Not working. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
Manipulation checks.  A one-way ANOVA on the manipulation check 
scale revealed that participants assigned to the high power position reported 
feeling more powerful (M = 5.92, SD = 1.01) compared to those assigned to the 
low power position (M = 2.42, SD = 1.17), F (1, 98) = 253.21, p < .001, η2 = .72. 
Hence, the power manipulation procedure was successful. 
Hypothesis test. A one-factor ANOVA (Power: High vs. Low) revealed a 
significant main effect on the P-score22 (F [1, 98] = 15.04, p < .001, η2 = .13). 
Participants who were placed in the high power position had a lower P-score (M 
= 29.93, SD = 11.43) compared to those who were placed in the low power 
position (M = 38.46, SD = 10.54).  
Overall, this study provides initial evidence to support our hypothesis that 
the experience of high, as opposed to low, power decreases individuals’ moral 
reasoning. 
                                                        
22 We also computed the N2 score, which represents the relative importance that participants give 
to the items representing the post-conventional moral reasoning level (i.e., Stage 5 and 6) in 
comparison to items that reflect the pre-conventional moral reasoning level (i.e., Stage 2 and 3; see 
Rest et al., 1997 for a detailed description of the scoring). A one-factor ANOVA (Structural Power: 
High vs. Low) revealed a significant main effect on the N2 score (F [1, 98] = 14.54, p < .001, η2 = 
.12). Participants who were placed in the high structural power position had a lower N2 score (M = 
7.61, SD = 11.76) compared to those who were placed in the low structural power position (M = 
16.36, SD = 11.17). 
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STUDY 2 
 
 We designed Study 2 for two reasons. First, we aimed to address an 
inherent limitation associated with structural manipulations of power. In 
particular, it has been argued that structural positions are often associated with 
other variables aside from power, such as status (Blader & Chen, 2014). Such 
variables might have different psychological effects compared to those of power 
(Blader & Chen, 2012; Blader, Shirako, & Chen, in press; Overbeck & Park, 2001). 
In Study 2, we therefore use a well-known and widely validated recall procedure 
to capture individuals’ experience of power. Second, we aimed to increase the 
generalizability of our results by using a different set of moral dilemmas from 
Rest’s (1990) instrument than the one we used in Study 1.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Ninety-four undergraduate business students 
from a medium-sized European university participated in return for course 
credits. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions of a two-level 
design (power: high vs. low). Based on criteria explained below, we included 
seventy-eight participants in subsequent data analyses (84%). Sixty percent of 
participants were male; the average age was 19.03 (SD = 1.51) years. Thirty-
four percent indicated currently having a job, working on average 10.93 (SD = 
6.44) hours per week. Eighty-five percent of participants had a high-school 
diploma, 12% had a bachelor diploma, and 4% indicated having finished another 
type of education (i.e., passed the first year exam for the bachelor studies). 
Procedure. The experiment was conducted in the lab. We informed 
participants that they would take part in two separate studies. We introduced 
the first one as a study about individuals’ feelings when recalling a past 
experience. In reality, this study contained the power recall procedure developed 
by Galinsky and colleagues (2003). Participants in the high-power condition 
received the following instructions: 
“Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another 
individual or individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled 
the ability of another person or persons to get something that they wanted, or 
were in a position to evaluate those individuals.” 
Participants in the low-power condition received the following instructions: 
“Please recall a particular incident in which someone else had power over 
you. By power, we mean a situation in which someone had control over your 
ability to get something you wanted, or was in a position to evaluate.” 
Following the writing task, the first study ended with four manipulation 
check questions. Next, we thanked and directed participants to the second study 
Chapter 4                                                                                                              97 
that was used to measure their moral reasoning level. We followed a similar 
procedure to measure moral reasoning as in Study 1 but this time using a sub-
set of the other three moral dilemmas from the DIT measure (Rest, 1990), 
namely: (1) Heinz and the drug (i.e., whether or not Heinz should steal a drug 
from its inventor to save his dying wife), (2) The escaped prisoner (i.e., whether 
or not an escaped prisoner should be reported to the authorities given that he 
has been living an exemplary life since his escape), and (3) The newspaper (i.e., 
whether or not a high school principal should stop a student newspaper because 
it stirs controversy in the community).  
Manipulation checks. In line with previous work (Anderson & Galinsky, 
2006; Fisher, Fisher, Englich, Aydin, & Frey, 2011; Weick & Guinote, 2008), we 
checked the effectiveness of our power manipulation with four items. 
Participants indicated on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree) the extent to which they felt they (1) had power over others, (2) affected 
others’ outcomes, (3) had authority over others, and (4) had the ability to 
dominate in the situation described. We combined these items into a reliable 
scale (Cronbach’s α = .90).  
Dependent variable. Similar to Study 1, we measured moral reasoning 
with the short form of the DIT, but as described above, using the other three 
moral dilemmas. Nonetheless, the same scoring applies to these dilemmas as to 
the ones included and explained in Study 1. We also used the same criteria as 
in Study 1 to check the reliability and consistency of the moral reasoning 
measure. Nine participants failed the reliability check and six participants 
failed the consistency check (i.e., consistently choosing a ranking order that was 
not in line with the ratings given across two or all three stories). Similar to 
Study 1, we also scanned the data for outliers. One participant had a value for 
the moral reasoning measure of 73.33, which is approximately 3.37 SDs above 
the mean of 29.79 (SD = 12.92). Therefore, we also excluded this participant 
from further analyses. 
 
Results 
Table 13 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among 
the variables included in this study. This table shows that participants who 
indicated having a job tended to have a lower P-score compared to those who 
indicated not having a job (r = -.25, p = .03)23.  
Manipulation checks.  A one-way ANOVA on the manipulation check 
scale revealed that participants in the high-power condition reported feeling 
                                                        
23 We conducted the main analyses while controlling for work and obtained results similar to those 
in the main text. 
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more powerful (M = 5.44, SD = .93) compared to those in the low-power condition 
(M = 2.47, SD = 1.04), F (1, 76) = 175.95, p < .001, η2 = .69. Hence, the power 
manipulation was successful. 
Hypothesis tests. A one-factor ANOVA (Power: High vs. Low) revealed a 
significant main effect on the P-score24 (F [1, 76] = 4.25, p = .04, η2 = .05). 
Participants in the high-power condition had a lower P-score (M = 27.19, SD = 
14.97) compared to those in the low-power condition (M = 33.52, SD = 11.12).  
Overall, this study provides further evidence to support our hypothesis that 
high, as opposed to low, power decreases individuals’ moral reasoning.  
 
Table 13 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among all variables, Study 2  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. P-score 29.95 13.72 -       
2. Condition a     .56     .49 -.23* -      
3. Age 19.03   1.51 -.02 -.19 -     
4. Gender b   1.60     .49 -.09 -.18 .01 -    
5. Education c   1.19     .48  .10 -.02 .18 -.32** -   
6. Work d     .31     .46 -.25* -.03 .24* -.11  .09 -  
7. Work hours 11.80   7.07  .09 -.34 .18  .09 -.17 - - 
Note. N = 78. a Coded as 0 = Low-power condition, 1 = High-power condition; b Coded as 1 = Male, 
2 = Female; c Coded as 1 = High-school degree, 2 = Bachelor degree, 3 = Other. d Coded as 1 = 
Working, 0 = Not working. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
STUDY 3 
 
We conducted Study 3 for two reasons. First, in line with recommendations 
stressing the value of replications (see Lishner, 2015, for a recent account), we 
aimed to replicate the results in order to increase the robustness of the 
conclusions that can be drawn from Study 2. Second, we added a control 
condition that allowed us to examine whether high power diminishes one’s level 
of moral reasoning or whether low power augments one’s level of moral 
reasoning.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and forty-eight undergraduate 
business students were randomly assigned to three conditions (power: high vs. 
                                                        
24 A one-factor ANOVA (Power: High vs. Low) revealed a marginally significant main effect on the 
N2 score (F [1, 76] = 3.24, p = .07, η2 = .04). Participants in the high-power condition had a lower N2 
score (M = 8.19, SD = 15.78) compared to those in the low-power condition (M = 14.03, SD = 11.79). 
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low vs. control). Based on criteria explained below, we excluded 39 participants 
(26%) from data analyses, leaving us with a final N of 109 (44% male) with an 
average age of 21.28 (SD = 2.56) years. Forty-five percent of these participants 
had a high-school diploma, 40.4% had a bachelor diploma, 9.2% had a master 
diploma, and 5.5% indicated having finished another type of education (e.g., 
passed the first year exam for the bachelor studies). Of these participants, 69.7% 
participated in exchange for five Euros and 30.3% participated in exchange for 
one course credit. Due to an error, we did not record work experience in this 
study. 
Procedure. The experiment was conducted in the lab. We followed a 
similar procedure as in Study 2 with two exceptions. First, in line with previous 
studies in the power literature, we included a control condition. Specifically, the 
instructions in this condition read as follows: 
 “Please recall what you did yesterday. Describe your experience – what you 
did, how you felt, and so on.” 
Second, we measured moral reasoning with the same three moral dilemmas 
that we used in Study 1.  
Manipulation checks. We used the same four items as in Study 2 to check 
the effectiveness of the power manipulation procedure (Cronbach’s α = .89).  
Dependent variable. We measured moral reasoning with the short form 
of the DIT, but as described above, using the three moral dilemmas from Study 
1 and applied the same procedure when computing the P-score. We used the 
same criteria as in Study 1 and 2 to check the reliability and consistency of the 
moral reasoning measure. Twenty-nine participants failed the reliability check 
and nine failed the consistency check. We also checked the data for outliers. We 
excluded one student for whom the score for the moral reasoning measure was 
83.33, which was approximately 3.19 SDs (14.59) away from the mean (M = 
36.77).  
 
Results 
Table 14 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among 
the variables included in this study. This table shows that none of the variables 
included were significantly related to either the P-score or the condition 
variable. As in Study 1 and 2, we therefore excluded these variables from 
subsequent analyses.  
Manipulation checks. A one-way ANOVA on the manipulation check 
scale revealed that there were significant differences in how powerful 
individuals felt across the power conditions (F[2,106] = 57.06, p < .001, η2 = .51). 
Post-hoc tests using Tukey’s HSD revealed that participants in the high-power 
condition felt more powerful (M = 5.50, SD = 1.06) compared to those in the low-
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power condition (M = 2.43, SD = 1.07), t(106) = 10.30, p <. 001, η2 = .50, and also 
compared to those in the control condition (M = 3.35, SD = 1.58), t(106) = 7.79, 
p < .001, η2 = .36. Additionally, participants in the low-power condition felt less 
powerful compared to those in the control condition, t(106) = -2.86, p < .01, η2 = 
-.07. 
Hypothesis tests. A one-factor ANOVA (Power: High vs. Low vs. Control) 
revealed that Power had a significant effect on the P-score25 (F [2, 106] = 3.49, 
p = .03, η2 = .06). Planned pairwise comparisons showed that participants in the 
high-power condition (M = 30.19, SD = 12.00) had a lower P-score compared to 
those in the low-power condition (M = 38.76, SD = 15.76), t(106) = -2.58, p = .01, 
η2 = .05, and also compared to those in the control condition (M = 37.41, SD = 
15.75), t(106) = -2.18, p = .03, η2 = .04. P-scores did not differ between the control 
condition and the low-power condition, t(106) = .37, p = .70, η2 = .00.  
 
Table 14 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among all  variables, Study 3  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. P-score 35.59 14.85 -      
2. Condition a   1.94     .82 -.19* -     
3. Age 21.28   2.56  .18  .00 -    
4. Gender b   1.56     .49 -.03  .14  .06 -   
5. Education c   1.81   1.00  .00  .14  .30**  .18 -  
6. Study 
motivation d 
  1.30     .46 -.13 -.15 -.41** -.18 -.25** - 
Note. N = 109. a Coded as 1 = Control condition, 2 = Low-power condition, 3 = High-power condition; 
b Coded as 1 = Male, 2 = Female. c Coded as 1 = High-school degree, 2 = Bachelor degree, 3 = Master 
degree, and 4 = Other; d Coded as 1 = Money, 2 = Credits. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
Overall, this study provides further evidence that having high power 
decreases individuals’ level of moral reasoning26.  
                                                        
25 A one-factor ANOVA (Power: High vs. Low vs. Control) revealed that Power had a significant 
effect on the N2 score (F [2, 106] = 3.11, p = .04, η2 = .05). Planned pairwise comparisons showed 
that participants in the high-power condition (M = 14.43, SD = 12.83) had a lowered N2 score 
compared to those in the low-power condition (M = 23.05, SD = 15.98), t(106) = -2.31, p = .02, η2 = 
.04 and compared to those in the control condition (M = 21.72, SD = 17.04), t(106) = -2.01, p = .04, 
η2 = .03. N2 scores did not differ between the control condition and the low-power condition, t(106) 
= .37, p = .71, η2 = .00. 
26 To examine the robustness of our results in terms of high power versus low power from Studies 1-
3, we conducted a meta-analysis (random effects model) in which we included the outliers from 
Study 2 and 3 (total N = 248). We used the Meta-Essentials tool (Rhee, Suurmond, Hak, 2015) to 
computed Hedges’s g, which is a standardized mean difference effect size that corrects for bias that 
is particularly likely in small sample sizes (Hedges, 1981). Results indicated that power has a 
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STUDY 4 
 
In Study 1 we found that placing individuals in a high (as opposed to low) 
structural power position regresses their moral reasoning level. Furthermore, 
in Study 2 and 3 we found that participants who recalled an experience of high 
power (as opposed to low power or a control condition) had a lower (thus less 
advanced) level of moral reasoning. In Study 4 we wanted to examine whether 
high power would always have such effects. In particular, as noted, in 
organizational settings in particular, the experience of high power is more likely 
to instigate a sense of responsibility (Tost, 2015). In line with this argument, in 
Study 4 we zoomed-in high power role and induced two different framings of 
power (i.e., opportunity vs. responsibility) via a mindset priming procedure 
developed by Sassenberg et al. (2012). Making such a difference is imperative 
because it is likely to affect how individuals think about moral issues. That is, 
when individuals experience their power as responsibility, rather than as 
opportunity, maintaining the status quo and thus their position of power 
becomes less attractive. As a result, their judgment of what is right or wrong is 
less likely to be driven by the rules and laws set by one’s immediate social circle 
or the broader society. We therefore expect that individuals in the responsibility 
condition will display higher levels of moral reasoning compared to those in the 
opportunity condition. We also included a control condition27. This allows testing 
whether a responsibility frame heightens moral reasoning levels, or whether an 
opportunity frame lowers moral reasoning levels. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred undergraduate business students 
participated in return for course credits. We randomly assigned them to one 
condition in a three-level design (power construal: opportunity vs. responsibility 
vs. control condition). Based on the same criteria that we applied in Studies 1-
3, we removed 19 participants leaving us with a total N of 82 (82%) (see 
dependent variable for details). Fifty-two percent of these participants were 
male; the average age was 19.32 (SD = 1.40) years. Of these participants, 53.7% 
indicated currently having a job, working on average 11.37 (SD = 6.03) hours 
                                                        
medium effect (Cohen, 1988) on moral reasoning (Hedges’s g = .60, SE = .12, CI: [0.08-1.12]). The 
effect size was also homogenous (I2 = 0.00%), indicating that these three studies can be considered 
as studies of the same population.  
27 Data on the control condition were collected about four months later than the data collected for 
the other two conditions. Nevertheless, participants were drawn from the same participant pool of 
undergraduate business students who participated for the same reason – course credits. We ensured 
that pool members who had participated in this study in one of the other two conditions could not 
participate in the control condition.  
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per week. In terms of education, 94% had a high-school diploma as the highest 
completed education and 6% had a bachelor diploma. 
Procedure. The study was conducted in the lab. Similar to Study 2 and 3, 
we told participants that they would take part in two separate studies. We 
introduced the first one as a study that looks at people’s opinion about sports 
and athletes. This contained an adapted version of the manipulation of the 
construal of power as developed by Sassenberg and colleagues (2012). 
Specifically, we told participants to imagine that they were part of an 
organizational committee for a large sports event such as the Olympic Games 
and had the occasion to lead and make essential decisions for such an event. 
Thus, we requested all participants to imagine that they were in a high power 
role. In this role, we asked participants to judge twelve measures such as “To 
enable an exact comparison of the sportive achievements, great sums should be 
invested in the newest measurement technologies”. In the power as opportunity 
condition, we asked them to judge the extent to which such measures would 
contribute to the success of the event. In the power as responsibility condition, 
we asked them to judge the extent to which such measures would be an ethically 
responsible action to undertake for the event. In the control condition, we asked 
them to judge the extent to which such measures were interesting. Each 
measure was judged on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).  
After rating the measures, participants were directed to the second study. 
This contained the moral reasoning measure for which we followed the 
procedure described in Study 2. 
Dependent variable. We measured moral reasoning with the same three 
moral dilemmas that we used in Study 1 and applied the same procedure when 
computing the P-score.  
We used the same criteria as in Studies 1-3 to check the reliability and 
consistency of the moral reasoning measure. Eleven participants failed the 
reliability check and nine failed the consistency check. We excluded these 
participants from the analyses. There were no outliers in this study. 
 
Results 
Table 15 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among 
the variables included in this study. Results from this table show that age was 
positively and significantly related to the P-score (r = .27, p = .01) indicating 
that older participants tended to have a higher P-score compared to younger 
participants28.  
                                                        
28 We conducted the main analyses while controlling for age and obtained results similar to those in 
the main text. 
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Table 15 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among all variables, Study 4  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. P-score 30.28 13.76 -       
2. Condition a     .00     .81 -.30** -      
3. Age 19.32   1.40  .27* -.36** -     
4. Gender b   1.48     .50  -06 -.21 -.11 -    
5. Education c   1.06     .24 -.21 -.12 .34**  .06 -   
6. Work d     .54   6.03 -.05 -.09 .26* -.00 .23* -  
7. Work hours 11.37   6.03 -.19 -.18 .22  .05 .18 - - 
Note. N = 82. a Coded as -1 = Control condition, 0= Power as responsibility condition, 1 = Power as 
opportunity condition; b Coded as 1 = Male, 2 = Female. c Coded as 1 = High-school degree, 2 = 
Bachelor degree. d Coded as 1 = Working, 0 = Not working. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
Hypothesis test. A one-factor ANOVA (Power: Opportunity vs. 
Responsibility vs. Control) revealed that Power had a significant effect on the 
P-score29 (F[2, 78] = 5.12, p < .01, η2 = .11). Planned pairwise comparisons 
showed that participants in the power as opportunity condition (M = 23.70, SD 
= 11.22) had a lower P-score compared to those in the power as responsibility 
condition (M = 32.97, SD = 12.21), t(78) = -2.62, p = .01, η2 = .08, and compared 
to those in the control condition (M = 34.07, SD = 15.53), t(78) = -2.90, p < .01, 
η2 = .08. P-scores did not differ between the control condition and the power as 
responsibility condition t(78) = .31, p = .75, η2 = .00. 
Overall, this study showed that framing high power as opportunity results 
in lower levels of moral reasoning, compared to framing it as responsibility and 
compared to a control condition. 
  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
We hypothesized that high power (as opposed to low power or a control 
condition) decreases moral reasoning. We further hypothesized that this 
negative effect of high power is more likely to emerge when it is construed as 
                                                        
29 A one-factor ANOVA (Power: Opportunity vs. Responsibility vs. Control) revealed that Power had 
a significant effect on the N2 score (F [2, 78] = 5.30, p < .01, η2 = .11). Planned pairwise comparisons 
showed that participants in the power as opportunity condition (M = 5.61, SD = 10.73) had a lower 
N2 score compared to those in the power as responsibility condition (M = 14.76, SD = 12.68), t(78) = 
-2.54, p = .01, η2 = .07 and compared to those in the control condition (M = 16.64, SD = 16.06), t(78) 
= -3.04, p <.01, η2 = .10. N2 scores did not differ between the control condition and the power as 
responsibility condition, t(78) = .52, p = .60, η2 = .00. 
104                                                                                                              Chapter 4 
providing opportunities for goal attainment (as opposed to being construed as 
coming with responsibility for one’s actions and a control condition). Results 
from four laboratory studies using different manipulations of power provide 
support for our predictions. Specifically, we found that participants who were 
placed in a high power position had a less advanced level of moral reasoning 
compared to those who were placed in a low power position (Study 1). Similarly, 
we found that participants who recalled a high-power role had a less advanced 
level of moral reasoning compared to those who recalled a low-power role (Study 
2-3) and to those in a control condition (Study 3). Finally, the level of moral 
reasoning was lower for participants who were primed with the notion of power 
as opportunity compared to those who were primed with the notion of power as 
responsibility or to those who were in a control condition (Study 4). Below we 
discuss the implications and limitations of our research. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
The present research provides a number of theoretical contributions. First, 
our results illustrate the relevance of studying moral reasoning in leadership 
contexts by providing initial experimental evidence that the experience of high 
power lowers one’s moral reasoning level. The importance of understanding the 
effects of such antecedents on moral reasoning is embedded in the 
conceptualization of leadership as influence (Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl, 2002, 
2008). Scholars increasingly emphasize the important of ethical leadership 
(Brown et al., 2005; Kalshoven et al., 2011; Riggio et al., 2010; Yukl et al., 2011). 
Prior work has introduced the relevance moral reasoning to the study of 
leadership by showing that leaders can influence their followers’ moral 
reasoning (Jordan et al., 2013; Schminke, Ambrose, & Neubaum, 2005). The 
present research shows that the power that leaders have also shape their own 
level of moral reasoning. 
Second, our results have implications for our understanding of how power 
affects morality. Much of the existing research explains power’s effects on 
unethical behavior via the unconscious effects of power on individuals’ inner 
feelings and motivations (Sassenberg et al., 2014). By linking power to moral 
reasoning, our work, however, suggests that we could enlarge our 
understanding of the effects of power on unethical behavior by also focusing on 
the effects of power on conscious and intentional processes. In this sense, the 
power literature links well with the current wave of research in moral 
psychology that emphasizes the central role that affect and intuition play in 
moral judgment (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001). Interestingly, at the basis 
of this research rests the idea that individuals’ moral judgment is driven by their 
motivation to find evidence that supports their initial moral intuitions or moral 
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emotions, an argument rooted in the motivated cognition literature (Kunda, 
1990). Integrating the knowledge that individuals are ‘cognitive misers’ or 
‘motivated tacticians’ (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) with research on power, our results 
indicate that the influence of power on moral psychological processes is not 
limited to affect and intuition but expands further on to conscious cognitive 
processes. 
Third, our work further contributes to the power and leadership literatures 
by distinguishing two of the most common underlying construals of high power, 
that is, opportunity and responsibility. Specifically, we showed that even among 
participants who were placed in a high power position, moral reasoning was not 
necessarily lowered. Only when high power was construed as opportunity did it 
lead to lowered levels of moral reasoning. When power was construed as 
responsibility, moral reasoning was as high as in the control condition. This 
shows that it is not only the experience of power by itself that is relevant to 
moral reasoning, but also how individuals construe having high power. Aside 
from shedding a positive light on the effects of power, our work also draws 
scholars’ attention to the often-overlooked element of responsibility that 
underlies the experience of high power, particularly within an organizational 
context (cf. Tost, 2015). 
Fourth, the present paper contributes to the large body of work on moral 
reasoning. For decades, scholars studied moral reasoning as a type of cognitive 
process that, over relatively long periods of time, may progress to higher (i.e., 
more complex) levels (Kolhberg, 1969; O’Fallen & Butterfield, 2005; Treviño et 
al., 2006). In the present paper, we showed that high (vs. low) power lowers one’s 
moral reasoning level. By acknowledging that short-term contextual factors can 
influence moral reasoning, a deliberative cognitive process, our work identifies 
an important caveat for the moral development theory. Specifically, our 
research contests the stable nature of moral reasoning and draws researchers’ 
attention to the necessity to move away from further studying the effects of long-
term contextual factors to focusing on how other short-term contextual factors 
might impact moral reasoning. 
 
Practical Implications 
Power differences are an important reality of organizational life. It is 
particularly leaders in high power positions that set the tone in the organization 
and emerge as influential ethical role models for those in lower power positions 
(Treviño, 1986; Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Treviño, 2006). Equally important 
is that leaders’ cognitive moral development has a significant impact not only 
on the organizations’ ethical climate (Logsdon & Corzine, 1999; Sims & 
Brinkman, 2002; Treviño, Hartman, & Brown, 2000) but also on followers’ 
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cognitive moral development and perceptions of ethical leadership (Jordan et 
al., 2013; Schminke et al., 2005). The present research showed that even a subtle 
change in how individuals think about the power they have can influence the 
way they judge what is a morally right or wrong action to pursue. In particular, 
our work showed that participants who were subtly primed to frame their power 
as having responsibility for their actions had a higher level of moral reasoning 
compared to those who were subtly primed to frame their power as having 
opportunities to produce desired effects. We therefore recommend that 
organizations stress, particularly to leaders and organizational members who 
aspire to hold formal leadership positions that their power comes first and 
foremost with responsibility for their actions.  
Another practical implication that stems from our results pertains to 
ethical training programs and, in particular to executive leader ethics programs. 
By and large, organizations have focused on developing and delivering rigorous 
cognitive moral development-based programs that often span across 4 to 12 
weeks and require the help of trained facilitators (Rest & Thoma, 1986; Wells & 
Schminke, 2001). This is not surprising given that moral reasoning has been 
described and studied as a relatively stable cognitive process that should be 
immune to the immediate influence of short-term contextual factors (Kolhberg, 
1969; O’Fallen & Butterfield, 2005; Treviño et al., 2006). Nevertheless, in light 
of our findings, focusing exclusively on long-term training might not be 
sufficient to influence organizational leaders’ moral reasoning. We therefore 
recommend that organizations consider developing and introducing 
interventions that target these short-term influences. For example, 
organizations could implement labels on which one’s function is framed 
primarily in terms of the underlying responsibilities. In addition to such 
measures, organizations could seek to select individuals for leadership positions 
based on how they tend to frame the power that they would be given. In fact, 
recently, Scheepers, Ellemers, and Sassenberg (2013) developed an instrument 
that captures the meaning of power in terms of opportunity versus 
responsibility. Organizations could therefore integrate such a questionnaire in 
their selection processes, particularly those for high power leadership positions.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Like all research, our studies are not without limitations. One potential 
limitation that should be discussed is that all four studies were conducted in a 
controlled laboratory setting among students. This potentially limits the 
generalizability of our findings to actual leadership settings. However, in 
defense of our approach, student samples are appropriate and frequently 
employed in organizational and leadership research (cf. Shen, Kiger, Davies, 
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Rasch, Simion, & Ones, 2011) particularly when one’s goal is to examine basic 
psychological processes and test causal theoretical relations (Dobbins, Lane, & 
Steiner, 1988), as was the case in the current research. More specific to the 
present research, past studies found no difference in moral reasoning levels 
when comparing a sample of managers with a sample of students (Wimalasiri, 
Pavri, & Jalil, 1996; Wimalasiri, 2001; see also Dipboye, 1990; Wofford, 1999 for 
evidence that students do not necessarily behave differently from other 
populations). While leadership scholars recommend making more extensive use 
of laboratory research designs within the leadership literature (cf. Garner, 
Lowe, Moss, Mahoney, & Cogliser, 2010), future research could expand our work 
and test our hypotheses in applied settings, thus addressing the lack of external 
validity inherent in laboratory studies.     
 
CONCLUSION 
 
By integrating insights from motivated cognition with those from research 
on power, our work showed that high power (as opposed to low power or a 
neutral control condition) lowered individuals’ moral reasoning level. However, 
this effect was more likely to emerge when high power was construed as a notion 
of opportunity rather than as a notion of responsibility. Overall, our work 
unveiled not only how fragile moral reasoning abilities can be, but also 
emphasized the potential benefits of framing high power as having 
responsibility for ones’ actions rather than framing it as providing opportunities 
for goal attainment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 
Wrapping up this journey 
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“We should make things as simple as possible but not one bit simpler” 
– Albert Einstein  
 
 
Each of the three empirical papers presented in this dissertation began with the 
goal of answering a simple and straightforward research question. Yet, with 
each paper, the reality grew different, owning in great part to my diverse 
research interests but also to the undeniable reality that both behavior and the 
underlying cognitive processes are dynamic and complex. Discarding such 
complexity as measurement error and adopting between-individual designs has 
been, for the most part, the dominant perspective in, for instance, organizational 
research (Dalal et al., 2014). Notwithstanding the unique insights that emerged 
(and will continue to emerge) from taking such a perspective, it has nevertheless 
simplified the research questions that we ask, the theoretical frameworks that 
we develop, the necessary statistical analyses that we undertake, and the 
answers that we provide to practitioners. Furthermore, it has not allowed us to 
capture fluctuations in behavior as they occur within each individual, in real 
time, or within context. This is simply because between-individual designs were 
not meant to achieve this.  
In this dissertation, I switched from simple and static questions to 
dynamic ones in relation to both behavior and cognitive processes. Albeit the 
fact that each chapter has its unique focus, there is one core element that unites 
them: variability. The beauty of variability lies in the realization that it is a 
multifaceted concept that provides the possibility to answer diverse questions 
in relation to different constructs and across a variety of contexts. With this in 
mind, I now turn to briefly outline the main empirical findings that emerged 
from the research undertaken in this dissertation. As I did in the first chapter, 
I will use “we” rather than “I” when presenting these three empirical chapters 
in order to reflect the contribution of my co-authors. 
 
Overview of Empirical Findings and Contributions 
In Chapter 2 we explored how a meso-level factor, structural power, 
influences a micro-level factor, individual time-appropriate decision-making. 
Across two experience-sampling (ESM) studies and a laboratory experiment we 
consistently, yet unexpectedly, found that structural power facilitates slow but 
not fast decision-making in line with the velocity of the situation. The reason for 
this was that organizational members with high structural power experienced 
high rather than low daily subjective power. The organizational context and, in 
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particular, the organizational structure, is a crucial factor in shaping 
organizational decision-making. This statement was made more than five 
decades ago. It formed one of the main pillars of the Carnegie School and the 
start of a new era in the study of organizations. Yet, five decades later and it is 
still largely unclear how exactly does the organizational structure influence 
individual decision-making. To that end, the main contributions of this chapter 
lie in the domains of organizational theory and organizational behavior. 
Specifically, it not only brings back scholars’ attention to the influence of 
structural factors on essential individual behaviors in organizations, such as 
decision-making, but also explicitly examines how such an influence unfolds.  
Apart from the above, the findings presented in Chapter 2 have important 
implications for the literatures on power and decision-making. In particular, by 
using ESM, our work heeds the call for new methods to study the effects of power 
within organizations. To that end, it also represents the first externally valid 
test of the situated focus theory of power. In finding only partial support for this 
theory, our results call into question the extent to which this theory accurately 
portrays the actual day-to-day organizational life. In terms of decision-making, 
our work represents a step forward in clarifying, theoretically and empirically, 
the concept of time appropriateness - a concept that has been argued to be of 
great value to organizational managers, but that has received little attention in 
the literature.  
Overall, the work from Chapter 2 suggests that we can gain a deeper and, 
perhaps more accurate, understanding of how power affects organizational 
members’ behavior if we are to zoom-in on what these members do and how they 
feel on a daily basis. ESM designs make it possible to examine such variability 
within individuals and within specific contexts, such as the work context, as a 
function of stable structural and individual characteristics. 
In Chapter 3, we explored how the enactment of counterproductive work 
behavior (CWB) unfolds in time. Combining a within-individual approach with 
a self-regulation perspective, we suggested that CWB is addictive. An ESM 
study conducted among organizational members from various organizations and 
across 10 consecutive working days provided support for our claim. In 
particular, we found that enactment of CWB one day promotes enactment of 
CWB the following day. This was particularly true for employees who 
experienced low sleep quality during the night connecting the two days and who 
scored low on moral identity. This chapter builds upon and extends the work 
presented in Chapter 2 by providing further evidence for the value of adopting 
a within-individual approach to study behavior in organizations. The bulk of 
research to date on antecedents of CWB has been conducted at the between-
individual level where antecedents are identified for employees’ average levels 
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of CWB at one single point in time (Robinson & Greenberg, 1998). However, this 
approach is limited from a theoretical as well as a practical point of view. 
Theoretically, this approach fails to capture the dynamic and temporal nature 
of behavior. Practically, the recently unveiled substantial within-individual 
variability in CWB (Dalal et al., 2009; Judge et al., 2006; Matta et al., 2014) 
indicates that organizations selecting prospective employees or letting existing 
ones go on account of being predisposed to engage in such behaviors greatly 
limits the extent to which organizations can control the display of CWB. Neither 
employees nor their behaviors are in an absolute sense “bad”; instead the same 
employee engages in more, or less, bad behaviors on different occasions 
compared to their usual average display of such behaviors.  
The main contribution of this chapter lies in the domain of unethical 
behavior by introducing a novel perspective to the study of CWB. Specifically, 
the work presented in this chapter suggests that we could advance the literature 
on antecedents of CWB at the within-individual level by examining factors that 
facilitate the temporal unfolding of CWB. Existing work on this topic 
incorporated temporality only to the extent of looking at what triggers the 
enactment of CWB within the same day. It did not address how the enactment 
of CWB unfolds in time. Our knowledge of whether displaying CWB at some 
point in time makes it more (or less) likely that CWB is displayed on a 
subsequent moment in time is virtually nonexistent. However, knowing when 
and for how long things happen (Dalal et al., 2014; Mitchell & James, 2001; 
Shipp & Cole, 2015; Roe, 2008) is important if we wish to gain a deeper 
understanding of the processes that underlie the emergence of CWB. Time is 
embedded in any human experience and a full account of why employees engage 
in CWB is arguably not possible without addressing the temporal context in 
which such behaviors emerge (Cole et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, by integrating insights from various theoretical domains, the 
implications of this chapter extend beyond the literature on unethical behavior 
and into the domains of self-regulation. Most work on impaired sleep has been 
conducted at the between-individual level and focused on sleep quantity. Yet, as 
Barnes and colleagues (2015) pointed out, it was sleep quality rather than sleep 
quantity that predicted impaired daily self-regulation. In focusing on the effects 
of daily sleep quality we not only heed calls for further research on such effects, 
but also expand past work. In particular, we broaden previous perspectives on 
self-regulation by examining sleep quality not as a main driver of self-regulation 
failure but as a facilitator of its re-occurrence in the form of CWB. Finally, by 
focusing on moral identity, our work integrates two levels of analysis in the 
CWB literature. It also draws scholars’ attention to the importance of 
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individual’s motivation in understanding within-individual variability in 
behavior (Dalal et al., 2014).  
At the broadest level, the work presented in this chapter suggests that we 
can learn more about behavioral self-regulation if we consider the underlying 
self-regulatory mechanisms that drive it. As our findings suggest, such 
mechanisms are likely to be influenced by both self-regulation factors that are 
relatively stable across time, such as moral identity, and self-regulation factors 
that can vary from one day to another, such as sleep quality. Moreover, by 
examining the interaction between daily ability and long-term motivation, two 
underlying components of self-regulation, our work is instrumental in closing 
the gap between our current understanding of how different self-regulation 
components operate in isolation and the actual complex and dynamic nature of 
behavioral self-regulation. 
In Chapter 4, we simplified our quest and explored whether a stable 
cognitive process that has been said to drive unethical behavior is liable to short-
term influences. In particular, we focused on a process that is thought to 
progress, over relatively long periods of time, to more complex and abstract 
levels of cognitive moral development: moral reasoning (Kolhberg, 1969). 
Combining theorizing on power with that on motivated cognition, we argued 
that the experience of power, a short-term contextual factor, lowers moral 
reasoning levels. We further argued that this effect would surface particularly 
when power is framed as a notion of opportunity rather than as a notion of 
responsibility. Our findings were in line with our arguments. Across three 
laboratory studies we discovered that placing individuals in a high (vs. low) 
power position and recalling a high-power role (vs. a low-power role or a control 
condition), lowers their moral reasoning level. In a fourth laboratory study, we 
further discovered that power lowers moral reasoning only when it is construed 
as opportunity for goal attainment, rather than as responsibility for one’s 
actions.  
This chapter’s primary contribution pertains to the literature on moral 
reasoning. Especially surprising about our results is that a stable cognitive 
process, such as moral reasoning, is liable to short-term influences, and in 
particular, to the experience as well as the framing of one’s power. These results 
therefore question the stable nature of moral reasoning and suggest that 
scholars ought to shift from focusing on the effects of long-term contextual 
factors on moral reasoning to focusing on how short-term contextual factors 
might shape this cognitive process.  
Linking moral reasoning to the experience and construal of power, this 
chapter further provides valuable insights for the literature on power. In 
particular, it illustrates that it is not only the experience of power in and by 
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itself that matters, but also how individuals construe such an experience. To 
that end, it sheds a positive light on the psychological effects of power. In order 
to gain a deeper understanding of the effects of power, scholars ought to zoom-
in on other underlying dimensions of power in addition to the often looked at 
aspect of opportunity. Relatedly, our work shows that the influence of power on 
moral psychological processes is not necessarily limited to affect and intuition 
(what currently the focus of almost all research in moral psychology is, Haidt, 
2007; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Reynolds, 2006), but extends to conscious 
cognitive processes. Finally, by providing initial experimental evidence that the 
experience of power, a defining element of most formal leadership roles, lowers 
moral reasoning, our findings illustrate the relevance of addressing the 
experience of power within the leadership domain.  
In Chapter 4 we took a different methodological and theoretical approach 
by focusing on a cognitive process and using only experimental designs. 
Nevertheless, the findings from this chapter add to the previous ones by 
suggesting that it is not only behavior that is liable to variability across short 
periods of time, but also allegedly stable cognitive processes.  
 
Practical Implications 
In this section, I wish to briefly summarize the main practical implications 
that each chapter brought to light. The findings from Chapter 2 indicate that 
managers, and in particular those in a high structural power position (high 
number of subordinates to oversee), have the ability to slow down when the 
velocity of the situation indicates that slow action would be effective. This is 
because a high structural power position enhances their daily subjective 
experience of power. In light of these findings, organizations ought to empower 
organizational members on a day-to-day basis in order to facilitate slow 
decision-making when slow action is effective. This could be achieved by, for 
instance, short daily practices of empowerment. Furthermore, our results 
highlight the need for organizational members to consider not only the broader 
and more stable contextual factors (i.e., industry), but also the micro day-to-day 
factors (i.e., the characteristics of the surrounding situation) before acting. To 
that end, organizational programs and/or interventions could be tailored 
towards training managers and employees to pay more attention to situational 
cues (such as velocity) and respond accordingly. 
The results from Chapter 3 provide organizations with new insights on how 
to address the fact that every employee may, at some point in time, enact CWB. 
Particularly worrisome is that our results confirmed our claim that such 
behaviors are addictive: enacting CWB one day leads to enacting CWB the next 
day, and this seems to be particularly true for employees who suffer from low 
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sleep quality and who chronically do not consider morality as central to their 
self-definition. Focusing on selecting employees or letting existing ones go based 
on their predisposition to engage in CWB at one point in time and in a particular 
context is limited. Instead, our results indicate that organizations ought to 
implement daily methods that are meant to address (1) the detrimental 
addictive nature of CWB (i.e., by delivering reassurance messages that a one-
time display of CWB does not affect their long-term goal of wanting to be a good 
and moral person) and (2) impaired daily sleep quality (i.e., by allowing 
employees to take naps at work).  
The findings from the final empirical chapter cast a positive light on the 
experience of power. In particular, we found that even a subtle change in how 
individuals think about the power they have can influence the way they judge 
what is a morally right or wrong action to pursue (moral reasoning). Power 
seems to corrupt the mind particularly when it is framed as a notion of 
opportunity, as opposed to a notion of responsibility. Organizations might 
therefore consider stressing, especially to leaders and organizational members 
who aspire to hold formal leadership positions that their power comes first and 
foremost with responsibility for their actions. Furthermore, in light of our 
findings that contest the stable nature of moral reasoning, one-time ethical 
training programs might not be sufficient to alter how individuals approach 
moral decisions. Thus, it might be necessary to supplement them with regular 
interventions such as creating labels that remind organizational members to 
frame their function primarily in terms of responsibilities.  
 
Sparks for Further Research Inquires  
The empirical findings presented in this dissertation and briefly 
summarized above contribute to various streams of literatures such as moral 
reasoning, moral psychology, power, individual decision-making, unethical 
behavior, and self-regulation. The theoretical contributions to these literatures 
were briefly presented above and at length in the chapter corresponding to each 
specific empirical paper. In this section I aim to highlight a few potential and 
interesting lines for future research. 
First, as outlined in Chapter 2, decision-making behavior is dynamic and 
varies across time as a function of the situation (i.e., situational velocity), of the 
person (i.e., experienced subjective power), and of the broader organizational 
structure (i.e., structural power). Acknowledging this opens up a rather new and 
exciting area of research in relation to (decision-making) time. In this 
dissertation, and in particular in Chapter 2 and 3, I approached the element of 
time from a more objective (i.e., actual time taken to make a decision) and rather 
methodological angle (i.e., variations within individuals and across time). 
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However, time can also be approached from a subjective angle. To that end, we 
know that decision-making time is a powerful informational cue (Critcher, 
Inbar, & Pizarro, 2013) that can color perception, behavior, and how 
interpersonal social relationships develop. Yet, past research informs us that 
fast decision-making signals either incompetence (Gavin & Roberto, 2001) or 
certainty (Critcher et al., 2013), whereas slow decision-making signals either 
doubt (Van De Calseyde, Keren, & Zeelenberg, 2014) or consideration (Willis & 
Todorov, 2006). It is therefore unclear when and why would either positive or 
negative perceptions of one’s decision-making time emerge. Our lack of 
understanding this is due, in part, to past research looking at the effects of 
decision-making time from the decision-maker’s point of view. It is further 
unclear what the downstream consequences of the perceptions of one’s decision-
making time on organizational members’ job attitudes, performance, and 
interpersonal relationship quality are. In light of nowadays fast-paced and 
increasingly demanding business environment, addressing such questions has 
never been more crucial. For the reasons presented in Chapter 2, ESM 
represents the perfect tool for zooming-in on organizational members’ decision-
making time and understanding not only what might be the individual-level 
influences on perceptions of decision-making time, but also what role do stable 
structural elements unique to each organizational environment play in 
facilitating or hindering such perceptions.  
Second, the results from Chapter 3 indicated that the within-individual 
variability in unethical behavior unfolds across time as a function of stable 
individual differences (i.e., moral identity) and malleable self-regulatory 
abilities (i.e., sleep quality). This opens up new areas of research within the 
emerging body of work on antecedents of CWB at the within-individual level. To 
that end, there are a handful of questions that await answers from future 
research. For instance, how do factors outside the work environment (e.g., stress 
at home) influence the display and unfolding of both ethical and unethical 
behavior at work across time and within the same individual? Another natural 
next question for future research to explore is how do factors inside the work 
environment (i.e., stress at work) influence the temporal display of both ethical 
and unethical behavior at home? With the emergence of ESM, it further becomes 
possible to explore more practical questions. In particular, to what extent would 
one time-interventions (i.e., a seminar on ethics) or otherwise daily small 
interventions alter organizational members’ behavior? Do such interventions 
have a lesser or stronger effect on individuals who hold high power positions? 
In providing an answer to such questions we perhaps come a step closer to 
solving the ongoing debate of how can organizations tackle employees’ unethical 
behavior and, respectively, foster ethical behavior.   
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Finally, recognizing that even our stable cognitive processes might be liable 
to variability signals the necessity to perhaps adopt a within-individual 
thinking when examining such processes. Furthermore, with this realization, it 
becomes clear that one-time and intensive ethical interventions and training 
programs might not be enough to truly train our leaders in dealing with ethical 
issues (Weaver & Wasieleski, 2013). In a similar vein, recognizing that power is 
a much more complex element that is contingent upon the underlying 
organizational structure, the subjective perception of one’s experience of power, 
and on the way individuals frame their experience of power, brings another 
layer of complexity to research on power both in interpersonal relationships and 
in an organizational context (cf. Tost, 2015). Such complexity ought to be 
addressed by future research not only because power is and will most likely 
continue to remain a defining element of leadership (Magee et al., 2005; Magee 
& Galinsky, 2008; Williams, 2014), but also because power and ethics are tightly 
connected. For instance, it is those who are in a position of power that get to set 
the ethical tone in an organization (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Jordan et al., 2013).  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
In line with the quote presented at the beginning of this chapter, we have 
perhaps over-simplified the questions that we ask and the answers that we 
provide to practitioners in terms of organizational behavior. That is, a between-
individual conceptualization of behavior was and still is, in many ways, 
necessary because it allows the dissemination of simpler research questions 
(e.g., why do some employees, compared to others, engage, on average, in more 
or less unethical behavior?). By extension, theories, research designs, and even 
statistical analyses are simpler because they involve studying behavior at only 
one level of analysis. Yet, the reality is that this is an oversimplification of the 
dynamic and temporal nature of behavior (Beal et al., 2005; Dalal, 2005; Dalal 
et al, 2014). That is, the same individual may display more or less unethical 
behavior on different occasions compared to his or her usual average display of 
such behavior. With saying this, it is not my aim to discard between-individual 
research, but rather to urge future work to supplement such research with both 
theoretical and empirical within-individual research in order to understand the 
true nature of behavior (and of the underlying cognitive processes) in 
organizations. In the research included in this dissertation I focused on two 
types of behaviors (decision-making and unethical behavior) that are relevant 
for the organization as well as on one cognitive process (moral reasoning) that 
has been said to drive unethical behavior. It is my hope that future research will 
embrace the view that both behavioral and cognitive processes are dynamic and 
that our questions and answers ought to reflect this. 
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SUMMARY 
 
 
Both behavior and cognitive processes are inherently ongoing, dynamic, and 
time-dependent. They vary not only between individuals as a function of 
differences in personality and stable contextual characteristics, but also within 
individuals as a function of one’s unique stream of experiences. For instance, 
the same individual might engage in unethical behavior one day but not the 
next day or might experience impaired sleep one night but not the next. 
Understanding the drivers and consequences of individuals’ daily experiences 
and behaviors is, however, as challenging as it is important. This dissertation 
deals in various ways with variability. It is the result of extensive and intensive 
data collection in the laboratory and in the field, using experimental and 
experience-sampling designs.  
The first empirical chapter examined how and why structural power, a 
fundamental and stable aspect of the organizational structure, facilitates daily 
managerial decision-making that is flexibly attuned to the velocity of the 
situation. We defined this concept as time-appropriate decision-making and 
derived our theoretical argument from organization theory (i.e., the Carnegie 
School) and social psychology theory (i.e., the situated focus theory of power). 
Across two ESM studies and a lab experiment we consistently, yet unexpectedly, 
found that structural power, via daily subjective power, plays a role in 
facilitating slow, but not fast, decision-making. 
The second empirical chapter explored how counterproductive work 
behaviors (CWB) unfold across time. Building on control theory and the resource 
model of self-control, we developed a dynamic self-regulation argument and 
proposed that the display of CWB resembles addictive behaviors such that 
enactment of CWB one day promotes enactment of CWB the next day. An ESM 
study conducted among organizational members provided support for our claim 
that enacting CWB is addictive. This was particularly true for organizational 
members whose daily sleep quality was impaired and who scored low on moral 
identity. 
The third empirical chapter zoomed-in on the relationship between power 
and moral reasoning, a stable cognitive process involved in judging what is a 
morally “right” or “wrong” action to pursue. Combining theorizing on power with 
that on motivated cognition, we hypothesized and found, in three experiments, 
that power (structural and subjective power) lowers moral reasoning. We 
further hypothesized and found in a fourth experiment that this effect emerged 
only when power was framed as a notion of opportunity, as opposed to when it 
was framed as a notion of responsibility, or a control condition. These findings 
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provide initial experimental evidence that even stable cognitive processes might 
be affected by short-term contextual factors.  
Together, the studies included in this dissertation represent a more in-
depth and realistic exploration of the undeniably complex nature of behavior, 
and, respectively, of the underlying cognitive processes that drive it. It is my 
hope that future research will embrace this approach to individuals’ behavior so 
that the questions that we ask as researchers and the answers that we provide 
to practitioners can get a step closer to reality. 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
 
Zowel gedrag als cognitieve processen zijn inherent in beweging, dynamisch, en 
tijdsafhankelijk. Ze variëren niet alleen van persoon tot persoon vanwege 
verschillen in persoonlijkheid en stabiele omgevingsfactoren, maar ook binnen 
de persoon als een functie van ieders unieke stroom aan ervaringen. Een 
individu vertoont bijvoorbeeld de ene dag onethisch gedrag maar een andere dag 
niet, of ervaart na de ene nacht een slechte nachtrust maar niet na een andere 
nacht. Het begrijpen van de drijfveren en gevolgen van een individu’s dagelijkse 
ervaringen en gedrag is echter even uitdagend als dat het belangrijk is. Deze 
thesis behandelt op verschillende manieren het onderwerp van 
veranderlijkheid. Het is het resultaat van uitgebreide en intensieve 
dataverzameling in het laboratorium en in het veld, waarbij experimentele en 
“experience-sampling” methodes zijn gebruikt. 
De eerste empirische hoofdstuk onderzoekt hoe en waarom structurele 
macht, een fundamenteel en stabiel aspect van een organisatiestructuur, 
dagelijkse besluitvorming van managers faciliteert die flexibel afgestemd is op 
de veranderlijkheid van de situatie. Wij definieerden dit concept als tijds-
adequate besluitvorming en ontleenden ons theoretisch argument aan 
organisatietheorie (bijvoorbeeld de Carnegie School) en sociaal psychologische 
theorie (bijvoorbeeld “the situated focus theory of power”). In twee ESM studies 
en een laboratorium experiment vinden we consistent, maar onverwachts, dat 
structurele macht, via dagelijkse subjectieve macht, een rol speelt in het 
faciliteren van langzame, maar niet snelle, besluitvorming. 
In het tweede empirische hoofdstuk wordt de ontwikkeling van 
counterproductive work behavior (CWB) in de tijd bestudeerd. Gebruik makend 
van “control theory” en “the resource model of self-control”, formuleerden we een 
dynamisch zelfregulatie argument en stelden wij voor dat het vertonen van 
CWB lijkt op verslavingsgedrag aangezien het tonen van CWB op de ene dag 
CWB op de andere dag bevordert. Een ESM studie ondersteunde deze 
voorspelling. Dit was vooral het geval voor medewerkers die lage slaapkwaliteit 
rapporteerden en laag scoorden op morele identiteit. 
In het derde empirische hoofdstuk werd de relatie tussen macht en moreel 
redeneren bestudeerd. Moreel redeneren is een stabiel cognitief proces dat 
betrokken is bij het besluiten wat moreel “goed” en “fout” gedrag is. Nadat we 
theorieën over macht en gemotiveerde cognitie hadden gecombineerd, 
voorspelden en vonden we in drie experimenten dat macht (structurele en 
subjectieve) leidt tot minder moreel redeneren. Verder voorspelden en vonden 
we in een vierde experiment dat dit effect alleen optreedt als macht was 
154                                                                                                              In Dutch 
beschreven in termen van mogelijkheden, in vergelijking met een beschrijving 
in termen van verantwoordelijkheden. Deze bevindingen verschaffen 
experimenteel bewijs dat zelfs cognitieve processen die steeds als stabiel zijn 
gezien kunnen fluctueren onder invloed van contextuele factoren. 
Bij elkaar vormen de studies in deze thesis een meer diepgaande en 
realistische analyse van de onbetwistbaar complexe aard van gedrag en 
onderliggende cognitieve processen. Ik hoop dat toekomstig onderzoek deze 
benaderingswijze van gedrag zal benutten, zodat de vragen die wij stellen als 
onderzoekers en de antwoorden die wij geven aan de praktijk een stap dichter 
bij de werkelijkheid zullen komen. 
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REZUMAT 
 
 
Atât procesele comportamentale cât și cele cognitive sunt în mod inerent 
continue, dinamice, și depedente de timp. Aceste procese se pot schimba nu doar 
de la un individ la altul în funcție de personalitate și context, cât și pentru 
fiecare individ în parte. Spre exemplu, e posibil ca același individ să se comporte 
în mod ne-etic într-o zi, dar să se abțină de la acest tip de comportament în 
următoarea zi. În mod similar, același individ poate să doarmă neadecvat într-
o noapte, dar foarte bine în noaptea următoare. Studierea factorilor de influență 
și a consecințelor pe care le au experiențe și comportamentele noastre cotidiene 
este nu doar importantă, cât și complexă. Această teză de doctorat tratează din 
mai multe perspective conceptul de schimbare. Este rezultatul unui proces 
intensiv și extensiv de colectare de date în laborator și în organizații, folosind 
atât metode experimentale cât și metode care permit studierea 
comportamentului organizațional de la o zi la alta, cunoscute sub numele de 
“experience-sampling” (ESM).   
Primul articol descris în această teză de doctorat adresează cum și de ce 
puterea hierarhică, un aspect fundamental și stabil al structurii hierarhice al 
unei dintr-o companie, facilitează luarea deciziilor zilnice în funcție de 
velocitatea situației înconjurătoare. Am definit acest concept ca fiind decizii 
luate în timp adecvat și am construit argumentul teoretic combinând cunoștiințe 
dintr-o teorie organizațională (Carnegie School) cu cele dintr-o teorie din 
psihologia socială (“the situated focus theory of power”). În două studii ESM și 
într-un experiment am decoperit, în mod surprinzător însă consecvent, că 
puterea hierarchică, prin intermediul sentimentului zilnic de putere, joacă un 
rol important în facilitarea luării deciziilor care necesită timp, însă nu a celor 
care trebuie luate rapid.  
Al doilea articol adresează desfășurarea temporală a comportamentelor 
contraproductive la muncă (CWB). Aplicând un argument teoretic dinamic de 
autoreglare a comportamentului ce combină două teorii de renume, “control 
theory” și “the resource model of self-control”, am sugerat că CWB este similar 
comportamentelor care crează dependență, astfel încât afișarea de 
comportament contraproductiv într-o zi facilitează afișarea aceluiași tip de 
comportament în ziua următoare. Într-un studiu ESM am descoperit că CWB 
poate întradevăr crea dependență. Acest lucru este adevarat în special pentru 
angajații al căror somn este de calitate redusă de la o zi la alta și pentru care 
moralitatea nu este o parte importantă a identității lor.  
Al treilea articol adresează relația dintre putere și raționamentul moral, un 
proces cognitiv stabil care ajută în raționalizarea a ceea ce reprezintă un 
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comportament “corect” sau “greșit”. Combinând două teorii, una care adresează 
puterea și una care adresează percepția motivațională, am presupus și 
descoperit, în trei experimente, că  puterea reduce raționamentul moral. Mai 
mult, într-un alt experiment am observat că acest efect este predispus să apară 
în mod special atunci când puterea pe care un individ o are este văzută ca o 
formă de oportunitate, și nu ca o formă de responsabilitate. Aceste rezultate 
oferă primele dovezi experimentale că până și procesele stabile și cognitive ar 
putea fi afectate pe termen scurt de factori contextuali. 
In concluzie, aceste studii reprezintă o cercetare mult mai aprofundată și 
realistă a complexității de necontestat a comportamentului uman și a proceselor 
cognitive din spatele acestuia. Sper ca această teză de doctorat să încurajeze și 
alți cercetători să folosească o abordare similară în ceea ce privește studierea 
comportamentului organizațional, astfel încât întrebările pe care le adresăm ca 
și cercetători și răspunsurile pe care le oferim companiilor să se aproprie și mai 
mult de realitate.
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Selected out of +2000 applications to be part of Aspire Young Professionals | 2016  
An international platform for education and professional development  
Attended a 4-day program with Ivy League professors| Poiana Brasov, Romania 
Social Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making Preconference | 2014 
European Association of Social Psychology | Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Professional and Development Workshops | Orlando, FL | 2013 
Reviewing in the Rough: A PDW for Doctoral Students and Junior Faculty͒ 
OB Division New Member Research Networking Forum  
Multilevel Models and Applications Certificate |University of Essex, UK | 2013 
Mediation and Moderation Analysis Certificate | University of Kansas, USA | 2013 
 
LANGUAGE  
Romanian | Native 
English | Fluent | CPE (Grade A) | TOEFL (Score 113 out of 120) 
Dutch | Intermediate | 5 language courses completed at Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Spanish | Conversational 
 
OTHER ACTIVITIES 
Developed my own website on Art & Photography | 2014 – present 
www.lauramgiurge.com 
Content writer for an international cultural magazine – Citinerary | 2015 – present 
Currently responsible for writing and photographing Rotterdam  
Member of the Public Leadership Foundation | 2016 – present 
Currently involved in setting up the first Make a Difference (MAD) House – a virtual and 
occasionally physical space where individuals can come together and take the initiative to 
identify a challenge and a number of potential solutions together 
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The ERIM PhD Series contains PhD dissertations in the field of Research in 
Management defended at Erasmus University Rotterdam and supervised by 
senior researchers affiliated to the Erasmus Research Institute of Management 
(ERIM). All dissertations in the ERIM PhD Series are available in full text 
through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://repub.eur.nl/pub. ERIM is the 
joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) and the 
Erasmus School of Economics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR). 
 
Dissertations in the last five years 
 
Abbink, E.J., Crew Management in Passenger Rail Transport, Promotors: Prof. 
L.G. Kroon & Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2014-325-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/ 
pub/76927 
 
Acar, O.A., Crowdsourcing for Innovation: Unpacking Motivational, Knowledge 
and Relational Mechanisms of Innovative Behavior in Crowdsourcing  
Platforms, Promotor: Prof. J.C.M. van den Ende, EPS-2014-321-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76076 
 
Akin Ates, M., Purchasing and Supply Management at the Purchase Category  
Level: strategy, structure and performance, Promotors: Prof. J.Y.F. Wynstra & 
Dr E.M. van Raaij, EPS-2014-300-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50283 
 
Akpinar, E., Consumer Information Sharing, Promotor: Prof. A. Smidts, EPS- 
2013-297-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50140 
 
Alexander, L., People, Politics, and Innovation: A Process Perspective,  
Promotors: Prof. H.G. Barkema & Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2014-331-
S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77209 
 
Almeida e Santos Nogueira, R.J. de, Conditional Density Models Integrating  
Fuzzy and Probabilistic Representations of Uncertainty, Promotors: Prof. U.  
Kaymak & Prof. J.M.C. Sousa, EPS-2014-310-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51560 
 
 
 
162                                                                                         ERIM PH.D. SERIES 
Bannouh, K., Measuring and Forecasting Financial Market Volatility using  
High-frequency Data, Promotor: Prof. D.J.C. van Dijk, EPS-2013-273-F&A,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38240 
 
Ben-Menahem, S.M., Strategic Timing and Proactiveness of Organizations,  
Promotors: Prof. H.W. Volberda & Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch, EPS-2013-278- 
S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39128 
 
Benning, T.M., A Consumer Perspective on Flexibility in Health Care: Priority  
Access Pricing and Customized Care, Promotor: Prof. B.G.C. Dellaert, EPS- 
2011-241-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23670 
 
Benschop, N, Biases in Project Escalation: Names, frames & construal levels,  
Promotors: Prof. K.I.M. Rhode, Prof. H.R. Commandeur, Prof. M.Keil & Dr  
A.L.P. Nuijten, EPS-2015-375-S&E, hdl.handle.net/1765/79408 
 
Berg, W.E. van den, Understanding Salesforce Behavior using Genetic  
Association Studies, Promotor: Prof. W.J.M.I. Verbeke, EPS-2014-311-MKT,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51440 
 
Betancourt, N.E., Typical Atypicality: Formal and Informal Institutional  
Conformity, Deviance, and Dynamics, Promotor: Prof. B. Krug, EPS-2012-262- 
ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/32345 
 
Beusichem, H.C. van, Firms and Financial Markets: Empirical Studies on the  
Informational Value of Dividends, Governance and Financial Reporting,  
Promotors: Prof. A. de Jong & Dr. G. Westerhuis, EPS-2016-378-F&A, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93079 
 
Bliek, R. de, Empirical Studies on the Economic Impact of Trust, Promotor: Prof.  
J. Veenman & Prof. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2015-324-ORG,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78159 
 
Blitz, D.C., Benchmarking Benchmarks, Promotors: Prof. A.G.Z. Kemna & Prof.  
W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2011-225-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22624 
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Boons, M., Working Together Alone in the Online Crowd: The Effects of Social  
Motivations and Individual Knowledge Backgrounds on the Participation and  
Performance of Members of Online Crowdsourcing Platforms, Promotors: Prof.  
H.G. Barkema & Dr D.A. Stam, EPS-2014-306-S&E,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50711 
 
Brazys, J., Aggregated Marcoeconomic News and Price Discovery, Promotor:  
Prof. W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2015-351-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78243 
 
Burger, M.J., Structure and Cooptition in Urban Networks, Promotors: Prof.  
G.A. van der Knaap & Prof. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2011-243-ORG,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26178 
 
Byington, E., Exploring Coworker Relationships: Antecedents and Dimensions  
of Interpersonal Fit,Coworker Satisfaction, and Relational Models, Promotor:  
Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2013-292-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41508 
 
Camacho, N.M., Health and Marketing: Essays on Physician and Patient  
Decision- Making, Promotor: Prof. S. Stremersch, EPS-2011-237-MKT,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23604 
 
Cancurtaran, P., Essays on Accelerated Product Development, Promotors: Prof.  
F. Langerak & Prof.G.H. van Bruggen, EPS-2014-317-MKT,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76074 
 
Caron, E.A.M., Explanation of Exceptional Values in Multi-dimensional  
Business Databases, Promotors: Prof. H.A.M. Daniels & Prof. G.W.J. Hendrikse,  
EPS-2013-296-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50005 
 
Carvalho, L. de, Knowledge Locations in Cities: Emergence and Development  
Dynamics, Promotor: Prof. L. Berg, EPS-2013-274-S&E,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38449 
 
Cranenburgh, K.C. van, Money or Ethics: Multinational corporations and  
religious organisations operating in an era of corporate responsibility, Prof.  
L.C.P.M. Meijs, Prof. R.J.M. van Tulder & Dr D. Arenas, EPS-2016-385-ORG,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93104 
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Consiglio, I., Others: Essays on Interpersonal and Consumer Behavior,  
Promotor: Prof. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2016-366-MKT,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79820 
 
Cox, R.H.G.M., To Own, To Finance, and To Insure - Residential Real Estate  
Revealed, Promotor: Prof. D. Brounen, EPS-2013-290-F&A,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40964 
 
Darnihamedani, P. Individual Characteristics, Contextual Factors and  
Entrepreneurial Behavior, Promotors: A.R. Thurik & S.J.A. Hessels, EPS-2016- 
360-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93280 
 
Deichmann, D., Idea Management: Perspectives from Leadership, Learning, and  
Network Theory, Promotor: Prof. J.C.M. van den Ende, EPS-2012-255-ORG,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/31174 
 
Deng, W., Social Capital and Diversification of Cooperatives, Promotor: Prof.  
G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2015-341-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77449 
 
Desmet, P.T.M., In Money we Trust? Trust Repair and the Psychology of  
Financial Compensations, Promotor: Prof. D. de Cremer, EPS-2011-232-ORG,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23268 
 
Dollevoet, T.A.B., Delay Management and Dispatching in Railways, Promotor: 
Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2013-272-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38241 
 
Doorn, S. van, Managing Entrepreneurial Orientation, Promotors: Prof. J.J.P. 
Jansen, Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch, & Prof. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2012-258- 
STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/32166 
 
Douwens-Zonneveld, M.G., Animal Spirits and Extreme Confidence: No Guts,  
No Glory? Promotor: Prof. W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2012-257-F&A,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/31914 
 
Duca, E., The Impact of Investor Demand on Security Offerings, Promotor: Prof.  
A. de Jong, EPS-2011-240-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26041 
 
Duyvesteyn, J.G. Empirical Studies on Sovereign Fixed Income Markets,  
Promotors: Prof. P.Verwijmeren & Prof. M.P.E. Martens, EPS-2015-361-F&A,  
hdl.handle.net/1765/79033 
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Duursema, H., Strategic Leadership: Moving Beyond the Leader-Follower Dyad,  
Promotor: Prof. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2013-279-ORG,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39129 
 
Eck, N.J. van, Methodological Advances in Bibliometric Mapping of Science,  
Promotor: Prof. R. Dekker, EPS-2011-247-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26509 
 
Elemes, A, Studies on Determinants and Consequences of Financial Reporting  
Quality, Promotor: Prof. E.Peek, EPS-2015-354-F&A,  
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/79037 
 
Ellen, S. ter, Measurement, Dynamics, and Implications of Heterogeneous Beliefs  
in Financial Markets, Promotor: Prof. W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2015-343-F&A,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78191 
 
Erlemann, C., Gender and Leadership Aspiration: The Impact of the  
Organizational Environment, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2016- 
376-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79409 
 
Eskenazi, P.I., The Accountable Animal, Promotor: Prof. F.G.H. Hartmann,  
EPS-2015-355-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78300 
 
Essen, M. van, An Institution-Based View of Ownership, Promotors: Prof. J. van  
Oosterhout & Prof. G.M.H. Mertens, EPS-2011-226-ORG,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22643 
 
Evangelidis, I., Preference Construction under Prominence, Promotor: Prof.  
S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2015-340-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78202 
 
Faber, N., Structuring Warehouse Management, Promotors: Prof. MB.M. de  
Koster & Prof. Ale Smidts, EPS-2015-336-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78603 
 
Fernald, K., The Waves of Biotechnological Innovation in Medicine: Interfirm  
Cooperation Effects and a Venture Capital Perspective, Promotors: Prof.  
E.Claassen, Prof. H.P.G. Pennings & Prof. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2015-371- 
S&E, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/79120 
 
Fliers, P.T., Essays on Financing and Performance: The role of firms, banks and  
board, Promotor: Prof. A. de Jong & Prof P.G.J. Roosenboom, EPS-2016-388- 
F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93019 
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Fourne, S.P., Managing Organizational Tensions: A Multi-Level Perspective on  
Exploration, Exploitation and Ambidexterity, Promotors: Prof. J.J.P. Jansen &  
Prof. S.J. Magala, EPS-2014-318-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76075 
 
Gaast, J.P. van der, Stochastic Models for Order Picking Systems, Promotors:  
Prof. M.B.M de Koster & Prof. I.J.B.F. Adan, EPS-2016-398-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93222 
 
Gharehgozli, A.H., Developing New Methods for Efficient Container Stacking  
Operations, Promotor: Prof. M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2012-269-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/37779 
 
Gils, S. van, Morality in Interactions: On the Display of Moral Behavior by  
Leaders and Employees, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2012-270- 
ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38027 
 
Ginkel-Bieshaar, M.N.G. van, The Impact of Abstract versus Concrete Product  
Communications on Consumer Decision-making Processes, Promotor: Prof.  
B.G.C. Dellaert, EPS-2012-256-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/31913 
 
Gkougkousi, X., Empirical Studies in Financial Accounting, Promotors: Prof. 
G.M.H. Mertens & Prof. E. Peek, EPS-2012-264-F&A,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/37170 
 
Glorie, K.M., Clearing Barter Exchange Markets: Kidney Exchange and Beyond,  
Promotors: Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans & Prof. J.J. van de Klundert, EPS-2014- 
329-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77183 
 
Hekimoglu, M., Spare Parts Management of Aging Capital Products, Promotor:  
Prof. R. Dekker, EPS-2015-368-LIS, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/79092 
 
Heij, C.V., Innovating beyond Technology. Studies on how management  
innovation, co-creation and business model innovation contribute to firm’s  
(innovation) performance, Promotors: Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof. H.W.  
Volberda, EPS-2012-370-STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78651 
 
Heyde Fernandes, D. von der, The Functions and Dysfunctions of Reminders,  
Promotor: Prof. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2013-295-MKT,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41514 
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Heyden, M.L.M., Essays on Upper Echelons & Strategic Renewal: A Multilevel  
Contingency Approach, Promotors: Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof. H.W. 
Volberda, EPS-2012-259-STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/32167 
 
Hoever, I.J., Diversity and Creativity, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, 
EPS-2012-267-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/37392 
Hogenboom, A.C., Sentiment Analysis of Text Guided by Semantics and  
Structure, Promotors: Prof. U. Kaymak & Prof. F.M.G. de Jong, EPS-2015-369- 
LIS, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/79034 
 
Hogenboom, F.P., Automated Detection of Financial Events in News Text,  
Promotors: Prof. U. Kaymak & Prof. F.M.G. de Jong, EPS-2014-326-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77237 
 
Hollen, R.M.A., Exploratory Studies into Strategies to Enhance Innovation- 
Driven International Competitiveness in a Port Context: Toward Ambidextrous  
Ports, Promotors: Prof. F.A.J. Van Den Bosch & Prof. H.W.Volberda, EPS-2015- 
372-S&E, hdl.handle.net/1765/78881 
 
Hoogendoorn, B., Social Entrepreneurship in the Modern Economy: Warm Glow,  
Cold Feet, Promotors: Prof. H.P.G. Pennings & Prof. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2011- 
246-STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26447 
 
Hoogervorst, N., On The Psychology of Displaying Ethical Leadership: A  
Behavioral Ethics Approach, Promotors: Prof. D. de Cremer & Dr M. van Dijke,  
EPS-2011-244-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26228 
 
Hout, D.H. van, Measuring Meaningful Differences: Sensory Testing Based  
Decision Making in an Industrial Context; Applications of Signal Detection  
Theory and Thurstonian Modelling, Promotors: Prof. P.J.F. Groenen & Prof.  
G.B. Dijksterhuis, EPS- 2014-304-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50387 
 
Houwelingen, G.G. van, Something To Rely On, Promotors: Prof. D. de Cremer  
& Prof. M.H. van Dijke, EPS-2014-335-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77320 
 
Hurk, E. van der, Passengers, Information, and Disruptions, Promotors: Prof.  
L.G. Kroon & Prof. P.H.M. Vervest, EPS-2015-345-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78275 
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Hytonen, K.A., Context Effects in Valuation, Judgment and Choice: A  
Neuroscientific Approach, Promotor: Prof. A. Smidts, EPS-2011-252-MKT,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/30668 
 
Iseger, P. den, Fourier and Laplace Transform Inversion with Applications in  
Finance, Promotor: Prof. R. Dekker, EPS-2014-322-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76954 
Jaarsveld, W.L. van, Maintenance Centered Service Parts Inventory Control,  
Promotor: Prof. R. Dekker, EPS-2013-288-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39933 
 
Jalil, M.N., Customer Information Driven After Sales Service Management:  
Lessons from Spare Parts Logistics, Promotor: Prof. L.G. Kroon, EPS-2011-222- 
LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22156 
 
Kappe, E.R., The Effectiveness of Pharmaceutical Marketing, Promotor: Prof. S.  
Stremersch, EPS-2011-239-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23610 
 
Karreman, B., Financial Services and Emerging Markets, Promotors: Prof. G.A.  
van der Knaap & Prof. H.P.G. Pennings, EPS-2011-223-ORG,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22280 
 
Khanagha, S., Dynamic Capabilities for Managing Emerging Technologies,  
Promotor: Prof. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2014-339-S&E,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77319 
 
Kil, J., Acquisitions Through a Behavioral and Real Options Lens, Promotor:  
Prof. H.T.J. Smit, EPS-2013-298-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50142 
 
Klooster, E. van ’t, Travel to Learn: the Influence of Cultural Distance on  
Competence Development in Educational Travel, Promotors: Prof. F.M. Go &  
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Koendjbiharie, S.R., The Information-Based View on Business Network  
Performance: Revealing the Performance of Interorganizational Networks,  
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Koning, M., The Financial Reporting Environment: The Role of the Media,  
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Roosenboom, EPS-2014-330-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77154 
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2014- 333-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77042 
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“There is nothing in this world that does not have a decisive moment.” 
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